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The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era,
1945-2004
ChristopherS. Yoo', Steven G. Calabresi**& AnthonyJ Colangelo~

ABSTRACT: Since the impeachment of President Clinton, there has been
renewed debate over whether Congress can create institutions such as special
counsels and independent agencies that restrict the president's control over
the administration of the law. Initially, debate centered on whether the
Constitution rejected the "executive by committee" used by the Articles of
Confederation in favor of a "unitaryexecutive, "in which all administrative
authority is centralized in the president. More recently, the debate has
focused on historical practices. Some scholars suggest that independent
agencies and special counsels are such established features of the
constitutional landscape that any argument in favor of a unitary executive
is foreclosed by established practice. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, claim
that the New Deal represented a "constitutionalmoment" that ratified big
changes in the distribution of power within the federal government. Still
others argue that the added policymaking role of the modern administrative
state means Congress ought to be able to impose greaterlimits on presidential
control over the execution of the law. To date, however, a full assessment of
the historicalrecord has yet to appear.
This Article is part of a largerproject offering a comprehensive chronicle
of the battles between the president and Congress over control of the
administration of federal law. It reviews the period between 1945 and
2004, paying particular attention to the Clinton impeachment and the
lapse of the independent-counsel statute. The record shows that presidents
from Harry S. Truman through George W Bush consistently defended the
unitariness of the executive branch, vitiating any claim that a custom of
allowing congressionalincursions on the unitary executive has emerged. In
fact, the episodes discussed herein eloquently illustrate both the legal and the
normative arguments supportingthe unitary executive.
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THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen renewed interest in the separation of powers.
Supreme Court decisions striking down the legislative veto,' the line-item
veto,' and congressional attempts to control federal spending through the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act3 led to much academic commentary on the
proper roles of Congress and the president in controlling the execution of
federal law. 4 Much of this scholarship has focused on the constitutionality of
the so-called independent agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which
5
theoretically operate outside of direct presidential control. But the most
dramatic flash point for debates about Congress's ability to limit presidential
authority over the execution of the law has been the use of independent
counsels. 6 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
independent-counsel statute in Morrison v. Olson,7 notwithstanding Justice
Scalia's warning that special prosecutors could be manipulated for political
purposes." The years that followed bore outJustice Scalia's predictions, 9 with

1.

INSv. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
4. Professor Calabresi has been a leading participant in these debates. See Steven G.
Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541 (1994); Steven
G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The StructuralConstitution: UnitaryExecutive, PluralJudiciary, 105
HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
2.
3.

5. See e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19,
31-36; Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215; Geoffrey Miller,
Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and
PresidentialPower: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 608-23 (1989); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 573 (1984); Symposium, The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus of the Administrative Agencies, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1987); Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v.
Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779.
6. For early commentary on the constitutionality of independent counsels, see generally
TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL (1989); Stephen L. Carter,
The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v.
Olson: A FormalisticPerspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 Am. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Shane,
supra note 5, at 598-608; Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on
Abuses of Executive Power,63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983).
7. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
8. Id. at 712-14, 727-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9.
See Archibald Cox & Philip B. Heymann, After the Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1999, at A19; Benjamin Ginsberg & Martin Shefter, Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. &
POL. 497 (1995). For an analysis of the separation-of-powers impact of the political abuse of
independent counsels, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the UnitaryExecutive,
48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 90-95 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments]; Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Structural Consequences of the Increased 1 rse of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11
J.L. & POL. 521 (1995).
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the eventual initiation of politically controversial impeachment proceedings
against President Clinton. In the wake of the Clinton impeachment, the
statute authorizing independent counsels was allowed to lapse in 1999
because it had completely lost the support of both major parties in
Congress.
Scholarly debate has focused on whether the Constitution created a
"unitary executive" in which all executive authority is centralized in the
president, rather than the "executive by committee" that existed under the
Articles of Confederation. Participants in the debate have examined the
Constitution's text' and ratification history" to determine whether it
rejected the plural executive used by the Articles of the Confederation and
many state constitutions in favor of a structure in which all administrative
authority was concentrated in a single person." To the extent that
commentators have focused on the post-ratification history with respect to
this issue, they have concentrated on the practices during the presidential
administrations immediately following the Founding. 3 Moreover, some of
the historical treatments to date suggest that arguments in favor of the
unitary executive have been foreclosed by the sweep of more than two
centuries of consistent contrary practice. 4 Others have offered the more

10.
Compare, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 4 (arguing that the Article II Vesting Clause,
bolstered by other constitutional provisions, represents a substantive grant of constitutional
power), Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4 (same), and Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4 (same),
with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 47-55, 119 (1994) (disagreeing with Professor Calabresi's views), and A. Michael Froomkin,
The ImperialPresidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994) (same).
11.
Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 603-05 (arguing that the
preratification history supports the unitary executive), and Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential
Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 753-89, 808-12 (same), with Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755-810 (1996) (drawing the opposite
conclusion), and Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 123, 138-53 (1994) (same).
12. The position that the Constitution of 1787 established a unitary executive has found
general acceptance among courts, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.52, 110-33 (1926); Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981); among historians, see JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONsTITuTION 250-53, 257-58
(1996); and even among leading critics of the unitary executive, see Strauss, supra note 5, at 599601; Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 432-33 (1987).
13.
See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 635-63; Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation
of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989); Gerhard Casper,
Executive-CongressionalSeparation of Power Duringthe Presidency of ThomasJefferson, 47 STAN. L. REV.
473 (1995); Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the First Year of
Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 82-111 (1993); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 5-84; Prakash,
supra note 11, at 789-800.
14.

See FORREST McDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 180

n.35 (1994). ("[M]ore than 200 years of practice under the Constitution ... render a strict
separation [of powers] impossible."); Flaherty, supra note 11, at 1816 (suggesting that a
common law constitutionalist would regard the past 200 years of practice under the
Constitution "dispositive" in foreclosing the unitary vision of the executive); Tiefer, supra note
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limited historical claim that non-unitariness has only been an established
practice since the New Deal. Some of those offering such arguments have
candidly acknowledged the incompleteness of the current literature and
have recognized the need for a more thorough assessment of the historical
record of presidential control over the execution of the law.'
We have tried to fill this void by embarking on a four-article series
examining the history of the president's ability to execute the law. In The
Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century,1 6 we analyzed the first seven
presidencies under the Constitution to determine the view of presidential
power held by the incumbents between 1789 and 1837. In so doing, we paid
particular attention to what is generally recognized as the first great clash
between the president and Congress over control of the administration of
the law: AndrewJackson's removal of his Treasury Secretary during his battle
with the Bank of the United States. 7 Writing in 1997, when the institution of
independent counsels still enjoyed broad support among both politicians
and academic commentators,' we
called for and predicted the demise of
9
the independent counsel statute.1
We continued our project in The UnitaryExecutive During the Second HalfCentury,"0 beginning with Martin Van Buren's presidency in 1837 up through
the end of the first Administration of Grover Cleveland in 1889. In the
process, we offered an extended discussion of the second great conflict over
the unitary executive: the impeachment of AndrewJohnson for violating the
Tenure of Office Act. 2' The period closed with a series of landmark events,
including the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1883, the creation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 (the agency that would

6, at 103 ("From the creation of the government's structure by the First Congress, through the
development of the modern agency, and down to the present, the status of agencies has not
been a unitary or monolithic one."); see also Miller, supra note 5, at 83-86 (finding past
presidents' failure to consistently oppose independent agencies problematic, but ultimately
insufficient to constitute acquiescence).
15.
See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 84 n.334 (noting that "a full account of the
growth of presidential power" would allow consideration of "the enormously significant and
self-conscious changes in the role of the presidency from the period following Jackson through
Franklin Roosevelt").
16.
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During theFirst HalfCentury, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1451 (1997).
17.
Id. at 1538-59.
18.
See Ken Gormley, Monica Lewinsky, Impeachment, and the Death of the Independent Counsel
Law: What Congress Can Salvagefrom the Wreckage-A Minimalist View, 60 MD.L. REv. 97, 101-02
(2001) (noting that as of the end of 1997 the independent-counsel statute still enjoyed broad
support and that the abruptness with which people abandoned it came as a shock).
19.
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1462.
20.
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second HalfCentury, 26 HAR.J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 668 (2003).
21.

Id. at 746-58.
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eventually become the model for all subsequent independent agencies), and
the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act in 1887.2
In The UnitaryExecutive Duringthe Third Half-Century,23 we continued our
survey of presidents from Benjamin Harrison through Franklin D. Roosevelt.
In the process, we carefully analyzed FDR's failed attempt to implement the
Brownlow Committee's proposal to reorganize the executive branchrecognized to be a watershed moment in the history of the president's
control over law execution. 4 This period plays a key role in arguments about
the unitariness of the executive branch. Many constitutional theorists, led by
Bruce Ackerman, regard the New Deal era as a constitutional moment that
ratified big changes in the allocation of power within the federal
government. 5 This period also witnessed the rise of the so-called
independent agencies, which had been languishing in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's decision in Myers v. United States.'6 The anti-unitarian
position did not receive any material support until 1935, when the Supreme
Court reversed decades of precedent and upheld the constitutionality of
congressionally imposed limitations:on presidential power to remove 7officers
charged with executing the law in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.
.Our prior three articles have shown that each of the first thirty-two
presidents-from George Washington up through Franklin D. Rooseveltbelieved in a unitary executive of the kind defended by many scholars in
recent years. We now pick up the survey where we left off and examine the
presidencies during the fourth half-century of our constitutional history to
see the views expressed by presidents from Harry Truman through George
W. Bush regarding the scope of the president's power to execute the law. As
in our previous articles, in conducting our historical review of presidential
practices, we employ the interpretive method known as "departmentalism"
or "coordinate construction." This approach holds that all three branches of
the federal government have the power and duty to interpret the
Constitution and that the meaning of the Constitution is determined
through the dynamic interaction of all three branches. 2 8" The relevant
inquiry is whether a long-standing and unbroken practice exists in which
both Congress and presidents have acquiesced. Only if that is the case can
22. Id. at 788-89, 795-99.
23. Christopher S. Yoo et al, The UnitaryExecutive During the Third Half-Centluy, 1889-1945,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2004).
24. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2274-75 (2001);
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 84 n.334; Miller, supra note 5, at 79, 85.
25.
See, e.g., I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-08 (1991); Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 845-96 (1995).
26. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding unconstitutional a statute purporting to prevent the
President from removing postmasters without the advice and consent of the Senate).
27. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). For our discussion of Humphrey's Executor, see Yoo et al., supra
note 23, at 84-89.

28.

See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1463-72.
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one justifiably claim that a practice has become established."' Our
methodology resembles that followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v.
Chadha which relied on the fact that eleven of thirteen presidents from
Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan had refused to accede to the legislative
veto in rejecting arguments that the legislative veto had become accepted
under the separation of powers."
Our historical account focuses primarily on the three devices generally
viewed as necessary to any theory of the unitary executive: the president's
power to remove subordinate policy-making officials at will, the president's
power to direct the manner in which subordinate officials exercise
discretionary executive power, and the president's power to veto or nullify
such officials' exercises of discretionary executive power. We do not claim
that there is consensus among all three branches of government as to the
president's control of the removal power and of the powers to direct and
nullify. Rather, we claim only that there is no consistent, three-branch
custom, tradition, or practice to which presidents have acquiesced
permitting congressionally-imposed limits on the president's sole power to
execute the law.
In the words of political scientist David E. Lewis,
"Presidents usually oppose attempts to insulate" the bureaucracy from their
control. 34 We thus reject claims that arguments regarding the proper
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches have
been effectively foreclosed by history. Instead, we contend that such
arguments must be resolved based on their legal and normative merits.
We begin in Parts I through X below with a discussion of the ten
presidencies between 1945 and 2004. In Part XI, we pay particularly close

29. For the classic statement of this position, see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 474 (1915). For other examples, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 686
(1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J, concurring); Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679-83 (1929); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 170-76 (1926); Stuartv. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
30.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
31.
fd. at 942 n.3.
32.
33.

Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1458.
Id.

34.
DAVID E. LEwiS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL
INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1977, at 15 (2003).

35.
Id. at 24. Conceding that the Constitution's vesting of the executive power in the
president suggests that
presidents are obligated to direct the executive branch of the government. In
order for presidents to successfully carry out their oath of office, it is their
responsibility to make sure the policies of the U.S. government are implemented
effectively. To do so, they need control of the administrative apparatus of
government. In short, they need the types of administrative structures that
maximize presidential control.
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attention to the rise and fall of the Ethics in Government Act, which created
so-called independent counsels to prosecute wrongdoing by senior executive
branch officials. We shall see that the history of the Ethics in Government
Act is strikingly similar to the history of the Tenure of Office Act and would
end in the Act's demise, just as we predicted in 1997.6 We conclude in Part
XII with a discussion of the path-breaking presidency of George W. Bush.
I.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin D. Roosevelt as president at a time
when the world was consumed by war. Fortunately, as Truman's biographer
Donald R. McCoy points out, his character "enabled him to make much of
his on-thejob training as president. He was brisk, decisive, direct,
industrious, practical, and tough."37 Truman "exercised command
vigorously, ' 38 and he gets high marks as "a supremely tough, decisive
leader"3 9 who from the start was completely in control of his entire
Administration. David McCullough reports that upon being sworn into
office, Truman made clear to Roosevelt's cabinet that "[hie welcomed their
advice. He did not doubt that they would differ with him if they felt it
necessary, but final decisions would be his and he expected their support
once decisions were made."40
Despite his initial determination to continue Roosevelt's policies,
Truman soon realized that "there could be no Truman administration
unless he had his own people in office" 41 and had a cabinet that was "in
entire sympathy with what I wanted to do,"42 Truman therefore acted swiftly
to assemble his own White House staff. Six months into his presidency, only
43
three of the ten cabinet members Truman inherited from FDR remained.
Roosevelt,"4
had
than
subordinates
Truman relied "more heavily on his top
and he "had daily meetings with his chief White House aides and at least
weekly meetings with cabinet members."45 McCoy describes Truman's
position as follows:
Cabinet members were to help the president "carry out policies of
the government; in many instances the Cabinet could be of
tremendous help to the President by offering advice whether he
liked it or not but when [the] President (gave] an order they
36.

Calabresi &Yoo, supra note 16, at 1462.

37.

DONALD R. McCoy, THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRYS. TRUVAN 15 (1984).

38.

Id. at 22.

39.

Id. at 65.

40.
41.

DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 348 (1992).
McCoy, supra note 37, at 17.

42.

Id. at 18.

43.

Id. at 19.

44.

Id. at 16.

45.

Id
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should carry it out. I told them I expected to have a Cabinet I could
depend on and take in my confidence and if this confidence was
not well placed I would get a Cabinet in which I could place
confidence."46
When cabinet members did not execute the law in accordance with
Truman's wishes, he did not hesitate to remove them or force them to
resign. For example, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson was told to
resign because of his "conflicts with other officials, his verbal indiscretions,
his chumminess with Republicans, and his slowness in conforming to new
policies during a war." 47 Even more dramatic was the forced resignation of
Attorney General J. Howard McGrath. The sequence of events that led to
McGrath's undoing began on February 1, 1952, when Truman appointed
Newbold Morris as a special prosecutor to investigate alleged corruption in
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Department of Justice's Tax
Division, only the fifth occasion in history in which a special prosecutor had
been named. After Morris attempted to identify senior Justice Department
officials who might have taken bribes by preparing a lengthy questionnaire
intended to identify those officials whose lifestyles outstripped their salaries,
McGrath ordered that the questionnaires not be distributed. When Morris
then sought access to McGrath's official and personal records, McGrath
fired Morris, which in turn prompted Truman to fire McGrath later that
same day.48 The investigation was then completed by Judge James P.
McGranery, who succeeded McGrath as Attorney General. Truman
disagreed with McGrath's actions as a matter of policy; at no point, however,
did Truman suggest that McGrath lacked the authority to dismiss Morris.
As befitting a person with a plate on his desk proclaiming "[t]he buck
stops here, " 5° Truman exerted direct supervisory control over other aspects
of his Administration as well. Truman listened to and relied upon his White
House staff and the Bureau of the Budget, but it was always "clear he was the
boss, the person on whose desk 'the buck stops.' For all their influence, they
were advisors, not executives or policy makers." 5 Truman is also seen by
2
some as "creatting] the institution of the presidency" 5 by refining the
structure of the White House staff and increasing the use of the Bureau of
the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the National Security

46.

McCoy, supra note 37, at 16 (quoting Harry S.Tnman).

47.

Id. at 236.
Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2316-

48.

17 (1998).
49.

See generally KATY J.

HARRIGER,

INDEPENDENT JUSTICE:

PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 15-16 (1992).
McCoY, supra note 37, at 315.
50.
51. Id. at 147.
52. Id. at 164.

THE

FEDERAL

SPECIAL
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Council. The development of efficient means of using the White House staff
to police the executive branch greatly enhanced the unitary executive.
From the outset, Truman defined in no uncertain terms the unitary
nature of executive power in military and foreign policy matters. Indeed,
Truman's "first major act after the election in November [1949] had been to
instruct the State Department to open negotiations for the new alliance
[NATO], and he rightly considered it his treaty."Ss And when faced with the
incredibly burdensome and historical decision of whether the atomic bomb
would be used against the Japanese, Truman took full personal
responsibility as Commander in Chief.54 After the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, Truman informed his cabinet that there was to be "no further use
of atomic bombs without his express permission."55 As Truman saw it, "the
real issue was one of broad policy and that the bomb must not be the
responsibility of anyone other than the president, because of his
constitutional role as both Commander in Chief and Chief Magistrate."56
By the summer of 1950, Truman found himself being drawn into a
major undeclared war in Korea. 57 This was a significant exercise of executive
power, and Truman was to proceed on his own authority: He "had been
advised to proceed on the basis of presidential authority alone and not
bother to call on Congress for a war resolution. ' 5" This decision was
characteristic of President Truman. He always kept in mind how his actions
would affect future presidential authority. 9
And although prominent advisors such as General Bradley, among
others, seriously objected to General Douglas MacArthur's planned invasion
at Inchon, Truman backed the plan. As David McCullough observes,
In time to come, little would be said or written about Truman's
part in the matter-that as Commander in Chief he, and he alone,
was the one with the final say in Inchon. He could have said no,
and certainly the weight of opinion among his military advisers
would have been on his side. But he did not. He took the chance,
made the decision for which he was neither to ask nor receive
anything like the credit he deserved.60
The conflict would also lead to one of the most dramatic removals ever
in American history when Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur of
his command of U.S. troops in Korea for insubordination and open

53.
54.

MCCUI LOUGH, supra note 40, at 735.
Id. at 442.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 460.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 226-27.
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 40, at 780.
Id. at 789.

60.

Id. at 797.
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intervention in the political arena. Truman believed that MacArthur's
actions posed "a danger to the fundamental principle of civilian supremacy
over the military." 61 Against the President's direct policy of a cease-fire
proposal, MacArthur had issued a communiqu6 to the Chinese communists
in which he threatened to expand the war into the Chinese mainland. 62
MacArthur then, in a letter to House Minority LeaderJoe Martin, voiced his
opposition to the President's policy. 63 Truman, who had already lost faith in
MacArthur as a general, decided on his own and again after meeting with
the Joint Chiefs, that MacArthur was to be fired.6 4 The criticism Truman
received from Congress and the country was overwhelming. For example:
The full Republican leadership held an angry emergency meeting
in Joe Martin's office at 9:30 in the morning, after which Martin
talked to reporters of "impeachments," the accent on the plural.
"We might want the impeachments of 1 or 50." A full-dress
congressional investigation of the President's war policy was in
order.65
Yet Truman would not budge and was completely unintimidated; he felt his
decision was wholly within his prerogative as Commander in Chief.66 The
hearings proceeded, but interest in MacArthur faded.
While some spoke of Truman's firing of MacArthur as a courageous act,
Truman would respond that "[c]ourage didn't have anything to do with
it.... General MacArthur was insubordinate and I fired him. That's all there
was to it.",67 Dean Rusk captured Truman's perspective perfectly with regard
to the President's insistence on executive removal power:
Truman's conflict with MacArthur... was more than a clash of
egos or a contest of wills; Truman was concerned about the
presidency.... I am convinced that 95 percent of Truman's
decision to fire MacArthur hinged on the relationship of the
in Chief to his general and on civilian
President as the Commander
6
control of the military. 8
This highly visible removal illustrates dramatically why the removal power is
so important for the president if he is to be in charge of the executive
branch.

61,

CHESTER

J.

PACH, JR. &

ELMO
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Not only was Truman willing to exercise the removal power; he also
vigorously defended it against congressional attempts to place limits on its
exercise, 69 as evinced by his continuation of the defense of the removal
power in connection with the case of United States v. Lovett,7° begun during
the Roosevelt Administration. 7 1 The Lovett case arose when Congress
attached a rider to an appropriations bill specifying that no federal funds
could be used to pay Lovett and two other named executive branch
employees suspected of holding subversive views. In essence, the issue in
Lovett was whether Congress could use its spending power to, in effect,
remove executive branch employees whom the President wanted to retain.
Although the Court of Claims had decided in favor of the Administration's
position, it failed to provide the strong endorsement of the removal power
that the Administration sought. Dissatisfied with the court's disposal of the
case on nonconstitutional grounds, the Attorney General successfully
petitioned for certiorari in early 1946. 72 The Attorney General's decision to
seek Supreme Court review is telling because the outcome he desired had
prevailed in the Court of Claims. Therefore the Attorney General petitioned
for certiorari not to change the result in the judgment below, but rather to
change its rationale.
The Truman Administration's brief on the merits primarily attacked the
appropriations rider as an impermissible infringement on the President's
power to remove, 73 as did its presentation during oral argument,74 The
Administration's brief specifically stated:
If the President is to perform his constitutional obligation to
execute the laws, he must have power to control the subordinate
officers through whom the executive function is administered. The
principal control which the President has over executive officers is
his power to remove them, and it has been said that he is ... Chief
of the Executive only through his power of removing appointees
who are recalcitrant and unwilling to follow his wishes. Any
exercise of the removal power by the legislative branch necessarily
interferes with the executive power and tends to subject the
executive branch to the control and domination of Congress.75

69.

LEWIS, supra note 34, at 21 (noting that "after Truman ascended to the White House,

his enthusiasm for delegating authority to independent regulatory commissions had waned").
70.
71.

66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945), affd, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
SeeYoo et al., supra note 23, at 82-83.

72. John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigatingthe Separationof Powers, 10 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1975).

73. The Administration's brief devoted some forty-seven pages to its removal argument,
spending the remaining fifteen pages challenging the rider as a bill of attainder. Id. at 28-29
(citing Brief for the Petitioner, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (No. 809)).
74. Id. at 30 & n.86 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Brief for the Petitioner at 15, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (No. 809).
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The Truman Administration's brief further claimed that in England the
power to remove executive officers was vested in the Crown,"76 and the brief
specifically cited the Vesting Clause of Article II as the source of the
President's removal power. 77 The brief concluded its argument against a
congressional power to remove Lovett by showing that the consistent
practice from 1789 up through the 1940s was of presidential, not
78
congressional, power to remove.
Although the Supreme Court did reach the constitutional questions
avoided by the Court of Claims, it upheld the Administration's position on
the grounds that the statute represented a bill of attainder without reaching
the removal issue. 79 As a result, none of the arguments on the removal
power in the Administration's brief found its way into the Supreme Court's
opinion. For the purposes of this Article, however, it is of no consequence
that the Supreme Court chose not to base its resolution of the case on the
removal power. The fact that the Truman Administration strongly opposed
congressional infringement upon the removal power is sufficient to show
that Truman did not acquiesce in this deviation from the unitary executive.
Having failed in its attempt to use its control over appropriations to
remove certain executive officers, Congress tried to remove Commissioner
of the Bureau of Reclamation Michael W. Straus and Regional Reclamation
Director Richard L. Boke by arbitrarily changing the qualifications for their
positions.8 0 Truman complained that this provision, designed as it was to
"effect the removal of two men now holding such positions," was "contrary to
the spirit, if not the letter, of those provisions of the Constitution which
guarantee the separation of legislative and executive functions."8 ' However,
because Congress had already adjourned, Truman felt that he "had no
choice" but to sign the bill. At the same time, Truman indicated that "had
[it] been possible to veto this bill without bringing the vital work of the
Department to a standstill," he would have done so.8 2 Congress persisted the
following year, attaching a provision to a continuing resolution prohibiting
the use of appropriated funds for paying Straus's or Boke's salaries. 83 Again
Truman objected in much the same terms. s4 Perhaps chastened by their
76.
77.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.

78. Id. at 32-48.
79. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 307. The House considered refusing to allocate the money to pay
Watson, Dodd, and Lovett, but in the end voted 99-98 to appropriate the necessary funds. 93
CONG. REc. 2973-75, 2977, 2987-91 (1947) ; see also Ely, supra note 72, at 10 n.32, 31 n.93.
80. Interior Department Appropriation Act, ch, 754, 62 Stat. 1112, 1126 (1948).
81.
Statement by the President on the Interior Department Appropriation Act (June 30,
1948), in 1948 PUB. PAPERS 390.
82. Id.
83. Temporary Appropriations Act of 1949, ch. 101, 63 Star. 67.
84. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Temporary Appropriations Bill (May 12,
1949), in 1949 PUB. PAPERS 250 (1964).
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defeat in Lovett, Congress finally backed down the following month when it
deleted the changes in these offices'
qualifications without having forced
5
Straus or Boke out of their posts.8
Truman's insistence that executive power over removals not be sapped
by congressional or other pressures was shown on many other occasions as
well. When a member of Truman's staff, Harry Vaughn, was attacked by the
media and Republicans for accepting a decoration from the Argentine
dictator Juan Peron, Truman responded in blanket fashion: "'No
commentator or columnist names any members of my Cabinet, or my
staff... I name them myself. And when it is time for them to be moved on,
I do the moving-nobody else." '86 As McCullough notes, "[i]t was a
sentiment that had been felt by other presidents before him and would be
often again by more who followed in his place, but that none stated so
openly in so many words."8 7 On another occasion, Republicans in both
houses led by Senator Joseph McCarthy called on Truman to fire his
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, for statements Acheson had made
concerning the case engineered against Alger Hiss by the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, (Acheson had stated to reporters that he
did "'not intend to turn his back on Alger Hiss"'). 88 Acheson offered to
resign, but Truman would not consider such a concession. Again, Truman
would not have anyone other than the president "do the moving." 9 When a
reporter mentioned to Truman that some Republicans had called for
Acheson's90resignation, Truman replied that "'Mr. Acheson would remain,'
'Period.
That said, there were occasions on which Truman did not consistently
support the unitariness of the executive branch. Truman equivocated
regarding the president's power to direct and overrule subordinate
executive officials' exercises of discretion, as shown by his Administration
during the consideration of the Reorganization Act of 1945. Although
Truman's initial proposal would have included all of the independent
agencies within the president's reorganization authority, 9' Congress refused
to comply and instead followed the pattern established in the
Reorganization Act of 1939,92 by specifically exempting certain agencies
85.

Interior Department Appropriations Act, ch. 680, 63 Stat. 765, 778-79 (1949); see also

Note, 1949 PUB. PAPERS 250.

86.
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 40, at 737 (quoting Truman in The Presidency, TIME, Mar. 7,
1949, at 24).
87.
Id.
88.

Id. at 759 (quoting DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE

DEPARTMENT 360 (1st ed. 1969)).
89.
Id.at 737.
90. Id. at 814.
91. Letter from President Truman to the 79th Congress of the United States (May 24,
1945), inH.R. REP. No. 79-971, at 1-2 (1945).
92.

SeeYoo et al., supra note 23, at 93-107.
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from the Act altogether and by strictly limiting the degree to which certain
93
other agencies could be reorganized. Truman also implicitly condoned
another deviation from the unitariness of the executive branch when he
recommended that Congress incorporate the legislative-veto provision of the
941
1939 reorganization statute into the 1945 version. Congress, of course,
took Truman at his word and included a two-house legislative veto into the
1945 Act.9 5 Truman also tolerated the enactment of other legislative vetoes
96
throughout his first term.
Truman began to offer greater resistance to such intrusions after he
won reelection in his own right. Building on the recommendations of the
First Hoover Commission, 97 Truman asked in 1949 that Congress make the
Reorganization Act of 1945, ch. 582, § 5, 59 Stat. 613, 615-16; see also H.R. REP. NO. 7993.
971, at 6, 10-11 (1945); S.REP.No. 79-638, at 4-5 (1945).
94. Truman noted that under that arrangement, "necessary control is reserved to the
Congress since it may, by simple majority vote of the two Houses, nullify any action of the
President which does not meet with its approval." Letter from President Truman to the
Congress of the United States (May 24, 1945), in H.R. REP. NO.79-971, at 2.
95.
§ 6(a), 59 Stat. at 613, 616. The Senate even dallied with shifting to a one-house
legislative veto, S. REP. No. 79-638, supra note 93, at 3, but in the end it hacked down and
retained the two-house veto. Robert W. Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by
CongressionalResolutions and Committees, 66 HARV.L. REV. 569, 581 n.46 (1953) (citing 91 CONG.
REc. 10,269-74, 10,714 (1945)).
96. For a discussion of other legislative vetoes accepted during Truman's first term, see
Ginnane, supra note 95, at 583-86, 603-04. See generally Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto:
Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROS., Autumn 1993, at 273, 283 [hereinafter Fisher,
Legislative Veto]; Louis Fisher, Separationof Pomers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. L. REV.
57, 80 (1990) [hereinafter Fisher, InterpretationOutside the Courts]; H. Lee Watson, Comment,
Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL, L REV. 983, 1019-21
(1975).
97. The Commission called for a clear line of control from the President to these
deparunent and agency heads and from him to their subordinates. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: A
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 1 (1949). The Commission elaborated:
Responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority-the power to
direct. The exercise of authority is impossible without a clear line of command
from the top to the bottom, and a return line of responsibility and accountability
from the bottom to the top.
Id. Far from posing a threat to free and responsible government, "strength and unity in an
executive make clear who is responsible for faults in administration and thus enable the
legislature better to enforce accountability to the people." Id. at 2 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO.
70 (Alexander Hamilton)). However, such lines of authority and accountability "[have] been
weakened, or actually broken, in many places and in many ways." Id,at 4. As the Commission
found:
That line of responsibility still exists in constitutional theory, but it has been worn
away by administrative practices, by political pressures, and by detailed statutory
provisions. Statutory powers often have been vested in subordinate officers in such
a way as to deny authority to the President or a department head.
Id. at 4; see also Letter from Herbert Hoover to Kenneth McKellar, President pro tempore,
United States Senate (Jan. 13, 1949), in S. REP. No.81-232, at 3 (1949) ("[W]e must reorganize
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president's authority to reorganize the government permanent and extend
it to cover all governmental agencies, including the independent regulatory
commissions. (Surprisingly, "it was the Republican Congress of 1947-48 that
created the Hoover Commission to reorganize the executive branch with an
eye toward presidential control.") 98 In Truman's eyes, "the new
reorganization act should be comprehensive in scope; no agency or function
of the executive branch should be exempted from its operation." gg Truman's
growing support for the unitariness of the executive branch, however, was
still incomplete: his recommendation continued to condone the legislative
veto procedure contained in the Reorganization Acts of 1939 and 1945
"whereby a reorganization plan submitted to the Congress by the President
becomes effective in 60 days unless rejected by both Houses of Congress."'0 0
Congress accepted the gist of Truman's proposal and removed all of the
exemptions, except for those governing the Comptroller General and the
General Accounting Office. Congress did exact a price for surrendering its
ability to protect specific agencies that were of special interest to its

the executive branch to give it the simplicity of structure, the unity of purpose, and the clear
line of executive authority that was originally intended under the Constitution."). Therefore,
the Commission recommended that all agencies be placed within executive departments and
that all independent authorities granted to subordinate executive officials by statute or
appropriations rider be eliminated. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCI I OF THE GOV'T,
supra, at 32, 34. The Commission also recommended that Congress not exempt any agencies
from the President's reorganization authority, including in particular the independent
regulatory commissions. Furthermore, Congress should not place any limitations based on an
agency's "independent exercise of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions," Id. at xi. Such
phrases are too "vague and of uncertain meaning" and would only inhibit the President's
proper control over the executive branch. Id.
98. LEWIS, supra note 34, at 55.
99. Message from President to the Congress (Jan. 17, 1949), in S. REP. NO. 81-232, at 4, 5.
100. Id. at 5. In support of this proposal, the Attorney General's Office issued a
memorandum repudiating Attorney General Mitchell's formalist critique of the legislative veto.
The memorandum reasoned that legislative vetoes did not represent "an improper legislative
encroachment upon the Executive in the performance of functions delegated to him by the
Congress .... [T]he authority given to the President to reorganize the Government is legally
and adequately vested in the President when the Congress takes the initial step of passing a
reorganization act." Thus Congress simply reserved "the right to disapprove action taken by the
President under the statutory grant of authority." Letter and Memorandum from Peyton Ford,
Assistant to the Attorney General, toJohn L. McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Expenditures (Mar. 17, 1949), repqinted inS. REP. NO. 81-232, at 18, 20.
In fact, the memorandum did not regard the legislative veto as being any more sinister
than a provision requiring that the executive branch report its intended actions to Congress
and then wait for a specified period of time:
It cannot be questioned that the President in carrying out his Executive functions
may consult with whom he pleases .... There would appear to be no reason why
the Executive may not be given express statutory authority to communicate to the
Congress his intention to perform a given Executive function unless the Congress
by some stated means indicates its disapproval.

Id. at 20.
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members: it added the requirement that all proposed changes to certain
agencies be contained in a single reorganization plan unmingled with
reorganizations affecting other agencies and broadened the two-house
legislative veto into a one-house legislative veto.
Truman immediately used this authority to assert greater presidential
control over the independent agencies. Again building off of the
112
recommendations of the First Hoover Commission , Truman submitted a
reorganization plan on June 20, 1949, making sweeping changes to bring
the United States Maritime Commission under more direct control of the
executive branch .i The following year, Truman submitted a similar series
of plans proposing centralization of the executive and administrative
functions of all of the independent agencies in the Chairman and making
10 4
the Chairman appointable and removable at will by the president.
Congress's response demonstrated the legislative veto's effectiveness in
interfering with the proper functioning of the executive branch. Even
though Congress had dropped the specific exemptions for the independent
agencies from the Reorganization Act of 1949, Congress was still able to
frustrate Truman's efforts to assert greater control over the ICC, FCC, and

101.
Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, § 6(a), 63 Stat. 203, 205. See generally Ginnane,
supra note 95, at 581-82; Watson, supra note 96, at 1013, 1014 n.143.
102. Although the Commission stopped short of the Brownlow Committee's challenge to
the independent agencies' constitutionality, it still leveled several criticisms at their structure.
First, it complained that the independent agencies' exercise of executive authority was
cumbersome and badly coordinated with the rest of the executive branch. Therefore, the
Commission recommended that "all administrative responsibility be vested in the chairman of
the commission," and that a number of executive functions be transferred to Cabinet
Departments. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 5, 12-13 (1949). Finally, the Commission's task
force recommended that the President be given the authority to designate and remove at will
the particular commissioners who would serve as Chairman. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS app. N.
at viii, 13-14, 31-33 (1949). For similar views, see ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
RFGUI.ATORY COMMISSIONS 683-84 (1941).
103.
Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1949, 3 C.F.R. 1001 (1949-1953). Another plan abolished the
United States Maritime Commission and transferred its functions in part to the Secretary of
Commerce and in part to the newly constituted, semi-independent Federal Maritime Board
within the Commerce Department. Reorg. Plan No. 21 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1012 (1949-1953); see
also ltzhak Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 57 CAL. L. REv. 866, 903 n.180
(1969).
Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1950, H.R. DOc. No. 81-511, at 1, 2, (1950) (ICC); Reorg. Plan
104.
No. 8 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1005 (1949-1953) (FTC); Reorg. Plan No. 9 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1005
(1949-1953)(FPC); Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1949-1953) (Securities and
Exchange Commission); Reorg. Plan No. 11 of 1950, H.R. DOc. No. 81-515 (1950) (FCC);
Reorg. Plan No. 12 of 1950, H.R. DOc. NO. 81-516, at I, 2, (1950) (NLRB); Reorg. Plan No. 13
of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1949-1953) (Civil Aeronautics Board).
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NLRB by10 exercising
its legislative veto over the plans to reorganize those
5
agencies.
Perhaps in response to the mischief caused by these legislative vetoes,
Truman began objecting to the legislative veto as an improper interference
with the independence of the executive branch. Truman's first protest arose
when Congress revived the provision requiring that government
publications be subject to the prior approval of the Joint Committee on
Printing'0 6 that had drawn the wrath of both Presidents Wilson and Hoover
several decades earlier.."7 Truman signed this legislation, but objected to it
as an "invasion of the rights of the executive branch by a legislative
committee." ° 8 Although Truman acknowledged Congress's right to establish
printing policies and to place limits on the printing activities of the
executive branch, "restrictions imposed by the Congress should be left to the
executive agencies to administer. " 1°9 Although Truman did propose
substitute
legislation to eliminate this problem, Congress took no action on
I0
it.
Truman offered even stronger resistance to subsequent congressional
efforts to control executive discretion. In 1951, when Congress attempted to
enact a provision requiring that all significant military real estate projects be
approved in advance by the Armed Services Committees similar to one that
Roosevelt had previously tolerated,"' l Truman drew the line. Concerned by
Congress's increasing tendency to attempt to influence the execution and
administration of the laws, Truman vetoed the legislation. As Truman
reasoned, "Under our system of Government it is contemplated that the
Congress will enact the laws and will leave their administration and
execution to the executive branch."" l2 The House voted 312 to 68 to
override the veto. 3 The Senate, however, took no action, and the veto
stood. Four months later, however, Congress was able to frustrate Truman's

105.

96 CONG. REc. 6886 (1950) (reporting the Senate's rejection of Reorganization Plan

No. 12 (NLRB)); id. at 7173 (reporting the Senate's rejection of Reorganization Plan No. 7
(ICC)); id. at 7177 (reporting the Senate rejection's of Reorganization Plan No. 11 (FCC)); see
also Angel M. Moreno, Presidentiat Coordinationof the Independent Regulator, Proress, 8 ADMIN. LJ.
AM. U. 461, 486 (1994)

(citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT

COMMISSION 134-37 (1955)).
106. Act ofJuly 5, 1949, ch. 296, 63 Stat. 405, 406.
107.
SeeYoo et al., supra note 23, at 51-52.
108. Statement by the President on Government Printing and Binding (July 5, 1949), in
1949 PUB. PAPERS 346, 347.
109. Id.
110. Watson, supranote 96, at 1019 (citingJOSEPH P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 218 (1964)).
111.
SeeYoo et al., supra note 23, at 92.
112. Veto of Bill Relating to Land Acquisition and Disposal Actions by the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Federal Civil Defense Administration (May 15, 1951), in 1951 PUB. PAPERS 280, 282.
113.

97 CONG. REG. 5434, 5444-45 (1951).
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efforts to oppose the legislative veto by attaching an almost identical
provision to the Military Construction Act of 1951. 14 Because of the urgent
need for the legislation, the President had no choice but to sign it." 5
Truman continued his opposition to legislative vetoes the following year
when he pocket vetoed a bill that would have required the Postmaster
General to "come into agreement" with the Public Works Committees
before consummating lease-purchase contracts for the construction of post
offices. Truman objected because the bill "contain[ed] a provision which
would infringe upon the functions of the Executive branch to such an extent
that I feel I cannot give my approval." 1 6 According to Truman, it was
improper to "giv[e] Committees veto power over executive functions
authorized by the Congress to be carried out by executive agencies."' 1 7 Thus,
by the end of his term, Truman's metamorphosis into a steadfast opponent
of the legislative veto was complete.
Truman's vigor as president was further illustrated by the frequency of
his vetoes."s In the tradition of that great Democratic president, Andrew
Jackson, Truman liked to portray himself as "the tribune of the people" and
as "the people's president. " 1 9 Truman cast himself as the people's champion
against the special interest groups that held significant sway with Congress.
In the 1948 campaign, he saw the contest as being between "Truman-the
world class champion of peace, prosperity, democracy, and the peoplefighting against special interests at home and authoritarianism abroad."'120 As
Truman said explicitly on September 18, 1948,2 1 at a campaign stop: "The
issue is the people against the special interests."'
Another major exercise of the executive power occurred when Truman
invoked the authority vested in him "by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States" and issued a pair of executive orders directing all cabinet
secretaries to institute programs to ensure nondiscrimination in federal
employment2 2 and in the military.1 3 That these orders were based on the
president's inherent authority appears to have been no accident, as
evidenced by the fact that Truman invoked specific statutory authority when

114. Ch. 434, § 601, 65 Stat. 336, 365,
115.
See Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 96, at 282-83; Ginnane, supra note 95, at 603-04;
Watson, supranote 96, at 1019-20 (citing HARRIS, supra note 110, at 222).
116. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Authorizing the Postmaster General to Lease
Quarters for Post Office Purposes (July 19, 1952), in 1952-53 PUB. PAPERS 488.
117. Id.; see also Fisher, InterpretationOutside the Courts, supra note 96, at 80; Fisher, Legislative
Veto, supra note 96, at 283; Watson, supra note 96, at 1020.
118. McCoy, supra note 37, at 62.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
invoked

Id. at 104, 106.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 161.
Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1943-48).
Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-48). In this second order, Truman also
his authority as Commander in Chief Id.
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issuing a similar executive order mandating nondiscrimination in
government contracting.'2 4 McCoy reports that "by the time Truman left
office, the work of this committee would lead to substantial racial
integration in the military and to fairer procedures for promotion and
training."'2 5 Black Americans
saw these executive orders as "unprecedented
126
since the time of Lincoln."
One of the most famous controversies of the Truman Administration
involved the President's decision to seize the steel mills, which led to the
U.S. Supreme Court's famous Steel Seizure decision-a decision that limits
executive power although in a way that is wholly consistent with the theory
of the unitary executive. "The steel crisis had been brewing since late 1951,
when it became clear that the United Steelworkers wanted a large wage
increase."127 On April 8, 1952, Truman directed his Commerce Secretary,
Charles Sawyer, "to take over and continue the operation of the steel mills,
because a 'work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our
national defense.1 28 Signing Executive Order No. 10340, Truman saw his
emergency action as mandated and sanctioned by his office. "These are not
normal times" he stated, "I have to think of our soldiers in Korea... the
weapons and ammunition they need." 129 Significantly:
[f] rom his reading of history, Truman was convinced his action fell
within his powers as President and Commander in Chief. In a state
of national emergency, Lincoln had suspended the right to habeas
corpus, he would point out. Tom Clark, now on the Supreme Court,
had once, as Attorney General, advised him that a President, faced
with a calamitous strike, had the 'inherent' power to prevent a
paralysis of the national economy.0
[Truman] acknowledged the power of Congress to supersede his
policy and act on its. own to pass a new law enabling the
124. Exec. Order No. 10,308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-53); see also United States v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that Truman issued these orders
pursuant to his "war powers"); Contractors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor, 442. F.2d 159, 169 (3d Cir.
1971) (concluding that Truman issued these orders pursuant to his "national defense powers,"
while referencing several statutory bases); Note, Executive Order 11,246 and Reverse Discrimination
Challenges: PresidentialAuthority to Require Affirmative Action, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 376, 382-83, 387
(1979) (concluding that Truman's order was issued under his "presidential war powers" and
'national defense powers" rather than under any statutory authority). But see Andr6e Kahn
Blumstein, Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way: The Case for Delimiting Presidential Power Under
Executive OrderNo. 11,246, 33 VAND. L. REv. 921, 924 (1980) (suggesting that Truman based the
executive orders on statutory grounds).
125. MCCoY, supra note 37, at 109.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
id. at 290.
Id. at 291.

129.

MCCULLOUGH, supra note 40, at 896.

130.

Id. at 896-97.
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government to operate the mills as an emergency measure. Such
legislation, he said, might be "very desirable." But Congress did not
calls for
choose to grant him such power. Instead, there were
1 31
congressional investigations, calls for his impeachment.
Truman's action, in fact, led to an uproar, with members of the House
calling for impeachment and members of the Senate attempting to restrict
the use of federal funds for the steel mills. Furthermore, several attempts
were made to resolve the crisis through litigation. 3'2 The district court issued
an order enjoining the seizure on April 29th, and the government took the
case directly up to the Supreme Court for its resolution."
In its brief in the Steel Seizure case, the Truman Administration
vigorously pressed the view that the Vesting Clause of Article II is a
generalized grant of power to the president. The Administration's brief
explicitly said:
Section 1 of Article 11 provides that "the executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America." In our view,
this clause constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which
the government is capable. Remembering that we do not have a
parliamentary form of Government but rather a tripartite system
which contemplates a vigorous executive, it seems plain that Clause
1 of Article II cannot be read as a mere restricted definition which
would leave the Chief Executive without ready power to deal with
emergencies.'S4
The brief also pointed to the Take Care Clause, as construed in
Cunningham v. Neagle'5 and in In re Debs1 6 as justifying President Truman's
seizure of the steel mills. 37 The brief went on to note numerous actions by
presidents where property was taken in wartime, beginning with the War of
1812 and continuing "during the administrations of Presidents Lincoln,
Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt.""8 The brief also cited Inland Waterways Corp.

Id. at 899.
132.
McCoy, supra note 37, at 292.
133. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C.), affd, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
134.
Brief for Petitioner at 96-97, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (Nos. 744 and 745) (citing
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)); THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89
131.

(1913); CHARLES THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789, chs. 4-5 (1922); THE

FEDERALIST, Nos. 70 AND 71; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Sept. 15,
1790), in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 313, 338 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904)).
supra note 23, at 12135 U.S. 1 (1890). For our review of the Neaglecase, see Yoo et al.,
135.
16.
136.
158 U.S. 564 (1895). For our review of the Debs case, see Yoo et al., supra note 23, at
18-20.
137. Brief for Petitioner at 98, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (Nos. 744 and 745).
138.

Id. at 103-05.
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v. young19 and United States v. Midwest Oil Co.140 for the proposition that
constitutional power "when the text is doubtful, may be established by
usage."' 4 '
The Steel Seizure case involved a far more sweeping claim of executive
power than we assert when we say the Vesting and Take Care Clauses give
the president power over removals and law execution. Thus, for our
purposes, the fact that the Truman Administration also claimed those
clauses enabled it to seize the steel mills means only that Truman is another
in a long line of presidents to read the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of
power to the president alone. The Supreme Court, of course, rebuffed the
Truman Administration in the Steel Seizure case and, most damagingly, Justice
Robert Jackson explicitly said in his famous concurrence that the Article II
Vesting Clause is a mere designation of the title of the president and is not
an affirmative grant of the executive power. 14 Other justices did not follow
Jackson on this point, with Justice Felix Frankfurter in his concurrence
accepting the notion that long-established custom or usage could be a "gloss
14
3
on the 'executive power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.,
Obviously, given that this series of Articles is premised on the notion that
presidential construction of the Vesting and Take Care Clauses as
authorizing a presidential power over removal and law execution is
supported by a tradition of executive branch construction over the last 215
years, we would disagree with this view.
We agree with the Court's ruling in Youngstown that the President's
executive power did not authorize a seizure of the steel plants on the facts
presented in that case. We think this does not change the fact, however, that
the Vesting Clause of Article II is a sweeping grant of power to the President,
as the Truman Administration argued it was. Thus, by the end of his tenure
in the White House, Truman had adopted a position largely consistent with
the unitary executive, strongly defending the President's removal power,
using his reorganization powers to assert his control over the independent
agencies, and objecting to the legislative veto as an unconstitutional
infringement on the President's power to execute the laws. Truman stopped
short of condemning the independent agencies as unconstitutional and did
permit the enactment of a few additional legislative vetoes without
registering any objection. 44 Yet, Truman's level of opposition to
congressional infringements on the unitary executive on constitutional

139.

309 U.S. 517, 525 (1940).

140.
141.
142.

236 U.S. 459,472-73 (1915).
Brief for Petitioner at 121, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (Nos. 744 and 745).
343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson,J., concurring in the judgment).

143.
Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
144.
See, e.g., Act of July 15, 1952, ch. 758, § 1413, 66 Stat. 637, 661. See generally Ginnane,
supranote 95, at 604; Watson, supra note 96, at 1020.
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grounds was sufficient to preclude the inference that Truman acquiesced in
them for the purposes of coordinate construction.
II. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
In sharp contrast to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, Dwight
D. Eisenhower did not aspire to be an activist president. As a career soldier,
he considered it his duty to remain above politics, and he consistently strove
to operate behind-the-scenes when guiding national policy. As his
biographers, ChesterJ. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson, observe, "[a] t a time
of widespread discontent with the 'imperial presidency,' restraint in the
exercise of presidential power looked far more attractive than it had a
decade earlier."045 The general consensus of historians, however, is that
Eisenhower "only appeared to be a passive chief executive, He actually used
his power vigorously and deftly, but often behind the scenes, to achieve his
goals." 140 One of the reasons why people believed Eisenhower was not in
control of his Administration was that he would sometimes deliberately duck
questions at press conferences by pretending to garble his syntax. Pach and
Richardson note, "Critics seized upon such responses as evidence that the
president did not know what was going on in his own administration. Usually
147
otherwise."
he did, but his spontaneous oral statements seemed to suggest
Eisenhower's penchant for behind the scenes management of his
Administration has led political scientist Fred I. Greenstein to label "this
method of governing 'hidden-hand leadership.' Eisenhower made the
48
critical policy decisions, but he carefully muffled his responsibility." Pach
and Richardson note that a cost of hidden-hand leadership is that "it created
the appearance that Eisenhower was not in charge of his own
4
administration" even when he was, in fact, highly skilled politically. '
of
in
charge
actively
as
being
Another reason Eisenhower was not perceived
leadership
Eisenhower's
for
delegation.
his Administration was his penchant
style was very much the product of his prior career as a general.
Rather than grapple with matters that puzzled or bored him, he
acted as any general would-he delegated the task to a
subordinate. John Foster Dulles thus handled foreign affairs;
George M. Humphrey shaped economic policy; Sherman Adams
The
took responsibility for a host of domestic matters ....
1 50
president presided over his administration, but he did not run it.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 61, at xii.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at xi.
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Eisenhower also relied heavily upon his Attorney General designate, Herbert
Brownell, Jr., and on his longtime friend and associate, Gen. Lucius D. Clay,
in picking the other members of his cabinet. 15 ' He was also the first
president to make the Director of the Bureau of the Budget152 -an office of
vital importance to the unitary executive that had been created under the
Harding Administration and moved to the White House by FDR-a member
of the cabinet.5 3
Eisenhower's willingness to delegate responsibility should not be
confused with a lack of willingness to assert control over the conduct of his
Administration:
Contemporaries often misunderstood Eisenhower's style of
leadership; they mistook, for example, his delegation of authority
for his abdication of it. Despite these misapprehensions,
Eisenhower was in control of his presidency from its inception.
Indeed during the months between his election and inauguration,
style of
he carefully organized an administration that reflected his
4
leadership and his assessment of the needs of the nation.5
This style of leadership carried through Eisenhower's presidency. Thus,
at the end of his presidency, when reporters asked him about giving Nixon
more responsibility in light of the upcoming election, Eisenhower
responded flatly "that he alone could make the decisions .... [and] if a
decision had to be made, 'I'm going to decide it according to my
judgment. "15 Later, Eisenhower commented:
I don't see why people can't understand this: No one can make a
decision except me. ... I have all sorts of advisors, and one of the
principal ones is Mr. Nixon.... Now, if you talk about other people
they? No one can because then who is
sharing a decision, how can
56
going to be responsible?
There can be no doubt that Eisenhower executed his office in full
adherence to the principle that the president, and only the president, ran
the executive branch.
Eisenhower took several steps to enhance and assert his authority to
direct and review the actions of his subordinates. When Congress included a
provision in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 requiring the Secretary
of Defense to submit his reorganization plans directly to Congress without

151. Id. at 34.
152. Id. at 37.
153. See Yoo et al., supra note 23, at 60-61, 64-65, 80-81 (detailing the creation of the
Bureau of the Budget under Harding, Coolidge, and FDR).
154. PAcH & RICHARDsON, supra note 61, at 29.
155.

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: SOLDIER AND PRFSIDENT 524 (1990).

156.

Id.at 525.
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presidential oversight,5 7 Eisenhower flatly instructed the Secretary to submit
any such plans to him before transmitting them to Congress." 5 Eisenhower
Hoover
Commission's
unsuccessfully
backed
the
Second
also
recommendation to consolidate all federal legal services in the Department
of Justice. 1 9 Even without such centralization, Eisenhower did not hesitate
to intervene in the legal affairs of the federal government, at one point even
personally drafting part of the brief in Brown v. Board of Education.'60
Indeed, Brown set the stage for one of the most courageous examples of
presidential determination to enforce the law in our nation's history. After
the Court handed down its landmark opinion in Brown, Eisenhower made it
clear that his duty as president and citizen was compliance with the Supreme
Court's order: "The Supreme Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold
the constitutional processes in this country; and I will obey.' 61 Pach and
Richardson note, "Indeed only a day after the decision, Eisenhower asked
of the District of Columbia to set an example of
the Board of Commissioners
"
06
desegregation.
peaceful
In September of 1957, Little Rock, Arkansas, erupted in violent
opposition to court-ordered school integration. Eisenhower denounced the
"mob of extremists" and pledged to use "whatever force may be
necessary ... to carry out the orders of the Federal Court."'6 Hours later,
Eisenhower ordered "Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the army chief of staff, to
dispatch 1,000 paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock"

157. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, § 3, 72 Stat.
514,515.
158. Watson, supra note 96, at 1014 n.143 (citing HARRIS, supra note 110, at 210).
159. The Second Hoover Commission believed that such consolidation of legal services was
required to promote efficiency and policy coordination. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 16-17 (1955).
Other aspects of the Commission's report, such as their recommendation that lawyers be
covered by a separate civil service system in order to insulate them from politicians and career
civil servants, were less favorable to the unitary executive. Id. at 12-14. Even with such
protections, Congress rejected the proposal because of its concerns that the centralization of
legal services would limit their ability to oversee agencies. Neal Devins, Unitariness and
Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 265
(1994); James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice
Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1569, 1582 (1996) (citing JAMES M.
STRiNE, THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL: LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM 71
(1992)).
160. 347 U.S. 83 (1954). For Eisenhower's role in drafting the brief, see Devins, supra note
Frankfurter, and Civil Rights
159, at 284 (citing Norman Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice
Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 817-19 (1987) (interviewing
Philip Elman)).
161. The President's News Conference (May 19, 1954), in 1954 PUB. PAPERS 489, 491, quoted
in PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 61, at 142.
162. PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 61, at 142.
163. Id. at 152-53.
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and federalized the Arkansas National Guard. 64 The President "wanted
Taylor to move quickly in order to demonstrate how rapidly the Army could
respond. Within a few hours, Taylor had five hundred paratroopers of the
101st Airborne Division in Little Rock; another five hundred were there by
nightfall."6 '' Eisenhower felt a critical sense of duty
to protect the Constitution and uphold federal law. Despite his own
reservations about the Brown decision, he could not turn his back
on a mob that tried to substitute its will for that of a federal judge.
"If the day comes when we can obey orders of our Courts only
when we personally approve of them," he reminded Swede Hazlett,
"the end of the American system, as we know it, will not be far
6
,1 6

off.

It was for this reason that Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first
president since Ulysses S. Grant to send troops to the South to protect the
civil rights of African Americans.167 The sending of U.S. troops to Little Rock
"served notice that riotous obstruction of federal court orders might
provoke the armed intervention of the national government, a possibility
that had been unthinkable for eighty years." 66 "[A]t the critical moment, he
lived up to his oath of office. In the process, he convinced most white
southerners that they could not use force to prevent integration." 66
Eisenhower further opposed racial discrimination by renewing and
extending the executive orders first initiated during the FDR and Truman
Administrations' 7 0 prohibiting discrimination in federal contracting and
employment. Unlike his predecessors, Eisenhower explicidy based his orders
on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. 171
The Eisenhower Administration also preserved the unitariness of the
executive branch through his policies with respect to the civil service system.
As of the 1950s, the civil service laws did not impose any substantive limits on
the president's removal power." 7 2 The governing statute provided that
164. ldat 153.
165. AMBROSE, supra note 155, at 447.
166. PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 61, at 154 (quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 157.
169. AMBROSE, supra note 155, at 448.
170. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text; Yoo et al., supra note 23, at 81.
171. Exec. Order No. 10,577, pmbl. & § 4.2, 3 C.F.R. 218, 218, 220-21 (1954-58) (invoking
the president's authority under 5 U.S.C. § 631 (2000); the Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22
Stat. 403; and 3 U.S.C. § 301); Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-53) (invoking the
president's authority under the Act of May 3, 1945, ch. 106, § 214, 59 Stat. 106, 134); see also
Contractors Ass'n of E. Pav. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 1971).
172. See Gerald Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124
U. PA. L. REV.942, 947-72 (1976); see also Maheshwar Nath Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available
to FederalEmployees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 287, 309 (1968) (noting that as
of the end of the 1950s the law did not provide government employees with any remedy against
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officials could be removed from the civil service only "for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of said service." 173 Although on its face this language
would appear to give federal officials covered by the civil service laws
substantive protections against dismissal, both the executive branch and the
courts had repeatedly construed this language as not placing any substantive
limits on the executive branch's unlimited discretion in determining what
constitutes adequate cause for removal. 74 Congress had enacted the
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, giving veterans certain procedural
protections, providing them with written notice of removals, the right to
submit a reply, and the right to appeal adverse disciplinary actions to the
Civil Service Commission. 17 The 1944 legislation did not alter the
substantive standards governing removal, and courts continued to construe
it as not placing any restrictions on the exercise of the president's removal
authority. 176 For example, in Bailey v. Richardson,'77 the D.C. Circuit reviewed
what it regarded as an unbroken 160-year history of judicial noninterference
in removals and concluded, "No function is more completely internal to a
branch of government than the selection and retention or dismissal of its
employees."' 78 The Civil Service Commission was thus limited to conducting
compliance
with procedural
to
ensure
informal
investigations
requirements, 73 even decisions with respect to procedural compliance were
not made binding on agencies until 1948.180
The Supreme Court would acknowledge one narrow restriction on the
president's removal power by protecting federal employees against dismissal
for exercising constitutionally protected activity. 18' Such a limitation was
concededly quite narrow'8 2" and was also consistent with the provisions of the
Civil Service Act of 1883 preventing supervisors from requiring federal

arbitrary removal); Richard A. Merrill, Proceduresfor Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59
VA. L. REV. 196, 199 (1973) (same).
173. Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555.
174. SeeYoo et al., supra note 23, at 11-12, 22-23, 27-28, 36-37, 44-45, 108-09.
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, ch. 359, § 14, 58 Stat. 387, 390.
176. See Levy v. Woods, 171 F.2d 145, 145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Asher v. Forrestal, 71 F.
Supp. 470, 471 (D.D.C. 1947); Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222, 223 (1946). See generally
Yoo et al., supra note 23, at 90-91.
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
177.
178. Id. at 58.
179. See Egon Guttman, The Development and Exercise of Appellate Powers in Adverse Action
Appeals, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 331 (1970).
180. ActofJune 22, 1948, ch. 604, 62 Stat. 575, 575; see Merrill, supra note 172, at 213.
The seminal case is Wieman v. Updegraff 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). See also Pickering
181.
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-75 (1968); Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559
(1956); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Edgerton, J., dissenting), affd
mem. byan equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
182.
See Frug, supra note 172, at 972-74. For example, it does not bar the limits on federal
employees' political activities imposed by the Hatch Act. See Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 558 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1946).
175.
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employees to pay political assessments or engage in political activity in order
to keep their jobs.'85 Most importantly, the Court would subsequently make
clear that the doctrine prohibiting removals for the exercise of
constitutionally protected activity did not apply to removals related to job
performance.8 4 This would be demonstrated most eloquently by the Court's
decision in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,'s5 in which
the Court "summarily denied" the existence of limits on the removal power
'' 6
1
in cases involving "the Federal Government's dispatch of its own affairs.
The Court indicated that the executive branch had the unfettered discretion
to deny a security clearance to an employee of a government contractor
whose garrulousness posed a security risk)8 7
At times, the Civil Service Commission did seek a greater role in
decisions.""' This
of agency
removal
reviewing
the
substance
recommendation was effectively quashed by the harsh criticism of it leveled
by the Second Hoover Commission. As the Commission noted:
A judicial proceeding... leads to the worst kind of supervisoremployee relations because it requires the building of a written
record and the accumulation of formal evidence sufficient to stand
up as a support for the supervisor's action. It relieves the employee
of any necessity for demonstrating his competence and usefulness
to his department, and in effect, guarantees him a job unless his
supervisor can prove in a formal proceeding that he is
incompetent. This leads to working situations which are
intolerable.
If the supervisor acts on his best judgment, he normally
disciplines or separates an employee as soon as the misconduct
occurs or the incompetence is evident. But, if he does so, he may
be unable to substantiate his action judicially because he has not
waited to accumulate documentary evidence. 8 9
The Eisenhower Administration also strongly asserted the unitariness of
the executive branch by exerting control over the independent agencies.
Here, Eisenhower drew again upon the recommendations of the Second
Hoover Commission' 9" and a report by Professor Emmette Redford

183.
184.
185.

See Yoo et al., supra note 23, at 11, 22-23, 27, 36-37.
Picketing,391 U.S. at 573 n.5; Slochower, 350 U.S. at 559.
367 U.S. 886 (1961).

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 896.
Id. at 899.
See 48 U.S. CIVILSERV. COMM'NANN. REP. 41 (1931); Guttman, supra note 179, at 332.
COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON

PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE 96 (1955).

190. The Second Hoover Commission called for greater coordination of government
operations and recommended the transfer of all adjudicative functions of the independent
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requested by the President toward the end of his Administration, which
emphasized the need for greater presidential control over the independent
agencies in order to ensure proper leadership and guidance in policy
development.19' Eisenhower used a wide variety of means to influence the
independent agencies. He conducted policy studies on specific areas of
agency jurisdiction, jawboned individual commissioners, issued policy
statements and suggestions, and notified the commissions about his
192
Eisenhower even tried to turn the
budgetary and legislative priorities.
independent agency commission chairmen into executive officers by giving
them second hats as special assistants to the President. However,
congressional opposition and jealousy from other agency officials quickly
put an end to this practice. 193 Although the Eisenhower Administration did
4
not completely ignore the agencies' supposed independence,'1 there can be
little question that it asserted control over them when possible.
The issue of presidential control over the independent agencies came
to a head when Eisenhower removed Myron Wiener and Georgia Lusk after
they refused to resign from the War Claims Commission, a body created to
provide compensation to persons injured by the enemy during World War
II. Eisenhower based his actions solely on the importance of presidential
superintendence over the execution of federal law, noting that he
"regard[ed] it as in the national interest to complete the administration of

regulatory commissions to a newly created Administrative Court. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE
239-56, 269-82 (1955); see also Moreno, supra note 105, at 487 (citing HERBERT EMMERICH,
FEDERAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 101-28 (1971)).
191.
EMMETTE S. REDFORD, THE PRESIDENT AND THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Nov. 17,
1960) (unpublished report) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). Redford later published a
modified version of this study, in which he concluded, "The President should have
responsibility for leadership and guidance of the commissions in the development of policies to
implement the objectives embodied in law." Emmette S. Redford, The President and the Regulatory
Commissions, 44 TEX. L. REV. 288, 307 (1965). Only when authority over the commissions was
returned to the President could the President fulfill the "constitutional and statutory
responsibilities which separately and cumulatively require his attention to many policy aspects
of regulation" as well as "the expectancy of people that the President will supply unity and
leadership in the execution of the laws." Id. at 308. Therefore, Redford recommended that the
President be given the authority to issue policy guidance to the commissions, to designate and
remove the chairmen of all of the commissions at pleasure, and to have greater latitude to
dismiss commissioners. Id. at 309-12.
192.
See Redford, supra note 191, at 303-04.
Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J.
193.
1395, 1410 (1975).
194. One of Eisenhower's Solicitors General observed that he knew of no case in which the
Administration "'ha[d] precluded an independent agency from presenting its position,' even
when that position conflicted with that of the Administration. Devins, supra note 159, at 289
(quoting Robert L. Stem, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46
A.B.A.J. 154, 157 (1960)).
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the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended, with personnel of my own
19
selection."
Wiener brought suit in the Court of Claims challenging his removal,
and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court. 196 In its brief, the
Eisenhower Administration defended its actions primarily on unitariness
grounds.' 97 The brief began its summary of argument section by stating:
A constitutional usage which goes back to the very first year in
which the Constitution became effective establishes that the
President has the unlimited power to remove all the "officers of the
United States" appointed by him, subject only to constitutional or
statutory restrictions with respect to non-executive officers.
The President's removal power rests essentially on three
considerations: first, the canon of construction well known to the
Founding Fathers that the power to appoint carries with it the
power to remove; second, the President's constitutional duty to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed-a duty which cannot
be performed if the President is unable to control the officers who
carry out the laws; and third, the postulate of executive unity-i.e.,
that the President is the head of the entire executive branch. 9 8
The brief went on to argue two clearly correct propositions, both of which
were destined to be rejected by the Supreme Court. First, the brief argued
that Wiener was a core executive employee and that he was thus outside the
ambit of Humphrey's Executor v. United States,'
which sanctioned
congressionally imposed limitations on the president's removal power of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officers. Second, the brief argued that
even if Wiener were seen as being a quasi-judicial employee, the case was still
outside the ambit of Humphrey's Executor because Congress had been utterly
silent about removal in the statute setting up the War Claims Commission.
In Shurtleff v. United States,20° the Supreme Court had previously imposed a
clear statement rule, holding that it would not construe any statute as
limiting the president's removal power unless Congress employed "very clear

195.
Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Myron Wiener (Dec. 10, 1953), quoted in Wiener
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 350 (1958).
196. Wiener brought an action in the Court of Claims to recover the salary he would have
been paid had he not been removed. The Court of Claims dismissed this action on the grounds
that Congress had not intended to impose any restrictions on the removal of War Claims
Commissioners. Wiener v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 910, 910 (Ct. Cl. 1956), rev'd, 357 U.S.
349 (1958) (citing Shurtleffv. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1903)).
197. Brief for the United States at 21-68, Wiener (No. 52).
198.
Id. at 15-16.
199.
295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
200.
189 U.S. 311 (1903). For our review of the Shurtleffcase, see Yoo et al., supra note 23, at
25-26.
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20
and explicit language" indicating that such was its intent. ' Statutory
language merely stating that an officer may be removed for "inefficiency,
neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" was not sufficient.202 As the Court of
Claims had noted,20 3 the statute at issue in Wiener was completely silent as to
removal, providing only that the Commission wind up its affairs no later
than three years after the last claim was filed.0 4 Under Shurtleff the
government argued, the relevant statute should not be construed as limiting
the president's unfettered authority to remove Wiener.
In a remarkably brief and thinly reasoned opinion by Justice
Frankfurter, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Eisenhower
lacked the power to remove Wiener even though, as the Court twice noted,
205
the statute did not purport to place any limits on the removal power.
Instead, the Court inferred Congress's desire to impose such limits from the
fact that War Claims Commissioners were quasi-judicial officers.20 6 In so
holding, the Court took the remarkable step of implicitly reversing the
presumption acknowledged in Shurtleff against construing statutes as limiting
the removal power, at least when quasijudicial officers were involved. To do
so without any significant analysis of the considerations that led the Shurtieff
Court to erect the presumption in the first place was quite unfortunate.
From the standpoint of politics, Wiener can be regarded as the converse
of Humphrey's Executor. While Humphrey's Executor represented an attempt by
a largely conservative Supreme Court to snub a president who was
considerably more progressive,2 7 Wiener represented a decision by a mostly
New Deal Supreme Court that rebuked a president seeking to take the
administration of federal law in a different direction. For purposes of this
Article, it matters little that the Eisenhower Administration's arguments in
Wiener ultimately proved unsuccessful.'O' What matters is that the
Eisenhower Administration's defense of the removal power effectively
undercuts any inference of acquiescence by Eisenhower to a non-unitary
executive under the principles of coordinate construction.

201.
202.
203.

Shurtleff 189 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 315-18.
Wiener v. United States, 142 F. Supp. at 914.

204. War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1240, 1241. The filing deadline was
eventually postponed until March 31, 1952. Act of Apr. 5, 1951, ch. 27, 65 Stat. 28; Act of May
27, 1949, ch. 145, 63 Stat. 112.
Wiener, 357 U.S. 349, 350, 352 (1958).
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 353-54.
Yoo et al., supra note 23, at 88.

208. A parallel claim filed by Commissioner Lusk was settled without litigation. Lusk v.
United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 291, 294-95 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966). Eisenhower
eventually abolished the War Claims Commission in 1954. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1954, § 4(a), 3
C.F.R. 442, 443 (1954-58). See generally Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal
Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. LJ. 699, 750 (1987).
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Just as Eisenhower was content to assume more of a background,
supervisory role in the conduct of executive affairs, Eisenhower was also
measured in his dealings with Congress, insisting that FDR and Truman
"had upset the constitutional equilibrium between the White House and
Capitol Hill and promis[ing] to exercise restraint in order to restore the
balance.
Eisenhower's desire to rebalance the relationship between the
presidency and Congress should not be taken, however, as a sign of any
reluctance to defend the unitariness of the executive branch. As we shall see,
Eisenhower resolutely defended presidential power. Most notably,
Eisenhower outdid the Truman Administration in opposing2 10
the legislative
veto as infringing on the president's power to execute the law.
Eisenhower's first objection to a legislative veto appeared in his May 25,
1954, veto of a bill that would have required the Secretary of the Army to
"come into agreement" with both the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees before transferring the Camp Blanding Military Reservation to
the State of Florida. Eisenhower vetoed the bill because by "plac[ing] the
power to make such agreement joindy in the Secretary of the Army and the
members of the Committees on Armed Services," the bill "violate[d] the
fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers prescribed in
articles I and II of the Constitution which place the legislative power in the
Congress and the executive power in the executive branch." 211 Eisenhower
supported this conclusion with a forceful exposition against placing
executive functions outside of the executive branch:
The making of such a contract or agreement on behalf of the
United States is a purely executive or administrative function, like
the negotiation and execution of government contracts generally.
Thus, while Congress may enact legislation governing the making
of Government contracts, it may not delegate to its members or
committees the power to make such contracts, either directly or by
giving to them a power to approve or disapprove a contract which
an executive officer proposes to make.212
Echoing Hamilton's pronouncements in The Federalist No. 70, Eisenhower
concluded that "such a procedure destroys the clear lines of responsibility
213
for results which the Constitution provides."
209.
210.
211.

PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 61, at 50.

Watson, supra note 96, at 1021.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message (May 25, 1954), in 100 CONG. REc. 7135 (1954).
212.
Id.
213. Id.; see also Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 96, at 283; Watson, supra note 96, at 1021.
Other members of the Eisenhower Administration had already voiced their opposition to the
legislative veto during the debates on a proposal similar to the one pocket-vetoed by Truman,
see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text, that would have required the Administrator of
General Services or the Postmaster General to come into agreement with the Committees on
Public Works before acquiring property for the construction of post offices. H.R. 6342, 83d
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Eisenhower continued his opposition to the legislative veto the
following year in a signing statement accompanying the Defense
2 4
Appropriations Act of 1956. ' In an attempt to thwart Eisenhower's attempt
to privatize many of the Department of Defense's functions, members of
Congress whose districts contained military facilities likely to be adversely
affected attached a rider requiring that the Administration justify to the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees that the "discontinuance is
economically sound and the work is capable of performance by a contractor
without danger to the national security" before transferring work to a
5
contractor and by subjecting all such transfers to a committee veto.
Eisenhower signed the bill even though he believed that the justification and
committee veto provisions were unconstitutional. In language reminiscent of
his objections to the Camp Blanding bill, Eisenhower acknowledged that
"Congress has the power and the right to grant or to deny an
appropriation."1 6 However, backed by the advice of Attorney General
Brownell, Eisenhower maintained that "once an appropriation is made the
appropriation must, under the Constitution, be administered by the
Cong. § 41(e) (1954). The Justice Department issued a memorandum objecting that such a
provision would violate Article II of the Constitution, which "vests the Executive power in the
President and directs that 'he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'"
Memorandum from J. Lee Rankin, to Senator Knowland (Apr. 8, 1954), reprinted in 100 CONG.
REc. 4879 (1954) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3). Although Congress could overturn a
particular executive action through formal legislation, "Congress may not through its
committees administer or share in the administration of a statute." Id. Allowing Congress to
interfere in this matter would represent "a departure from our constitutional practice which, if
systemically pursued, could result in a radical change in the distribution of the powers of the
Federal Government." Id. After the Senate declined to delete this provision by a vote of sixty to
eight, 100 CONG. REc. 10017 (1954), theJustice Department transmitted an even more detailed
memorandum to the Chairman of the House Committee on Public Works. In response to these
objections and Eisenhower's veto of the Camp Blanding legislation, the conference committee
struck the committee-veto provision and replaced it with a requirement directed at Congress
prohibiting the appropriation of any funds without prior approval from the Public Works
Committee. Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 560, § 411, 68 Stat. 518, 519; see also Watershed Protection
and Flood Prevention Act of 1954, ch. 656, § 2, 68 Stat. 666, 666 (applying a similar provision to
"works of improvement"). Since this restriction was directed at Congress and not the executive,
Attorney General Brownell advised Eisenhower to sign the bill. See generally 41 Op. Att'y Gen.
300, 305 (1957); Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 96, at 284; Watson, supra note 96, at 1023
(citing HARRIS, supranote 110, at 231).
Defense Appropriations Act of 1956, ch. 358, 69 Stat. 301.
214.
Id. § 638, 69 Stat. at 321.
215.
216. Special Message to the Congress upon Signing the Department of Defense
Appropriation Act (July 13, 1955), in 1955 PUB. PAPERS 688, 689.
Brownell concluded that the legislative-veto provision violated Article II of the
217.
Constitution by "usurp[ing] power confided to the executive branch" and by intruding into the
authority "to engage in the administration and execution of the law, which by constitutional
warrant, has been the responsibility and right of the executive branch since the founding of our
constitutional form of Government." 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 230, 231 (1955). Brownell also
anticipated the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha by noting that the provision raised
problems under Article I as well. Id. See generallyFisher, Legislative Veto, supranote 96, at 283-84.
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executive branch of the Government alone, and the Congress has no right
to confer upon its committees the power to veto Executive action or to
prevent Executive action from becoming effective."2 " In so observing,
Eisenhower embraced a strongly formalist vision of the separation of powers:
"The Constitution of the United States divides the functions of the
Government into three departments-the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial-and establishes the principle that they shall be kept separate.
Neither may exercise functions belonging to the others."2 9 Accordingly,
Eisenhower felt "bound to insist that Executive functions be maintained
unimpaired by legislative encroachment" and refused "[t]o acquiesce in a
provision that seeks to encroach upon the proper authority of the
Executive. "22 Therefore, Eisenhower insisted:
[T] o the extent that this section seeks to give to the Appropriations
Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives authority
to veto or prevent Executive action, such section will be regarded as
invalid by the executive branch of the Government...
unless
....
221
otherwise determined by a court of competentjurisdiction.
Eisenhower's announced refusal to enforce the provision touched off a
confrontation between the President and the Comptroller General.
Recognizing his role as "the agent of the Congress," the Comptroller
General informed Congress that he would enforce the law and disallow any
covered expenditure that did not gain committee approval . 2222 Facing
personal liability for issuing checks without the Comptroller General's
approval, the Defense Department personnel ignored the President's wishes
and complied with the committee-veto provision. Further conflict was
averted when the provision was dropped the following year. 223
Three days after signing the Defense Appropriations Act, Eisenhower
24
vetoed yet another bill because it contained two legislative-veto provisions.1

218. Special Message to the Congress upon
Appropriation Act, supra note 216, at 689.
219.

Signing

the

Department of Defense

Id. at 688-89.

220.
Id. at 689.
221.
Id.
222.
Porter Hardy, Jr., No. 3-124985, 1955 WL 1368, 1955 ,IL2073 (Comp. Gen.Aug. 17,
1955).
223.
Congress intended to shift the committee veto from the Appropriations Committees
to the Armed Services Committees. However, the bill transferring the committee veto died in
the Senate. See generally Watson, supra note 96, at 1022-23 (citing HARRIS, supra note 110, at
229-30).
224. Veto of Bill Authorizing Certain Construction at Military Installations (July 16, 1956),
in 1956 PuB. PAPERS 596 (vetoing H.R. 9893, 84th Cong. (1956)). Sectioni 301 of the bill made
the authorizations for the Talos missile program contingent upon an agreement between the
Secretary of Defense and the Armed Services Committees of each House. Section 419 imposed
a similar requirement on contracts for the construction and acquisition of housing for military
families. Id. at 596-97.
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As before, Eisenhower indicated that such committee vetoes "would destroy
" 25
the clear lines of responsibility which the Constitution provides. 1 In
response to the veto, Congress changed the legislative veto into a "report
and wait" provision, which afforded executive action the force of law, but
delayed its effective date for a fixed amount of time so that Congress could
226
Because
decide whether to enact formal legislation revoking the action.
"report and wait" provisions do not purport to give Congress the authority to
effect a change in the law without having to comply with the constitutionally
required process for enacting legislation, this amendment eliminated
Eisenhower's constitutional concerns. Congress later returned to the
legislative veto by enacting a provision requiring congressional committee
approval of all contracts authorized by the Small Reclamation Projects Act of
1956.7 Eisenhower again registered his constitutional objections. He
believed that committee vetoes, to the extent that they could be regarded as
an executive act, constituted "an unconstitutional infringement of the
28
separation of powers prescribed in Articles I and II of the Constitution."
As Eisenhower further explained:
I do not believe that the Congress can validly delegate to one of its
committees the power to prevent executive actions taken pursuant
to law. To do so in this case would be to divide the responsibility for
administering the program between the Secretary of the Interior
and the designated committees. Such a procedure would be a clear
violation of the separation of powers within the Government and

225.

Id. at 597. Eisenhower further noted:

While the Congress may enact legislation governing the making of Government
contracts, it may not constitutionally delegate to its Members or Committees the
power to make such contracts, either directly or by giving them the authority to
approve or disapprove a contract which an executive officer proposes to make.
Two years ago I returned, without my approval, a bill . . . containing similar
provisions. At that time I stated that such provisions violate the fundamental
constitutional principle of separation of powers prescribed in Articles I and II of
the Constitution, which place the legislative power in the Congress and the
executive power in the Executive Branch.
Once again, I must object to such a serious departure from the separation of
powers as provided by the Constitution. Any such departure from constitutional
procedures must be avoided.
Id.
226. Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 939, § 419, 70 Stat. 991, 1018-19; see alsoWatson, supra note
96, at 1021 n.190.
227. Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, ch. 792, § 4(c), 70 Stat. 1044, 1045.
Statement by the President Upon Signing the Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956
228.
(Aug. 6, 1956), in 1956 PUB. PAPERS 648, 649.

90 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2005]

would destroy
the lines of responsibility which the Constitution
9
provides.2
The Committee veto also violated Article II by itself. As Eisenhower noted:
[T] he negotiation and execution of a contract is a purely executive
function. Although the Congress may prescribe the standards and
conditions under which executive officials may enter into contracts,
it may not lodge in its committees or members the power to make
such contracts, either directly or by giving them the power to
approve or disapprove
a contract which an executive officer
2 30
proposes to make.
Eisenhower nonetheless "approved this bill only because the Congress is not
in session to receive and act upon a veto message and because I have been
assured that the committees which handled the bill in the Congress will take
action to correct its deficiencies early in the next session. 2 3 ' In the
meantime, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior to initiate the
programs covered by the Act in the expectation that Congress would remove
or revise the objectionable section.2 3 2 As Eisenhower predicted, Congress
replaced the committee veto with a "no appropriation" provision the next
V3
session.
Although Eisenhower did accede without objection to a few legislative
vetoes, 4 Eisenhower subsequently objected to a provision providing a twohouse legislative veto over TVA power projects, 2 5 successfully called for the

repeal of the provision enacted during the Truman Administration giving a
legislative veto to a single member of Congress, 236 and questioned the
229. Id. at 649-50. Alternatively, to the extent to which the committee veto exercised a
legislative function, "the section is open to the objection that it involves an unlawful delegation
by the Congress to its committees of a legislative function which the constitution contemplates
the Congress itself, as an entity, should exercise." Id. at 649. See generallyJOHN R. BOLTON, THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWERS 11-12 (1977).

230.

Statement by the President, supra note 228, at 650.
231.
Id. at 649.
232. Id. at 650.
233, Act of June 5, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-47, sec. (b), § 4(d), 71 Stat. 48, 49; see also Watson,
supranote 96, at 1024.
234. Notably, Congress included a one-house veto in the Reorganization Act of 1957, Pub.
L. No. 85-286, 71 Stat. 611, and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, § 3,
72 Stat. 514, 514-16. In 1960, at the request of the General Services Administration, Congress
also restored a committee-veto provision to the Public Buildings Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86249, § 7, 73 Stat. 479, 480. See also Act ofJuly 12, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-626, 74 Stat. 425, 431; Act
of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-722, 74 Stat. 821, 826. See generally Watson, supra note 96, at 1013
n. 143, 1025 & nn.214-15.
235.
Statement by the President Upon Signing a Bill Amending the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act (Aug. 6, 1959), in 1959 PUB. PAPERS 566 (objecting to Act of Aug. 14, 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-157, 73 Stat. 338); see also Joseph Cooper & Ann Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the
Constitution,30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467, 470 n.ll (1962).
236.
SeeWatson, supra note 96, at 1020 (citing HARRIS, supra note 110, at 225).
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constitutionality of a provision subjecting the Attorney General's decisions
veto2 7 that
to parole certain refugees into the United States to a legislative
23
8
Chadha.
v.
INS
in
would eventually give rise to the decision
But Eisenhower's most sustained opposition to the legislative veto was
his attempt to overturn the committee veto in the Military Construction Act
of 1951 (to which Truman had acceded 2 9 ) that subjected all major military
real-estate transactions to the approval of the Armed Services Committees.240
241
Bolstered by the recommendations of the second Hoover Commission
and the criticism of other Administration officials,242 Eisenhower's 1961
Budget Message directed the Secretary of Defense to "disregard the section
unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise." 43 In the
veto into a
end, Congress relented and converted the committee
244
constitutionally permissible "report and wait" requirement.

237.

Eisenhower noted:
The Attorney General has advised me that there is a serious question as to whether
this provision is constitutional. Nevertheless, in view of the short period for which
this power is given and the improbability that the issue will arise, it is believed that
it would be better to defer a determination of the effect of such possible action
until it is taken.

Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Providing for the Admission of Refugees (July 14,
1960), in 1960-61 PUB. PAPERS 579, 579. As the Chadhadecision attests, Eisenhower was wrong
in his estimates both of the act's limited duration and of the likelihood of conflict arising under
it.
238. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
239. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
240. Military Construction Act of 1951, ch. 434, § 601, 65 Stat. 336, 365.
"The commission . . . questions the appropriateness of congressional committee
241.
participation in the executive function of operation on the ground that it is an invasion of the
executive by the legislative branch." COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
Gov'T, REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 35-36 (1955); see also COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 92-94, 99 (1955).
242. See 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 300 (1957).
243. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE
FISCALYEAR ENDINGJUNE 30, 1961, H.R. Doc. No. 86-255, pt. 1, at M18 (1960).
244. Act ofJune 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-500, § 2662, 74 Stat. 166, 186-87; see also H.R. REP.
No. 86-1307, at 43-45 (1960). It was no coincidence that the vast majority of the legislative-veto
provisions that Eisenhower blocked were aimed at the acquisition and disposition of military
facilities. See Watson, supra note 96, at 1023-25. As Professor Calabresi has noted, the incentives
that members of Congress face leave them little choice but to try to protect the interests of their
local constituencies even when those actions would be ill-advised as a matter of national policy.
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the UnitaryExecutive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 34-35,
58-70 (1995). Thus it is unsurprising that Congress has most strenuously attempted to inject
itself into the execution of the laws in those situations where the consequences for local
constituencies were the greatest. As Professor Joseph Harris noted, "The requirement of
advance approval by congressional subcommittees enables members of Congress to resist the
closing of military installations in their districts, and it cannot be doubted that the effect is to
force the retention of installations that in the interest of economy should be closed." HARRIS,
supra note 110, at 223.
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Eisenhower took a number of other steps to defend the president's sole
authority to execute the law. Eisenhower quietly opposed an amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, proposed by Senator John Bricker, designed to curb
presidential power over foreign affairs by barring the use of executive
agreements and prohibiting the negotiation of any treaty that abridged
constitutional rights or affected "any other matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States.",145 Eisenhower steadfastly
opposed the amendment on the grounds that it would "cripple the
Executive
power to the point that we [would] become helpless in world
24
affairs." 6
On the issue of executive privilege, Eisenhower dealt Senator Joe
McCarthy a "stunning blow by invoking executive privilege to prevent
congressional interrogation of members of the executive branch." 47 Pach
and Richardson call this "the boldest assertion of executive privilege in the
history of the republic." 24 Eisenhower maintained that "Congress has
absolutely no right to ask them to testify in any way, shape or form about the
advice that they were giving to me at any time on any subject." 249 He felt that
McCarthy's requests were an unacceptable infringement upon executive
autonomy. "What was at stake, as Eisenhower saw it, was the modern
Presidency.... There were so many things Eisenhower felt he had to keep
secret.., that he was willing to vastly expand the powers of the Presidency to
do it."2 50 In a letter directing the withholding of information from
McCarthy's committee, Eisenhower stated:
It is essential to efficient and effective administration that
employees of the Executive Branch be in a position to be
completely candid in advising with each other on official matters..
. it is not in the public interest that any of their conversations or
communications, or any documents or reproductions, concerning
such advice be disclosed. 51
Indeed, Eisenhower's response to McCarthy constituted "the most absolute
assertion of presidential right to withhold information from Congress ever
uttered to that day in American history. Earlier presidents had held that
their conversations in Cabinet meetings were privileged and confidential,

245.
S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951), see also97 CONG. REC. 8258, 8265 (1951) (statement of
Sen. Bricker introducing S.J. Res. 102).
246.

PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 61, at 60, 247-49.

247.
248.
249.

Id. at 70.
Id.
AMBROSE, supra note 155, at 364 (quoting President Eisenhower on May 14, 1954).

250.
251.

Id. at 365 (quoting President Eisenhower on May 17, 1954).
Id.
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but none had ever dared extend this privilege to everybody in the Executive
branch .,'2McCarthy made the mistake of publicly appealing to federal employees
to disregard Eisenhower's directive and testify irrespective of the President's
invocation of the executive privilege. 5 A furious Eisenhower made sure that
the issue came up at his next press conference in order to tell reporters "that
in my opinion this is the most arrogant invitation to subversion and
254
disloyalty that I have ever heard of. I won't stand for it for one minute." In
the end, Eisenhower's actions so severely crippled the senator, by robbing
him of his subpoena power, that McCarthy eventually crumbled.
Thus, by the end of his Administration, Eisenhower had defended the
removal power, had asserted his control over the executive branch and the
independent agencies, had resisted congressional attempts to interfere with
the execution of the laws through the legislative veto, and had taken other
actions to assert the unitariness of the executive branch. There was no
acquiescence in any diminution of the unity of the executive branch during
the Eisenhower years.
III.

JOHN

F. KENNEDY

John F. Kennedy "sought to be a strong, active president" "in the
Democratic tradition of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry
S. Truman. ", 55 In 1958 he wrote, "When the Executive fails to lead... it
' '2 56
In his
leaves a vacuum that the Legislative branch is ill-equipped to fill.
criticism, he "charged the executive branch with having had a 'failure of
nerve,' ... The key words were challenges, vigorous, fight, and the need for a
president ready to 'exercise the fullest powers of his office.' 2' 5 7 Kennedy's
splendid inaugural address immediately demonstrated his talent for using
the bully pulpit of the presidency. His call for national service-"[a]sk not
what your country can do for you-ask what you can do for your
_
a return to a vision of the President as a leader and
country" 5 8 -marked
shaper of public opinion.
From the outset of his Administration, Kennedy was determined to
exercise full control over the executive branch, illustrated most dramatically
by his decision to appoint his brother Robert to the post of Attorney
General. Although the decision drew significant criticism, James Giglio,
Kennedy's biographer, reports that the President "knew that in Robert

252.
253.
254.

Id
Id, at 366.
AMBROSE, supra note 155, at 366.

255. JAMES N. GIGLIO, THE PRESIDENCY OFJOHN F. KENNEDY 29 (1991).
256. John F. Kennedy, Wen the Executive Faitsto Lead, THE REPORTER, Sept. 18, 1958, at 14,
quoted in HERBERT S. PARMET,JFK: THE PRESIDENCY OFJOHN F.KENNEDY 9 (1983).
257.

PARMET, supra note 256, at 9.

258.

Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in 1961 PUB. PAPERS 1, 3.

90 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[20051

,,259

It would be hard for
Kennedy he had his most trusted associate on board.
a president to do more to retain control over the law execution function
than by appointing his closest sibling and former campaign manager to run
hisJustice Department.
In structuring his cabinet and White House staff, Kennedy was critical of
the extent to which Eisenhower had relied upon cabinet government. He
saw this as "a ponderous bureaucratic system, resulting in group or
corporate decisions." 26° Giglio notes, "Kennedy specifically objected to the
extent to which Eisenhower had shared power with the cabinet (which met
weekly); the chief of staff, Sherman Adams; and the National Security
Council (NSC), created in 1947 to advise the President on foreign and
domestic policy." 26 Giglio reports:
As president, Kennedy proved less willing to delegate power
outside the Oval Office. His staff, far smaller than Eisenhower's or
Johnson's, consisted for the most part of loyalists from the Senate
or his campaign staff, many of them still in their thirties. They
remained completely devoted to Kennedy and knew exactly what
he wanted.262
Kennedy was reluctant to meet regularly with the cabinet, and preferred
to communicate with his officials indirectly.263 Kennedy received weekly
written summaries from cabinet department heads about their most
significant activities. He followed these up with requests for additional
information and communicated with cabinet members through his White
House staff.' 4 Kennedy met frequently with certain favored cabinet
members, particularly his brother Robert who was his "lightning rod for
untested ideas and [his closest] personal adviser."2 65 The most prominent
removal during the Kennedy Administration was Chester Bowles, the
Undersecretary of State, where "[i]deology and personal displeasure" both
played a role. 266 Bowles was summarily handed a press release indicating that
George Ball would replace him. 67 As Bobby recalled: "The President snuck
up on him one day and got him fired before he knew it."2 Behind the

259.

GIGLIO, supra note 255, at 21.

260.

Id. at 30.

261.

Id.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id. at 34.
GIGLIO, supra note 255, at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
PARMET, supra note 256, at 204.
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the effort to clarify the lines of authority within the
dismissal was "[i]ndeed
26 9
State Department.
Kennedy's dynamism led him to exert his power over the execution of
federal laws to its fullest. For example, Kennedy followed the practice of
FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower"O by issuing executive orders prohibiting all
officers and government contractors from engaging in
federal
discrimination. This nondiscrimination mandate was now to be enforced by
the newly created President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity.27' Kennedy's nondiscrimination orders exceeded the scope of
previous orders by requiring that all government contractors undertake
"affirmative action to ensure that... employees are treated during their
"272
In
employment, without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin.
issuing these orders, Kennedy returned to the practice followed by FDR and
Truman and based the orders on "the authority vested in... [the president]
by the Constitution and the statutes. ' 73 The Comptroller General
acknowledged that, "[i]n this instance the Executive order is not based on
any Congressional directive. The authority to issue the order must,
therefore, stem from the general executive power under Article II of the
Constitution."2 ' 4 The Attorney General concurred, claiming that Congress's
failure to object to presidential nondiscrimination orders meant that
275
Congress had acquiesced in the president's power to issue such orders.
Kennedy also used his power as Commander in Chief to take care to
enforce civil rights. When James Meredith, a black student, attempted to
join the all-white student body of the University of Mississippi at Oxford,
violence ensued. Kennedy "issued a proclamation calling on obstructionists
to cease their activities and disperse peaceably. Hundreds of marshals were
dispatched to the site, and they were reinforced by federalizing the
Mississippi National Guard and the deployment of U.S. troops to the
Millington Naval Air Station at Memphis. "276 Kennedy further took a leading

269.

Id
SeeYoo et al., supra note 23, at 81; supra notes 122-24, 170-71 and accompanying text.
270.
271.
Exec. Order No. 10,925, §§ 101-204, 3 C.F.R. 448, 448-49 (1959-63); Exec. Order No.
11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-63).
272.
Exec. Order No. 10,925, § 301(1), 3 C.F.R. at 450; Exec. Order No. 11,114, § 301(1), 3
C.F.R. at 776-77.
Exec. Order No. 10,925, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 448 ; Exec. Order No. 11,114, pmbl., 3
273.
C.F.R. at 775.
40 Comp. Gen. 592, 593 (1961); see also Note, supra note 124, at 391 (citing
274.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))
(suggesting that the nondiscrimination orders might fall within the president's implied
authority to act in the absence of a contrary statute).
275.
Validity of Executive Order Prohibiting Government Contractors from Discriminating
in Employment Practices on Grounds of Race, Color, Religion, or National Origin, 42 Op. Att'y
Gen. 97, 106-07 (1961).
276.

PARMET, supra note 256, at 261.
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role in helping two blacks register at the University of Alabama over the
opposition of Alabama's segregationist governor, George Wallace. "Kennedy
Wallace that he intended
federalized the Alabama National Guard, signaling
277
to enforce the court order militarily if necessary."
The Kennedy Administration also issued an executive order making
small changes in the civil service laws. As noted earlier, these laws did not yet
2 78
give federal employees any substantive protection against dismissal.
Although some lower court decisions took small steps toward restricting the
removal power, 79 real limits would not emerge until Supreme Court cases in
the 1970s.250 Indeed, decisions from the Kennedy era continued to reaffirm
that a supervisor's lack of confidence in a subordinate was by itself sufficient
grounds for removal."' Veterans, who comprised roughly half of the federal
workforce,2 82 did enjoy a greater degree of procedural protection than
nonveterans.211 Kennedy eliminated this discrepancy by issuing an executive
order extending procedural protections similar to those provided by the
Veterans Preference Act of 1944 to nonveterans as well. He thus required
that each agency establish a system for hearings and appeals.1" 4 Although
this change did not place any substantive limits on the president's authority
to remove,289 it did attest to Kennedy's belief in his authority to exercise
control over the entirety of the federal bureaucracy.
277.
278.

GIGLIO, supra note 255, at 179-80.
See supra notes 172-89 and accompanying text.

279.
See Deak v, Pace, 185 F.2d 997, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Gadsden v. United States,
78 F. Supp. 126, 127-28 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (indicating that a removed employee has the right to the
"honest judgment" of the removing officer and that the decision must not be "arbitrary or
capricious" or rendered in "bad faith"); Creenway v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 72, 81 (1963)
(ruling that a removed employee is entitled to "honest consideration based on the merits");
Murphy v. Kelly, 259 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Mass. 1966) (inquiring whether removal was
arbitrary or capricious), affd mere., 368 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1966). But see Vigil v. Post Office
Dep't, 406 F.2d 921, 924-25 (10th Cir. 1969) (noting that subjecting day-to-day operations of an
executive agency to judicial review would be inconsistent with good administration);
Coledanchise v. Macy, 265 F. Supp. 154, 157-58, 162 (D.S.C. 1967) (noting that the removal of
federal employees because of inefficiency is beyond review by the courts and that courts should
not be permitted to substitute their judgments for that of the executive branch).
280.
See Frug, supra note 172, at 970-89; see also Chaturvedi, supra note 172, at 330 (noting
that as of 1968 substantive limits on the removal power had "yet to gain reversal recognition"
and that many courts continue to follow the doctrines of Hennen and Eberein).
281.

See Leonard v. Douglas, 321 F.2d 749, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

282.

PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIvIL SERVICE 436 (1958).

283.

See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.

284.

Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 527 (1959-63). The executive order largely adopted

the recommendations of a presidential task force. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-

MGMT. RELATIONS IN THE FED. SERV., A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN
THE FEDERAL SERVICE 24 (1961).
285.
See Kathleen V. Buffon, Comment, Removalfor Cause from the Civil Service: The Problem of
DisproportionateDiscipline, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 212 (1979) (noting that the Civil Service
Commission did not exercise its authority under the executive order in a way that placed
substantive restrictions on the removal power).

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
Kennedy also made clear his belief that his power to control the
executive branch extended to the independent agencies when he included
them in his executive order imposing ethical standards on conflict of
interest and ex parte communications.28 6 That Kennedy believed he
possessed the authority to direct the independent agencies should have
come as no surprise. After he was elected, but before he had been sworn in,
Kennedy asked Professor James Landis to prepare a report specifically on
the independent agencies. Landis concluded, among other things, that the
lack of effective inter-agency coordination was inhibiting federal policy
development and required that the president possess
• 287 greater influence over
distinction
Calling
all agencies, including the independent agencies.
,
•
•the ,,288
Landis
between independent and executive agencies meaningless,
recognized that the president's "constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed" was "applicable to the execution of laws entrusted 2to
89
or not.,
regulatory agencies, whether technically 'independent'
Therefore, Landis recommended strengthening the informal controls that
290
as well as giving
the president possessed over the independent agencies

286.

Exec. Order No. 10,939, 3 C.F.R. 469 (1959-63); Redford, supra note 191, at 316-17.

287.

STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON REGULATORY

AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 24-33 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored byJames Landis).
288.
Id. at 4; see also id.at 30 (noting that there was "not too great a difference between the
allegedly 'independent' agencies and those technically a part of some Executive Department").
Landis also concluded that "[tihe relationship of the agencies to the Congress generally
speaking is that of any statutory branch of the Executive to the Congress, with certain
exceptions." Id. at 33. The so-called exceptions to which Landis pointed were not that
exceptional. First, Landis stated that Congress should oversee the independent agencies, except
that it should not attempt to influence their decisions in particular adjudicatory matters. Id. at
33-34. This caveat, however, applied with equal force to executive agencies. Second, Landis
opined that the independent regulatory agencies were responsible
to the Congress rather than solely to the Executive. The policies that they are
supposed to pursue are those that have been delineated by the Congress not by the
Executive. Departure from these policies or the failure to make them effective or
their subordination of legislative goals to the directions of the Executive is thus a
matter of necessary legislative concern.
Id,at 34. However, all agencies, whether executive or independent, are obligated to follow the
policies established by Congress and thus exceed their authority whenever their actions
contravene legislative goals.
289. Id. at 32. In particular, "[t]he patent failure of the Federal Power Commission to
execute the laws relating to natural gas production" was 'rightly a matter of constitutional
concern to him," as was "[t]he congestion of the dockets of the agencies, the delays incident to
the disposition of cases, [and] the failure to evolve policies pursuant to basic statutory
requirements." Id. at 32-33. As Landis later noted, "Presidential concern, with the work of the
agencies, is important ... from the standpoint of the President's duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed." Id. at 82.
290. The President could influence the independent regulatory commissions' execution of
the law through appointments and removals (although statutes often provided that
commissioners could only be removed "for cause"), Bureau of the Budget clearance of
commission budget proposals and legislative proposals, and the President's power to appoint
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the president greater formal authority to control the independent
agencies.?N That Landis would come to such a conclusion is nothing short of
remarkable. One of the primary architects of the New Deal, Landis had
believed that the simple tripartite form of government, wherein power is
"divided neatly between legislative, executive and judicial," was inadequate
to deal with modern problems and must give way to the exigencies of
292
modern governance.
Armed with Landis's report, Kennedy strongly asserted his control over
the independent agencies. The chairmen of all of the commissions except
the Federal Reserve Board submitted their resignations, and Kennedy
293
replaced all of them except the chairman of the Federal Maritime Board.
Agencies," calling
Kennedy also sent a message to Congress on "Regulatory
• • 294
for greater presidential oversight of the commissions. Kennedy backed up
his rhetoric by impressing upon his nominees the importance of nationalpolicy coordination. He further expressed his hope that they would follow
the declared policies of his Administration by conducting numerous policy
studies and conferences to guide commission decisionmaking, and by

the chairman of all of the commissions except the ICC and perhaps the Federal Power
Commission (FPC). Id. at 30-31. The President could also influence commissions through less
formal means, either by engaging outside consultants to conduct surveys of their affairs or by
consulting with commissioners directly. Id. at 31-32.
291.
Specifically, Landis recommended that the President be permitted to use his
reorganization powers to give the chairmen of the commissions authority over all administrative
matters and to make them removable at will. Id. at 65-66, 85; see also id. at 37-38 (ICC), 43-44
(Civil Aeronautics Board), 48 (Securities and Exchange Commission & FTC), 58 (FPC). The
administrative matters would include the preparation and review of budget estimates, the
distribution of appropriated funds, the appointment of personnel, and control over the
commission's internal organization. Id. at 37-38, 85. Thus Landis returned to the vision that
Truman had pursued in 1950, only to see it shot down by the legislative veto.
Also, recognizing that policy development required "a close and intimate relationship
to the President," id. at 77, 80, Landis recommended. that the President create separate offices
within the Executive Office of the President to coordinate and develop transportation,
communications, and energy policy as well as an Office for the Oversight of Regulatory
Agencies charged with preparing reorganization plans specifically for the FPC, ICC, Civil
Aeronautics Board, and FCC. Id. at 85-87. See generallyMoreno, supranote 105, at 587; Redford,
supra note 191, at 312-14; Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over Agencies and Agency
Decisionmakers:The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57
GEO.WASH. L. REV.627, 697 (1989).
292.

JAMES M. LANDIS,THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (1938).

The omission of the Federal Maritime Board turned out to be insignificant since
293.
Kennedy replaced the entire membership of the Federal Maritime Board with his own
appointees when he reorganized it into the Federal Maritime Commission. The plan also
provided that "[e]ach Commissioner shall be removable by the President for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 102(a), 3 C.F.R. 875, 876
(1959-63).
Special Message to Congress on the Regulatory Agencies (Apr. 13, 1961), in 1961 PUB.
294.
PAPERS 267, 268.

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
requiring that the commissions send him monthly reports. 295 Moreover,
Solicitor General Archibald Cox refused to let the FTC present its own views
to the Supreme Court.'" Clearly, Kennedy did not acquiesce in the
supposed "independence" of the independent agencies.
Despite his tough stance regarding the independent agencies, Kennedy
was more tolerant of the legislative veto than Truman or Eisenhower had
been.297 He even went so far as to propose that an agricultural quota and an
income support program be subject to a committee veto.298 As Kennedy's
presidency progressed, however, he started to oppose the legislative veto.
Acting on the advice of the Attorney General, Kennedy challenged the
constitutionality of a provision in the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1963 that subjected changes in economic assistance
funds administered by the Agency for International Development (AID) to a
committee veto.2 99 Kennedy charged that
this provision is unconstitutional either as a delegation to
Congressional committees of powers which reside only in the
Congress as a whole or as an attempt to confer executive powers on
of powers
the Committee in violation of the principle of separation
°
prescribed in Articles I and II of the Constitution.'0
In signing the bill despite these constitutional objections, Kennedy followed
the earlier example set by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower.301
Kennedy did, however, direct the Administrator of the Agency for

295.
See Redford, supra note 191, at 314-18.
296. Brief for the United States at 10, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208
(1961) (No. 47), quoted in Devins, supra note 159, at 270-71.
297. Kennedy failed to object to a provision subjecting reorganization plans to a one-house
veto. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, § 47, 75 Stat. 631, 638 (1961).
President Kennedy also tolerated "no appropriation" provisions, see, e.g., Act of Aug. 9, 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-578, 76 Stat. 335, 338; Food and Agricultural Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-703,
§ 103, 76 Stat. 605, 608, as well as a provision requiring "consultation" before executive action,
see Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-796, 76 Stat. 904, 905. Kennedy also did not register any
objection to a provision requiring that the president appoint members of Congress as delegates
to certain trade negotiations. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 243, 76 Stat.
872, 878; see Watson, supra note 96, at 1010 n.115, 1026.
298. Special Message to the Congress on Agriculture (Mar. 16, 1961), in 1961 PUB, PAPERS
192, 196. Even more remarkably, Kennedy endorsed private control of executive action by
proposing that the agricultural controls not be put into effect until approved by a two-thirds
majority of authorized farmers. Id. at 195. Congress did not enact the proposal. Watson, 5upra
note 96, at 988 n. 12, 1026 (citing HARRIS, supra note 110, at 205).
299. Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 87-872, 76
Stat. 1163, 1164.
300. Memorandum on) Informing Congressional Committees of Changes Involving Foreign
Economic Assistance Funds (Jan. 9, 1963), in 1963 PUB. PAPERS 6.
301.

Id.
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International 302Development "to treat this provision as a request for
information."
Despite its brevity, the Kennedy Administration emerges as a steady
defender of presidential prerogatives. Kennedy's dominance over his
cabinet, his executive orders on civil rights, his claims of supervisory
authority over the independent agencies, his aggressive use of foreign policy
to oppose communism, and his eventual determination to oppose the
legislative veto place him squarely in the unitary-executive camp. In fact, the
president and his brother waged a war on organized crime that was so
effective that some have speculated that it led to the president's assassination
in Dallas on November 22, 1963. It is thus clear that there was no significant
acquiescence in any diminution of the unitary executive on John Kennedy's
watch.
IV. LYNDON B. JOHNSON
Anyone familiar with Lyndon Johnson's legendary personality would
have little doubt that he would be a strong chief executive. That said,
Johnson ascended to the presidency under extraordinarily difficult
conditions, having to succeed a charismatic leader who, after having
captured the imagination of the country, had died under tragic
circumstances. Having sworn to continue Kennedy's vision, Johnson
inherited a fully staffed executive branch to which he could not make
significant changes without seeming to abandon Kennedy's legacy.
For
instance, in order to associate his anti-poverty campaign with Kennedy,
Johnson appointed Kennedy's brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver, as head of the
War on Poverty. 30 4 In what would become typical Johnson operating
procedure, when Shriver hesitated in accepting and asked for time to
decide, Johnson called him and
[i]n a very low, confidential sounding voice, the President
explained that he had the Cabinet with him and had to keep his
voice down. "You just have to understand, Sargent, this is your
President speaking, and I'm going to announce you as the head of
the war against poverty. Boom," Johnson hung up. Shriver turned
to his wife and said: "Looks
as if I'm going to be the new head of
30 5
the war against poverty."

302. Id- Curiously, the Administrator did not carry out the President's request because "the
Comptroller General gave an opinion that it was in the act, unconstitutional or not, and we had
to abide by it as long as it was in the act." ForeignAssistance and Related Agencies Appropriations For
1964: Hearings on H.R. 9499 Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,88th Cong. 312-13 (1963);
see Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 944 (1994); Watson, supra note 96, at 1026.
303.

VAUGHN DAVIs BORNET, THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON B.JOHNSON 25-27 (1983).

304.

ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT 75 (1998).
Id.at 76.

305.

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
Although Johnson was respectfully slow to make significant changes to
the Administration, it would be a mistake to construe his reticence to
change personnel as any hesitancy to exert full control over the workings of
the executive branch. Clearly, Johnson was confident that he and he alone
would determine the direction of his Administration. When Adlai Stevenson
complained that he really wanted to be Secretary of State rather than an
you are Lyndon Johnson's
errand boy, Walter Lippman quipped, 30"If
6
secretary of state, you'll be an errand boy."
In fact, one of the foremost considerations in Johnson's appointment
policy was his ability to control his subordinates. Perhaps the plainest
example of this policy occurred when Johnson made his choice for a vicepresidential running mate in the 1964 election campaign. By that time it was
well understood among vice-presidential potentials that "a Johnson Vice
President would need to be a 'yes man' who conformed to LBJ's every wish.
'Whoever he is,' Johnson told people in 1964, '1 want his pecker... in my
pocket.' 3 7 When Johnson finally decided upon Hubert Humphrey, the
offer was accompanied by a demand for unequivocal loyalty. The President
sent instructions to Humphrey: "You can be against me in our conferences
'' 8
my policies. 30
until... I make up my mind.., then I want you to follow
Johnson reiterated that Humphrey must "understand that this is like a
marriage with no chance of divorce. I need complete and unswerving
loyalty. ",3 9 The bottom line was that:
Johnson hated criticism or any challenge to his authority. Everyone
who worked for him was expected to be 100 percent a Johnson
man, a loyalist who, whatever his inner thoughts, would
subordinate his views and ambitions to Johnson's. This is not to say
thatJohnson wanted only ciphers around him. To the contrary, he
valued having the services of "the best and the brightest." But at the
same time, he wanted them to bend the knee, to take a back seat,
to subordinate themselves to the President ...."I want people
around me," Johnson said repeatedly, "who would kiss my ass on a
hot summer's day and say it smells like roses. '..
Johnson's biographer, Vaughn Davis Bornet, reports that while "Hubert
Humphrey talked to the President at length upon occasion, he could not
1
count on prevailing," and neither could anyone else.3 1 Bornet adds that,
during his years in office, PresidentJohnson ran the executive branch andafter listening to much advice-made thousands of final decisions himself,

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

BORNET, supra note 303, at 25.
DALLEK, supra note 304, at 138.
Id,at 158.
Id,at 159.
Id.
at 160.
BORNET, supra note 303, at 42.
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while delegating masses of detail in administration to those whom he fully
trusted. "Together, the eager president and his ambitious team in the
executive branch dominated the federal government from 1963 to 1969.s12
As another example of Johnson's insistence on fierce loyalty from
subordinates, when it came time to appoint a head to his Cabinet
Department of Housing and Urban Development, everyone expected that
Johnson would appoint Robert Weaver, administrator of the Housing and
Home Finance Agency, as the first black Cabinet member.3 3 Before giving
him the post, however, Joseph Califano, who was one of Johnson's closest
aides, remembered howJohnson
made it clear he could break or make Weaver-by doing both. He
gave me a glimpse of the trait that sometimes drove him to crush
and reshape a man before placing him in a job of enormous
importance, much the way a ranch hand tames a wild horse before
mounting it. To Johnson, this technique helped assure that an
appointee was his alone."'
And when it became clear that he did not "own" his subordinates, Johnson
dismissed them forthwith, as in the case of Robert MacNamara, who made
the mistake of disagreeing with the President's policy in Vietnam.315
Johnson was a workaholic who wanted "to outdo his predecessors in the
field of foreign affairs"; Bornet reports that Johnson counted every meeting
he had had with a foreign head of state compared with his four predecessors
and was pleased that he far exceeded them, particularly in meetings held
outside the United States."' Johnson was also very aware "that his was the
finger on the button" for starting a nuclear war, and he insisted "that the
buck would "stop with him on matters involving central war or peace." 1 7
Johnson micro-managed law execution in a way that certainly asserted
presidential power, but that would be seen as offensive today. For example,
Bornet reports:
When an FBI agent hesitated to check the phone records of the
Republican vice-presidential candidate, Spiro Agnew, Johnson
himself "came on the phone and proceeded to remind [the agent]
that he was commander in chief and he should get what he
wanted." Johnson aides used presidential powers to push agents to
check on matters they thought promising."8

312.
313.
314.

Id. at 43.

315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 494-95.
BORNET, supra note 303, at 191.
Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 207-08.

DALLEK, supra note 304, at 288.

Id. at 229 (quotingJoe Califano).
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Bornet adds that "President Johnson was a person who inhaled every detail
of the national budget, kept track of the votes and predilections of even the
most obscure congressman, and had time to find out many obscure
things. 3 19 He was certainly aware of the extra-legal surveillance activities of
the FBI, and he "knew about the secret taping of phone conversations "in
the Oval Office, for it was done by a secretary on his signal.... National
power were placed above the Constitution
safety and, sometimes, personal
" 32
0
and the law in those years.
Notwithstanding Johnson's great attention to details, the administration
of many of the programs in his war on poverty was surprisingly poor.
Bornet reports that the "administration of the [Office of Economic
Opportunity] proved to be a nightmare" and that "' [a] nti-poverty programs
became political pork-barrel-type programs and were taken over by
sophisticated middle-class bureaucrats."' These administrative problems
were made more significant because the total number of federal employees
increased from 1,100,000 in 1963 to 1,300,000 in 1969, and two new cabinet
departments, Housing and Urban Development and Transportation, were
322
added during the Johnson years.
The cumulative effect of Great Society legislation was to produce
far greater problems of executive structure and coordination than
had existed at any other time, except perhaps during the Civil War,
the Great Depression, and World War II. The problems were
capacity of the
permanent, [experts assert] "threatening the
" 32
administrative system to fulfill policy objectives. 3
The Johnson years were also marked by the assassinations of Malcolm
X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, as well as many other
threats to the faithful execution of federal laws. Bornet observes that
Johnson was surprisingly lax in his law-execution efforts in response to some
of these threats, in part because of the liberal outlook of his Attorneys
General. Bomet states:
Riots, mass demonstrations, and defiance of the federal
government's authority to. draft youths for military service
combined to make law enforcement difficult. Johnson accepted the
burden with marked reluctance, given his public emphasis on
positive factors. His attorney generals [sic] knew that the law of the
land had to be enforced, but they hoped that, somehow,

319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.at 208.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 243.

323.

Id.

(quoting JAMES T. BENNET & MANUEL H. JOHNSON, THE POLITIcAL ECONOMY OF

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GROWTH, 1959-1978, at 29-33 (1980)).
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expenditures on education, money for better food and housing,
3'24
and a multitude of services would keep crime from growing.
This laxity in law enforcement was surprising because in all other respects,
during theJohnson years, "the executive branch ... developed, in the hands
of this leader and his
associates, into a dynamic administrative unit never
32
likely to be equaled." 5
Johnson also strongly resisted attempts by Congress to limit his
authority to administer the laws. For example, Congress passed a bill in 1966
that purported to restrict the President's authority to propose a financial
plan for agricultural research for fiscal year 1968. 326 Johnson indicated that
he would ignore the provision as an improper infringement upon executive
power by stating:
The provision thus clearly intrudes upon the Executive function of
preparing the annual budget. In developing the budget for fiscal
1968, I will give careful consideration to the view of Congress
expressed in this act-but I will propose an agricultural research
program designed and financed to make the best possible use of
the resources available to us.327
Two months later, after the Secretary of Commerce exercised his authority
under a previously enacted statute to impose export controls on leather and
cattle hides, Congress attached a rider to the Commerce Department's
appropriations bill prohibiting the Department from using any appropriated
funds to enforce the export controls.12s Johnson complained that "inthis
rider... Congress attempts to control the manner in which the Export
Control Act is to be administered. 3 2 9 These objections notwithstanding,
Johnson signed the bill; foreign demand for hides had fallen to the point
where the Secretary was planning on dropping the controls anyway.
However, since conditions might again require the imposition of export
controls on leather, Johnson directed the Secretary of Commerce and the
Director of the Budget to submit legislation removing this restriction.33 0
The following year, Johnson objected that three provisions of the
Military Construction Authorization Act of 1968331 were "inconsistent with
324. Id. at 247-48.
325. Id. at 351.
326. Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 89556, 80 Stat. 689, 690 (1966) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 612c (2002)).
327. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of Agriculture and Related
Agencies Appropriation Bill (Sept. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 980, 981.
328. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-797, § 304, 80 Stat. 1479, 1497.
329. Statement by the President Expressing Disapproval of Appropriation Act Provision
Relating to Export Control of Hides, Skins, and Leather (Nov. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS
1351, 1351.
330. Id.
331.
Pub. L. No. 90-110, 81 Stat. 279.
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the sound management of America's military establishment and raise
''
questions concerning the constitutional separation of powers. " 3 In these
provisions, the Act prohibited Johnson from closing the Naval Academy's
dairy farm,3s froze the present geographic boundaries and headquarters of
34
and prohibited the Department of the Army
the eleven Naval Districts,
Johnson's signing
from closing a particular installation in Hawaii .
statement dripped with sarcasm when he quipped, "Thus the Congress,
which has given the Navy Department authority over the world's most
" ss6
powerful fleet, has withdrawn the Department's authority over 380 cows.
337
In the end, however, the dairy remained open.
Johnson also issued more general directives to the executive officers, for
example ordering them to continue the antidiscrimination and affirmative338
Like
action programs begun during the Kennedy Administration.
as
powers
Kennedy, Johnson did not rely upon his defense or procurement
Rights
Civil
enacted
the basis for his actions, nor did he rely upon the newly
Act of 1964. Instead, Johnson followed Kennedy's example and simply
invoked "the authority vested in [him] as President of the United States by
39
Courts and
the Constitution and statutes of the United States."
issued the
Johnson
whether
determine
to
struggled
commentators have
powers as
implied
his
under
or
authority
statutory
to
order pursuant
340
president.

332. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization Act,
1968 (Oct. 21, 1967), in 1967 PUB. PAPERS 935, 935.
333. § 810(a), 81 Stat. at 309.
334. § 1001, 81 Stat. at 310.
§ 809, 81 Stat. at 309.
335.
336, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization Act,
supra note 532, at 935.
May, supra note 302, at 943-44.
337.
See supranotes 271-75 and accompanying text.
338.
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965). This order expanded the Kennedy
339.
Administration's program in two significant ways. First, it applied the antidiscrimination
prohibitions to all of a contractor's activities during the performance of the contract, not just
those activities connected with the contract. Second, it expanded the program to include sex
discrimination. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 CF.R. 339 (1964-1965). See generally James L.
Moeller, Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to Regulate Employment
Discrimination,43 MO. L. REv. 451, 456-61 (1978).
340. As noted earlier, the jurisdictional basis of the nondiscrimination executive orders has
traditionally been construed as resting on the executive power vested in the President by Article
11. See supra notes 122-24, 273-74 and accompanying text; Contractors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor,
442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that even if not statutorily authorized, Executive
Order No. 11,246 falls within the president's implied authority to act in the absence of a
contrary statute). Some courts nonetheless persisted in viewing Executive Order 11,246 as being
based on the procurement statute. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459,
466-67 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978); N.E. Constr.
Co. v, Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Contractors Ass'n, 442 F.2d at 171; Legal
Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Papermakers
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Johnson also pioneered what would emerge as a critical device in
allowing the president to control the execution of the law when he began
using the oversight responsibilities of the Bureau of the Budget to influence
the development of important agency regulations. 34' Thus Johnson plainly
had little doubt about his authority to control the execution of the laws. It is
symptomatic of Johnson's views that he "pocket vetoed a bill creating an
independent
maritime
administration,
and thus
the
Maritime
Administration remained in the Department of Commerce."342
Johnson exerted his influence over the independent agencies as well.
When he met with the heads of the commissions shortly after taking office,
his remarks indicated a broad view of presidential responsibility and left
little doubt that presidential intervention would be forthcoming if and when
the commissions failed to discharge their responsibilities in a manner
consistent with the President's policies. 43 Consistent with this vision,
Johnson directed the heads of three commissions involved in the regulation
of transportation to begin intra-agency consultations on their problems. A

Local 189, 282 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. La. 1968); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. Dist., 249
N.E.2d 907, 909-10 (Ohio 1969). But see Cramer v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673,
680 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holding that the order was foreclosed by statute); Blumstein, supra note
124, at 927-32, 939-49 (arguing that the order is not justified either by the Constitution or by
statute); Moeller, supra note 338, at 479-87 (same); Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The
PhiladelphiaPlan:A Study in the Dynamicsof Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 733 (1972). See
generally James A. Hardgrove, Note, The PhiladelphiaPlan, 45 NOTRE DAME L REV. 678, 685-88
(1970); Note, supra note 124, at 383.
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 raised a whole new round of questions about
the propriety of these executive orders. Opponents of the executive order argued that in
passing Title VII of the Act, Congress had explicitly prohibited the use of quotas and that policy
preempted the President's authority and that the House's failure to pass an amendment
explicitly authorizing the executive antidiscrimination program suggested that it was
unauthorized. The order's supporters pointed out that the Senate's failure to pass an
amendment that would have explicitly provided that Title VII constituted the exclusive remedy
for discrimination bolstered the imposition of additional antidiscrimination protection. See, e.g.,
James E. Jones, Jr., The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 wIs. L. REV. 341, 388-94; Earl M.
Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the PhiladelphiaPlan, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 84, 102-09 (1970); Blumstein, supra note 124, at 939-49; Hardgrove, supra, at
687-95; Moeller, supra note 338, at 482-87; Schuwerk, supra, at 733-38; Karen Ann Sindelar,
Note, Employment Discrimination Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.: Does Title VII
Limit Executive Order 11246, 57 N.C. L. REV. 695, 699-714 (1979); Note, The PhiladelphiaPlan:
EqualEmployment Opportunity in the Construction Trades, 6 COLUM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187, 224-29
(1970); Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 596-600 (1969). Regardless of how this controversy is resolved, Johnson's
actions clearly indicate that he believed he had the authority to direct the manner in which the
subordinate executive officers executed the laws.
341.
Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shfi of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of
EnvironmentalProtection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA.J. NAT. RESOURCES
L. 1, 9 (1984).
342.
LEWIS, supra note 34, at 34.
343.
Remarks at a Meeting with the Heads of Independent Regulatory Agencies (Dec. 3,
1963), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 18.
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Bureau of the Budget circular also established guidelines on the
responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and other executive
agencies in the acquisition of water data. 44 Additionally, 'Johnson, ever the
New Dealer faithful to the conviction that consolidation of control in the
executive assured greater economy and efficiency, intended to create a
Department of Transportation responsible for all phases of national mobility
and safety." 34 5 And in an attempt to make the nation's cities more habitable,
Johnson created the Cabinet Department of Housing and Urban
Development. 1Johnson also severely cut NASA's budget,14 ' and made sure
Department "to be sure those damned
to have "Johnson men" in the State
"4
0 8
fools didn't do something stupid.
Furthermore, Johnson ardently opposed the legislative veto as an
unconstitutional infringement on the unitary executive. Rather than vetoing
bills with legislative vetoes embedded in them, Johnson tended to use
signing statements to construe the legislation in a manner that preserved its
constitutionality. For example, within the first few weeks of his
Administration, Johnson criticized a provision of the Public Works
Appropriation Act that prohibited the Panama Canal Company from
disposing of any real property without obtaining the prior approval of
congressional committees. 349 Condemning the committee veto as either "an
unconstitutional delegation to Congressional committees of powers which
reside only in the Congress as a whole, or an attempt to confer executive
powers on the committees in violation of the principle of separation of
powers set forth in the Constitution," Johnson directed the Secretary of the
Army to treat the provision as a request for information rather than a formal
committee veto. 330 Similar signing statements followed.5

344.
Circular No. A-67 (Bur. of Budget Aug. 28, 1964) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
Seegenerally Redford, supra note 191, at 318-19.
345.
346.

DALLEK, supra note 304, at 313.
Id. at 228.

Id. at 423.
Id. at 144 (quoting Michael V. Forrestal, NSC member).
Pub. L. No. 88-257, 77 Stat. 844, 847 (1963).
349.
Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Works Appropriations Act
350.
(Dec. 31, 1963), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 104, 104 & n.1.
351.
In signing the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. I..
No. 88-638, 78 Stat. 1035,Johnson objected to two legislative veto provisions. One provision
347.
348.

seeks to give either the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry a veto
power over certain proposed dispositions of foreign currencies accruing from sales
under Public Law 480. The other seeks to prevent the President from making
certain loans at interest rates below a specified level unless he has concurrence of
an advisory committee composed in part of Members of Congress and in a part of
his own executive appointees.
Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Agricultural Trade and Assistance
Act (Oct. 8, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 1249, 1250. Since "[b]oth such provisions
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Johnson's opposition to legislative vetoes was so strong that he refused
to accept provisions first enacted during the Eisenhower Administration that
prohibited Congress from appropriating funds for particular uses unless a
particular committee had given its prior approval, on the grounds that they
were the functional equivalents of legislative vetoes.95 2 When confronted
with such a provision in the Water Resources Research Act of 1964, 35
Johnson directed the Secretary of the Interior not to request any funds
under the Act. Although Johnson acknowledged that such provisions were
technically constitutional, he still objected to them in principle and refused
to implement the Act until Congress eventually amended the legislation to
remove the committee approval provision.354 Johnson later went so far as to
veto legislation containing such a provision, concluding that such committee
approval "seriously violates the spirit of the division of powers between the
legislative and-executive branches" and "infringes upon the responsibilities
of the executive branch." 55 AsJohnson reasoned, "[t]he executive branch is
given, by the Constitution, the responsibility to implement all laws-a
specific and exclusive responsibility which cannot be shared with a
committee of Congress." Johnson accordingly withheld his approval from
the bill until the offending provision was removed.ab Johnson entered
similar objections throughout the balance of his Administration.35
represent[ed] a clear violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers,"Johnson
directed executive officials to keep Congress informed and consult with them on all aspects of
the law. Id.
Later that same month, Johnson signed legislation requiring that the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Director of Central Intelligence for the establishment and
maintenance of the retirement system were not to take effect until approved by the chairmen
and ranking minority members of the Armed Services Committees. Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-643, 78 Stat. 1043, 1043. Johnson noted that "Isluch a
provision attempts to confer executive powers on the members of the legislative branch, in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers." Statement by the President
Upon Approving Bill Authorizing a Retirement System for Certain Employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency (Oct. 14, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 1336, 1336. Accordingly, Johnson
instructed the Director to "treat the provision as a request for consultation with the named
committee members." It. See generally Watson, supra note 96, at 1026-27.
352. Since Congress is free to establish its own rules of procedure, and these provisions only
served to limit the discretion of Congress before it enacted legislation while not limiting the
discretion of the executive branch after legislation had been enacted, Eisenhower had accepted
such provisions as constitutional.
353. Pub. L. No. 88-379, § 200, 78 Stat. 329, 331.
354. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Water Resources Research Act (July 17,
1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 861, 862. The provision was deleted by the Act of Apr. 19, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-404, 80 Star. 129. See also May, supra note 302, at 939-40; Watson, supra note 96,
at 1027.
355. Lyndon B. Johnson, Veto Message (June 5, 1965), reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 12,639
(1965).
356.
Id.
357. Four months later, Johnson objected to a committee-approval provision in the
Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act, Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 201(a), 79 Star. 1073, 1073 (1965),
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Finally, Johnson even objected to the one type of provision that every
previous president had agreed was constitutional: the "report and wait"
provision. Although Johnson indicated that he would accept a "reasonable
30-day period of notification" to congressional committees, the proposed
Military Construction Act required that the administration wait 120 days.
Although again not technically unconstitutional, Johnson nonetheless
vetoed the bill, condemning it as "repugnant to the Constitution" and "a
fundamental encroachment on one of the great principles of the American
Constitutional system-the separation of powers between the Legislative and
Executive branches."058 Johnson continued: "By the Constitution, the
executive power is vested in the President .... [The President] cannot sign
" 59
0
into law a bill which substantially inhibits him from performing his duty.
As a result, Johnson concluded that "[t]he limitations upon... the
executive branch of the government here sought to be imposed are a clear
violation of separation of powers .... The Congress enacts the laws. Their
execution must be left to the President. 'ON It is "the President [who] is
responsible ... for the faithful execution of the laws enacted by Congress.
Johnson supported his conclusion by quoting James Madison's statement
during the Decision of 1789 and by noting that "Attorneys General in
unbroken succession since at least the time of President Wilson" had
opposed the use of such legislative vetoes. 362 Johnson eventually signed
concluding that acceding to such a provision "would make the President a parmer in the
abdication of a fundamental principle of our Government-the separation of powers
prescribed by the United States Constitution," which "would dilute and diminish the authority
and powers of the Presidency." Statement by the President Upon Signing the Omnibus Rivers
and Harbors Act (Oct. 26, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 1082, 1082-83. Unlike the previous
provision, the provision contained in this legislation was optional rather than obligatory.
Because nothing in the Act prevented Johnson from signing it and then directing his
Administration not to exercise the authority provided by the Act until the provision was
removed, Johnson concluded that the better course would be to sign the bill so that the
remaining legislative provisions could be enacted. Id. at 1083; see aLto May, supra note 302, at
939; Watson, supra note 96, at 1027-28.
The following year, Johnson criticized a provision that prohibited Congress from
appropriating funds for rural-renewal loans unless that loan had been approved by the
Agriculture Committees. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-796, 80 Stat. 1478 (amending the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-703, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 605, 608). Johnson
called such provisions "repugnant to the Constitution. They represent an improper
encroachment by the Congress and its committees upon executive responsibilities, and dilute
and diminish the authority and powers of the Presidency." Statement by the President Upon
Signing Bill Amending the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act (Nov. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB.
PAPERS 1354, 1354. Therefore, Johnson directed the appropriate Departments to submit
corrective legislation and ordered his Administration not to approve any loans which would
require committee approval. Id.
358. Veto of the Military Authorization Bill (Aug. 21, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 907, 907.
Id.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id.
Id. at 908.
Id.
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corresponding legislation that contained a more modest, thirty-day waiting
period.163 However, Johnson again objected when Congress attempted to
extend the waiting period to thirty days of continuous congressional
session.64 Johnson expressed his doubts as to whether such a waiting period
was reasonable and warned that his "responsibilities as President and
Commander in Chief will require [him] to seek prompt revision of the
restriction65 if future circumstances prove it to be inimical to the national
interest."0
Thus Johnson opposed the legislative veto more vehemently than any
other previous president. Moreover, Johnson consistently objected to
congressional efforts to encroach upon his authority and he resolutely
asserted his control over all parts of the executive branch. The conclusion
thus becomes inescapable that there was no acquiescence in any diminution
of the unitary executive during Lyndon Johnson's presidency.

V. RICHARD M. NIXON
Richard M. Nixon came to the presidency with a deep admiration for
the system of cabinet governance that he thought had prevailed during the
Eisenhower Administration. His initial plan was to let department heads run
their programs quite independently while he concentrated on foreign
policy.366 But, during his five-year tenure in office, he appointed thirty
cabinet heads, breaking the old record held by Ulysses S. Grant, and the
median length of tenure of cabinet secretaries fell from forty months to
eighteen. 367 Nixon was not afraid to make removals, as the frequent turnover
in his cabinet secretaries illustrates. Indeed, he began his second term by
asking for the resignations of all his cabinet secretaries so that he could
decide which ones to retain. %8He noted in doing this that once a cabinet
official has been in place for a while, the bureaucracy starts to run him
instead of the other way around.36 9
As early as the middle of 1969, Nixon "had begun to rethink his
approach to the cabinet,"3 70 and "[als the White House weakened the power
of the departments, Nixon's chief of staff became more important."3 7 ' H.R.
363.
Military Construction Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 89-188, 79 Stat. 793, 818 (1965);
Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization Act (Sept.
16, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 1003; see also Watson, supra note 96, at 1028.
364.
Military Construction Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 89-568, § 613(2), 80 Stat. 739,
757 (1966).
365.
Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization Bill
(Sept. 12, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 1008, 1008.
366.

MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON 37 (1999).

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 40.
Id.at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 41.
SMALL, supra note 366, at 42.
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Haldeman, Nixon's first chief of staff, became Nixon's buffer, and anyone
who wanted to see Nixon had to go through Haldeman to talk to the
President, which Nixon later conceded was a mistake.
Alexander Haig,
who ultimately replaced Haldeman as chief of staff, functioned much the
same way with Nixon praising
him as "the meanest, toughest, most ambitious
3 73
son of a bitch I ever knew."
Notwithstanding the many troubles that would eventually come to
engulf his Administration, Richard Nixon proved to be a stalwart defender
of the president's authority to execute the laws. 74 For example, Nixon
protected the president's removal power when he successfully resisted
Congress's attempt to remove his 0MB Director, Roy Ash, and his Deputy
0MB Director, Fred Malek, by abolishing their positions and reestablishing
them subject to Senate confirmation. 375 Nixon complained that "[t]his
legislation would require the forced removal by an unconstitutional
1,376
procedure of two officers now serving in the executive branch.
The
president's "power and authority to remove, or retain, executive officers"
was "deeply rooted in our system of government."3 77 Although Nixon did
"not dispute Congressional authority to abolish an office or to specify
appropriate standards by which the officers may serve," Nixon vetoed the bill
because "the power of the Congress to terminate an office cannot be used as
,, 378
a back-door method of circumventing the president's power to remove.
Nixon eventually prevailed in his defense of the removal power when, after
failing to override Nixon's veto, 3 9 Congress amended the legislation the
next year to require Senate confirmation only of future OMB Directors and
Deputy Directors. 3 °
A major administrative change that Nixon ushered in was the
transformation of the Bureau of the Budget, created under President
Harding and moved to the White House by FDR, into the modern, more
372.
Id. at 42-43.
373.
Id. at 45.
374.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation:Separation of Powers in the Reagan
Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 401, 401 (1989) ("The Nixon years were characterized by aggressive
assertions of presidential power vis-a-vis Congress.... .").
375.
Congress's efforts were similar to the efforts during the Truman Administration to
remove officials in the Bureau of Reclamation by changing the qualifications for their offices.
See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
376. Veto of a Bill Requiring Senate Confirmation of the Director and Deputy Director of
the Office of Management and Budget (May 18, 1973), in 1973 PUB. PAPERS 539, 539.
377.
Id.
378. Id. Nixon closed by quoting James Madison's ringing endorsement of the separation of
powers in the Decision of 1789. Id. at 540 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581 (1789)).
379. Although the Senate voted 62-22 to override the veto, 119 CONG. REC. 16,507 (1973),
the House failed to follow suit, voting 236-178 to sustain the veto, id. at 16,773.
380. Act of Mar. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, 88 Stat. 11; see Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 78 (3d ed. rev., 1991) [hereinafter FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS]; Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 51-55 (1975).
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powerful Office of Management and Budget. Nixon's biographer, Melvin
Small, describes this change as meaning that "[i] nstead of just clearing all
budgets except for those of the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense
before they were sent to Congress, the OMB would be concerned with policy
and operations management. This was another way for the White House to
exert more control over the departments."1' This was a crucial step in
reinforcing the unitary executive because the power of OMB could be
centrally harnessed by the president to bring recalcitrant cabinet
departments and agencies into line. Political scientist David Lewis notes that
"[t] he Office of Management and Budget... is also a source of presidential
institutional memory. The OMB has historically sought to increase
presidential influence and control. It is the locus of administrative
management in the executive establishment." 3s2 In fact, during his second
term, Nixon had hoped to expand the management authority of OMB,383
but he was soon overwhelmed by the Watergate scandal.
Nixon began his efforts to assert control over the executive branch by
expanding the program of White House oversight of regulatory policy
begun during the Johnson Administration . 4 Nixon's program was initially
restricted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which Nixon
created by executive order in 1970 and the regulations of which he sought
to subordinate to OMB's centralized clearance. 8 5 The Nixon oversight
program began on May 21, 1971, when OMB Director George Shultz sent a
memorandum to EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus requiring OMB
cost-benefit clearance for all EPA decisions that were expected to have a
significant impact on the policies of other agencies, impose significant costs
on non-federal sectors, or "create additional demands on the federal
budget."086 Nixon later expanded this initiative into a larger program termed
which required agencies to submit covered
"Quality of Life" review,

381.
382.
383.

SMALL, supra note 366, at 49-50.
LEWIS, supra note 34, at 71.
SMALL, supra note 366, at 271.

384.

See supra note 341 and accompanying text.

385.
Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
386. Letter from OMB Director George P. Shultz, to EPA Administrator William D.
Ruckelshaus (May 21, 1971), quoted in 2 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING IN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 86 (1977).
387. Memorandum from George P. Shultz, Agency Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines
Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and Occupational and Public
Health and Safety (Oct. 5, 1971), cited in Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive
Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at
127, 128 n.4. For general descriptions of Quality of Life Review, see Michael Herz, Imposing
Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 221 (1993); Moreno,
supra note 105, at 488-89; James T. O'Reilly & Phyllis E. Brown, In Search of Excellence: A
Prescription for the Future of OMB Oversight of Rules, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 421, 424-25 (1987);
Percival, supra, at 133-38; Caroline DeWitt, Comment, The President's Council on Competitiveness:
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regulations thirty days before draft publication, along with an analysis of the
rule's objectives, alternatives, and expected costs and benefits. 0MB then
solicited comments from other agencies, which were forwarded to the
agency proposing the rule. A similar process, focusing on public comments
and new issues raised during the rulemaking, was required twenty days
before the publication of final rules.
Although the program was nominally extended to all federal policy
proposals involving consumer protection, public health and safety, and
occupational health and safety, in practice, EPA remained the only agency
routinely required to submit its proposals to OMB. 88 In addition, 0MB
theoretically only facilitated inter-agency comments and mediated interagency conflicts; the issuing agency ostensibly retained control over the final
decision. In practice, OMB was able to use Quality of Life review to effect
significant changes in EPA policy.189 Nixon further strengthened his control
over regulatory policy on July 31, 1972, when 0MB Circular A-19 required
reports, or legislation to OMB
that agencies "submit proposed testimony,
"9 °
prior to their transmission to Congress.
The extent to which Nixon centralized administrative control in OMB is
underscored by the fact that leading EPA administrators were unable to
obtain written assurances that they retained independent decisional
authority. 391 It is true that these administrators sometimes threatened to
resign over their inability to obtain assurances that they would have the final
say over EPA regulations.392 Such threats are properly regarded as being
consistent with the unitary executive, rather than evidence of agency
independence as some have suggested,398 since resignation or removal is the
natural outcome under our theory when an executive official finds himself
or herself out of step with administration policy.
Nixon extended the policy initiated by Kennedy of extending the civil
service protection enjoyed by veterans to all federal employees. A pair of
executive orders giving nonveterans the right to appeal adverse employment

Underminingthe AdministrativeProcedureAct with Regulatory Review, 6 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 759, 76970 (1993).
388.
But see Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialPower and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J.
451, 466 (1978) (describing 0MB intervention in NHTSA rulemaking).
389.
Robert V. Percival, PresidentialManagement of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary
Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 988-89 (2001).
390.
391,

Percival, supra note 387, at 137.
Percival, supra note 389, at 989 n.154 (citing JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA:

AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 119 (1976)).

392.
See id. at 988-89 (citing Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970-Part I
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d
Cong. 325 (1972) (statement of EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus), and QUARLES, supra
note 391, at 119).
393.

See id.
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actions to the Civil Service Commission
and revoking the agency review
process established by Kennedy in favor of exclusive review by the Civil
Service Commission395 in effect extended the procedural protections of the
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 to all federal employees, veterans and
nonveterans alike. This action is fully consistent with the unitary executive
because, as we have noted, the procedural protections were not construed as
placing any limits on the president's unfettered power to remove.396 In
addition, the fact that the president had the power to remove Civil Service
Commissioners at will s 9 7 rendered any authority wielded by the Commission
unproblematic from the standpoint of the unitary executive.
That said, we acknowledge that the Nixon Administration did bear
witness to the emergence of the first real limits on the president's removal
power over the civil service. Interestingly, the threat to presidential power
came not from Congress, but rather from the courts. The Supreme Court
began to recognize that the civil service laws gave federal employees a
sufficient property interest in their jobs to give them the benefit of
procedural due process protections when fired. 98 And, even then, such
noted commentators as Gerald Frug criticized the Court's decisions as
starkly ahistorical and inconsistent with the longstanding, judicially
recognized tradition of unfettered presidential removal.39 9 In any event,
contrary to popular belief, the idea that the civil service laws limit the
president's power to remove is of fairly recent vintage dating hack only to
1974. Given the Court's acknowledgement in INS v. Chadha400 that the fact
that presidents since the Wilson Administration had consistently opposed a
particular practice was sufficient to keep a question open as a constitutional
matter, it is hard to see how this development could turn the civil service
laws into an established derogation of the unitariness of the executive
branch.
Nixon also asserted his authority to direct federal officials' execution of
the laws. As one example of this, Nixon continued the program initiated by
Johnson's executive order requiring that government contractors institute
affirmative action plans.4 ° ' Invoking the President's authority under the
394.
395.

Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 22,3 C.F.R. 191, 204 (1971), reprintedinS U.S.C. § 7101.
Exec. Order No. 11,787, 3 C.F.R. 876 (1971-1975).

396.

See supra notes 172-80, 278-85 and accompanying text.

397.
398.

See Calabresi &Yoo, supra note 20, at 788; Frug, supra note 172, at 955.
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151 (1974). Arnett followed from the Court's

decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), regarding the dismissal of state employees. Id.
399. Frug, supra note 172, at 977-89. As Professor Frug notes, both Roth and Sindermann
involved teachers who alleged that they were removed for their exercise of their constitutional
right to free speech. As a result, these cases could have been resolved under Wieman and
Pickeringwithoutresorting to judicial innovation. Id. at 977-78.
400.
401.

462 U.S. 919,942 n.13 (1983).
See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
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Constitution and the statutes of the United States, Nixon issued an executive
order declaring a federal policy of nondiscrimination in federal employment
and ordering very agency to institute an affirmative action program.40 ' The
Comptroller General issued a series of opinions suggesting that the order
was unenforceable because it did not spell out the minimum requirements
of a satisfactory affirmative action program.4 °3 In response, Secretary of
Labor George Shultz issued a revised version known as the Philadelphia Plan
that gave more specific guidance on what was required.4 4 After the
Comptroller General ruled that the additional guidance provided by the
Philadelphia4 Plan imposed quotas in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 , Attorney General John Mitchell issued an opinion clarifying
4405

that the Plan involved mere goals, not quotas, 406 an opinion that Shultz
accepted.40 7 Finally, after a complicated series of legislative maneuvers,
Congress ended future questions about the Philadelphia Plan's legitimacy in
1972 by unequivocally approving the President's authority to mandate
affirmative action programs. 4 8 But until that point, Nixon, like Kennedy and
Johnson before him, had derived the authority to require executive branch
affirmative action programs directly from his authority to control the
execution of federal law.
Nixon also undertook efforts to dominate the independent agencies.
Nixon's efforts were based on the conclusion of the Advisory Council on
Executive Organization (commonly known as the "Ash Council" after its

402.
Exec. Order No. 11,478, §§ 1-2, 3 C.F.R 133, 134 (1969).
See, e.g., Ernst-Theodore Arndt, 52 Comp. Gen. 145 (1972); Alton Box Bd. Co., 51
403.
Comp. Gen. 551 (1972); Sher and Harris, 50 Comp. Gen. 844 (1971); Apache Flooring Co., 50
Comp. Gen. 627 (1971); Sec'y of Labor, 49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969); Rep. William C. Cramer, 48
Comp. Gen. 326 (1968); Rep. William C. Cramer, 47 Comp. Gen. 666 (1968).
404. SeeContractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 1971).
405.
49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969).
406.
42 Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1969); Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Legal
Memorandum: Authority Under Executive Order 11246 (July 15, 1969), reprinted in The
Philadelphia Plan-CongressionalOversight of Administrative Agencies (The Department of Labor):
Hearingson the PhiladelphiaPlan and S. 931 Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciasy,91st Cong. 255-74 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Phila. Plan Hearings]. The
conflict between the Comptroller General and the Attorney General raised an interesting
question "whether the Executive branch of the Government has the right to act upon its own
interpretations of the laws enacted by Congress, and to expend and obligate funds approved by
Congress in a manner which the [Comptroller General's] Office, as the designated agent of the
Congress, has found to be contrary to law." Note, supra note 340, at 229 (quoting Senate Phila.
Plan Hearings, supra, at 139 (Staats statement)); Schuwerk, supra note 340, at 748. Clearly,
under the unitary-executive theory, subordinate executive officials are responsible only to the
President for their execution of the laws and not to the Comptroller General of Congress.
407. Jones, supra note 340, at 358-61, 364-73; Thomas D. Morgan, Achieving National Goals
Through Federal Contracts: Giving Frm to an UnconstrainedAdministrative Process, 1974 WiS. L. REv.
301, 311-12; Schuwerk, supra note 340, at 745-46.
See Schuwerk, supra note 340, at 757. For a discussion of the maneuvering that led up
408.
to the 1972 vote, see id. at 747-57.
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Chairman, OMB Director Roy Ash) that the commissions were "an anomaly
,,409
in government structure.
Independence had originally been intended to
shield the regulatory process from the partisanship of the executive branch,
but, instead, it had rendered the agencies "not sufficiently accountable to
either Congress or the executive branch. " ' Therefore, the Council
concluded, "[i]f regulation is to be more responsive to the public interest
and coordinated with national programs, it must first be brought within the
ambit of elective government, with accountability to those officials to whom
the public and the regulated industries alike look for fair and constructive
application of national policy." 41 To accomplish these goals, the Ash
Council recommended abolishing most independent agencies and
transferring their functions to newly created executive agencies headed by
single administrators serving at the President's pleasure.412 The adjudicativetype review previously performed by the independent agencies would
henceforth be conducted by the Administrative Court of the United
States.413 Only in that way could the President fulfill his constitutional duty

409.
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORYAGENCIES 13 (1971) [hereinafter

ASH COUNCIL REPORT]. See generally Moreno, supranote 105, at 487-88.
410. ASH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 409, at 14. The report elaborated:
Congress has conceived of these commissions as independent of executive branch
control, but in fact the commissions are almost as independent of Congress itself.
Apart from appropriations approval, periodic program review, and the
intermittent interest of one or several of its members, Congress does not exercise
the degree of oversight with respect to regulatory commissions that it does for
executive departments and other agencies of the executive branch. Congress has
sought to preserve the independence of the regulatory commissions, even as their
activities increasingly affect the implementation of national policy. The executive
branch, responsible for carrying out national policy, has been reluctant to support
reforms needed to integrate regulatory activities with executive programs because
the President does not have sufficient responsibility for commission direction.
Id- at 14-15.
411.
Id. at 16. The Ash Council later noted:
Accountability is an essential element of democratic government. The Congress
and the President are accountable to the people for the performance of
government. In turn, agencies of government headed by appointed officials should
be responsive and responsible to the Congress, to the Executive, and through
them, ultimately to the public.
Without clear accountability for performance to either Congress or the
President, it is not surprising that the agencies receive inadequate attention.
Id. at 40; see also id. at 15 ("Independence, and the resulting absence of regulatory
accountability, has transferred to a generally shielded arena those questions which should be
settled in a more open forum.").
412.
Id. at 4-5, 20.
413.
Id. at 6, 22.
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41 4
and his role as the
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed
person to whom the American public "looks ... for leadership in pursuing
41 5
national policy goals, including those affected by the regulatory process.
Bolstered by the proposals of the Ash Council, Nixon proposed a
massive government-wide reorganization in which all executive functions
would have been consolidated into four new superagencies. This proposal
41
eventually sank during the controversy caused by the Watergate scandal.
In the meantime, Congress defended its ability to control the independent
agencies by considering a proposal to make the commissions even more
independent of presidential control than they already were, by permitting
them to transmit their budget requests directly to Congress. Although this
proposal eventually failed, Congress did subsequently enact legislation
417
to Congress,
authorizing a few agencies to submit their budgets directly
418
and it granted independent litigating authority to the FTC.
At one point during the Nixon Administration, Congress even
considered a proposal to turn the Department of Justice into an
independent agency. 419 The Administration challenged the constitutionality
of this proposal through the able testimony of Assistant Attorney General
Robert G. Dixon, Jr. As Dixon noted, the Article II Vesting Clause and the
Take Care Clause compelled two conclusions: "First, the enforcement of the
laws is an inherently executive function, and second, the executive branch
42
has the exclusive constitutional authority to enforce laws.", Dixon also
argued that making the Department ofJustice independent was ill advised as
a matter of democratic political theory. As Hamilton recognized in The
Federalist No. 70, and the Landis Report and the Ash Council had recently

The Ash Council noted, "The President is responsible under article l[I] of the
414.
Constitution to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' That duty extends to the
activities of the regulatory agencies to assure that the laws enacted by Congress are carried out
effectively and fairly." Id. at 16. The Ash Council also contended that the fact that previous
presidents had offered similar regulatory reform proposals demonstrated that "these Presidents
presumably felt that such recommendations were part of their responsibility to oversee faithful
execution of the laws." Id. Furthermore, the inclusion of the independent regulatory
commissions in the President's reorganization power demonstrated that Congress also
"recognized the President's role in the regulatory scheme." Id.
415. ASH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 408, at 16.
416. Percival, supra note 387, at 133 n.28.
See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLicrs, supra note 380, at 191-92.
417.
418. Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576,
591-92 (1973). Nixon approved of this provision in return for the authorization of the TransAlaska Oil Pipeline. See Devins, supra note 159, at 270-71.
419. Under this proposal, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Solicitor
General would serve six-year terms and would be removable by the President only for "neglect
of duty or malfeasance of office." S. 2803, 93d Cong. § 2(c) (1973).
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
420.
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary on S. 2803 and S. 2978, 93d Cong. 84
(1974) [hereinafter 1974 Senate Committee Hearings] (statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
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reaffirmed, a plural executive would tend "to conceal faults, and destroy
responsiblity. 4 2 Finally, Dixon argued that "an 'independent' Department
ofJustice would be a constitutional anomaly fundamentally inconsistent with
the whole theory of a tripartite government envisioned by the Founding
422
Fathers and specified in the first three articles of the Constitution."
Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach agreed, arguing that the
president "is responsible for the administration of the law and should be,
and can be, held accountable for that stewardship., 423 Even Archibald Cox
opposed the notion that the Attorney General should be made independent
of presidential control: "I believe in focusing individual responsibility ....
There is no substitute for that responsibility. No president should be
relieved of it--or of the consequences of default." 42 4 Indeed, any attempt to
insulate the Attorney General from presidential direction would have the
effect of erecting the "presumption that our Attorneys General cannot be
be held
trusted. The presumption should be the other way, and they should
425
responsible when they were proved incompetent or unfaithful."
Perhaps most dramatically, Nixon asserted his right to control the
execution of the laws throughout the Watergate scandal. The issue first
arose during the hearings concerning Elliott Richardson's confirmation as
Attorney General. Richardson agreed, in principle, that a special prosecutor
should be appointed, but insisted on the importance "that the Attorney
General must retain ultimate responsibility" for the special prosecutor's
work. 426 Alternatively, the special prosecutor could be responsible only to the
chief executive, since "Executive power is vested in the President [by the
Constitution], and since it has been ruled by the Supreme Court that the
conduct of investigations and prosecutions as defined by the law are
executive branch functions." 42 7 Richardson insisted, "I know of no way
constitutionally whereby any individual who has been vested with
prosecutorial responsibility can be removed from responsibility to a superior
within the executive branch." 428
Nixon's belief in his sole authority to control the execution of the law
was demonstrated most dramatically by the "Saturday Night Massacre," in
which he directed Attorney General Richardson and Deputy Attorney
421.
Id. at 86.
422. Id. at 89.
423.
Id. at 153 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Former Attorney General).
424. Id. at 209 (statement of Archibald Cox, Former Special Prosecutor in the Department
ofJustice).
425. 1974 Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 420, at 211 (statement of Archibald Cox,
Former Special Prosecutor in the Department ofJustice).
426.
Nomination of Elliot L Richardson to Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the.
Judiciary, 93d Cong 5 (1973) [hereinafter Richardson Confirmation Hearings]
(testimony of Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Defense).
427.
Id. at 132.
428.
Id. at 139. See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 31-34.
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General William Ruckelshaus to remove Archibald Cox as Watergate special
prosecutor, notwithstanding the Justice Department order granting Cox the
"greatest degree of independence that is consistent with the Attorney
General's statutory accountability" and providing that Cox would not be
removed "except for extraordinary improprieties on his part."429 After
Richardson resigned and Ruckelshaus was removed for refusing to fire Cox,
the task fell to Solicitor General Robert Bork. Although regrettable, the
Saturday Night Massacre remains a vivid, if controversial, assertion of
Nixon's belief in his authority to control the execution of the law.
The Nixon Administration continued to press its belief in the
impropriety of insulating executive functions from presidential control
when opposing the welter of bills seeking to authorize the appointment of
temporary special prosecutors under the control of the courts. In Senate
hearings on the legislation, Acting Attorney General Bork testified that
"[tihe executive alone has the duty and the power to enforce the laws by
prosecutions brought before the courts." 43 0 Giving such authority to another
branch "is simply not our system of government. 43 ' Bork offered a similar
observation in his testimony before a House subcommittee, arguing that
"[t]o suppose that Congress can take that duty from the Executive and lodge
it in either itself or in the courts is to suppose that Congress may by mere
legislation alter2 the fundamental distribution of powers dictated by the
43
Constitution."
Over time, many leading Department of Justice officials have
questioned the conventional wisdom that the Saturday Night Massacre
showed the need for a prosecutorial institution operating independently of
presidential control. 33 The political uproar following Cox's dismissal forced
Nixon to appoint another special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, who completed
the Watergate investigation and drove Nixon out of office. The aftermath to
the Saturday Night Massacre showed how political constraints can ensure the
effectiveness of investigations of high-level government misconduct without
resort to constitutionally problematic institutional arrangements. From this
perspective, it is Jaworski's successful completion of the Watergate

Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (June 4, 1973).
429.
430.
Special Prosecutor:Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 451 (1973)
(statement of Acting Attorney General Robert Bork).
Id.
431.
432.
Special Prosecutor and Watergate GrandJury Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 253 (1973). See generally EASTLAND,
supra note 6, at 40-41.
433.
The Future of the Independent CounselAct: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Senate Committee Hearings) (testimony of
former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell); itdat 57 (testimony of former Independent Counsel
Joseph E. diGenova); id at 148 (testimony of Clinton counsel Robert S. Bennett); id. at 245
(testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno); id.at 425 (testimony of Independent Counsel
Kenneth W. Starr).
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prosecution rather -than Cox's removal that shows the central lesson for the
separation of powers. Regardless of where one comes down in this debate,
the fact remains that Cox's removal and the Administration's opposition to
congressional attempts to authorize special prosecutors operating
independently of presidential control represent prominent examples of
Nixon's steadfast insistence on the unitariness of the executive branch.
Nixon had an extraordinary belief that, as president and pursuant to his
implied powers, he could authorize FBI actions on national security grounds
that were otherwise in violation of statutes. This was a Lincolnian claim of
emergency power made during an emergency far less dire than Lincoln had
faced in the Spring of 1861. Thus, Nixon defended a plan targeted at violent
radicals such as the Black Panthers against charges of illegality by saying that
"when the president approves an action because of national security,
because of a threat to internal peace ... the President's decision ...is one
43 4
that enables those who carry it out to carry it out without violating a law."
This view that as president he could sanction actions in violation of statutes
is one reason that Nixon was quite deserving of being the first president in
American history to be forced to resign. A related step Nixon took was to
impound funds appropriated by Congress so executive employees could not
spend them. 435r This practice was eventually stopped by Congress in 1974,
when Nixon had been weakened by Watergate and Congress passed by
overwhelming majorities the Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which
made it very hard for future presidents to impound funds.3 6 The Act also,
unfortunately, established the Congressional Budget Office as a counterweight to OMB.437
One remarkable feature of the Nixon White House was the
organization of the "White House Special Investigations Unit," later known
as the Plumbers, to undertake illegal activities such as breaking into the
office of Nixon foe Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist-an illegal action that
Nixon appears to have ordered.43 This action was ultimately followed by a
group of White House operatives breaking into the headquarters of the
Democratic National Committee, thus launching the Watergate scandal.43 9
Ultimately, Nixon's presidency was undone by "a variety of illegal and
extralegal political actions directed by the president and his chief assistants,
including the former attorney general of the United States, that attempted
to subvert the American political system." 44°

434.
435.

SMALL, supranote 366, at 57.
Id. at 200.
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437.
438.
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Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 237-38.
SMALL, supranote 366, at 256.

440.

Id. at 273.
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Nixon presided over the transformation of the Postal Service "from the
cabinet to become the independent, self-supporting U.S. Postal Service,
owned by the federal government. ' 44' In one sense this action weakened
presidential control over postal employees. At the same time, it improved
the quality of service of the Post Office, and there is nothing in the theory of
the unitary executive to preclude the government from owning a
corporation as federal property.
Nixon also opposed congressional attempts to interfere with the
president's execution of the laws through the legislative veto. Although he
did not continue Johnson's opposition to "report and wait provisions" or
committee approval requirements directed at Congress,442 Nixon offered
numerous objections to provisions more properly regarded as legislative
vetoes. For example, Nixon objected to a provision of the Second
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1972 that subjected approval of three
building projects to a committee veto. 4 43 According to Nixon, such
committee vetoes "infring[ed] on the fundamental principle of the
separation of legislative and executive powers., 444 After Congress persisted in
its efforts to44 include
a committee veto, 445 Nixon announced that he would
6
it.
disregard
Nixon also objected that a committee veto contained in the Public
Buildings Amendments of 197244' was an unconstitutional "infring[ement]

441.
Id. at 196.
442. Early in his Administration, President Nixon announced that "this Administration will
interpose no objection to the procedures involved in the accomplishment of watershed projects
under" the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act and released the funds impounded by President
Johnson. Memorandum from President Richard M. Nixon to Secretary of Agriculture Hardin
(Mar. 27, 1969), quoted in Watson, supra note 96, at 1029; see also Louis Fisher, The Politics of
Impounded Funds, 15 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 361, 374 (1970). Nixon subsequently approved a similar
provision in the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, noting that "[t]he Congress regards this
'no appropriation may be made' provision as internal Congressional rulemaking which does
not affect the executive branch. This Administration has acquiesced in that construction."
Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972 (June 17, 1972), in 1972
PUB. PAPERS 686, 687 (approving of Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-313,
§ 7(a), 86 Stat. 216, 221); see also Statement About Signing the Second Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1972 (May 28, 1972), in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 627, 627 ("The Congress regards
this 'no appropriation may be made' provision, I understand, as internal Congressional rulemaking not affecting the executive branch, and this Administration has acquiesced in that
construction."). Nixon thereafter signed numerous such provisions into law without comment.
See generally Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 96, at 284; Watson, supra note 96, at 1029.
443.
175.

Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-306, 86 Star. 163,

444.
Statement About Signing the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1972, supra
note 442, at 627.
445. Act ofJune 14, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-313, § 5(f), 86 Stat. 216, 220.
446.
Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972 (June 17, 1972),
in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 686, 687; see also Watson, supra note 96, at 1025 n.215.
447.

Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-313, §§ 5(f), 7, 86 Stat. 220, 221.
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upon the fundamental principle of the separation of legislative and
executive powers" because it conditioned "the authority of the executive
branch upon an action by committees of the Congress." Consequently,
President Nixon directed the General Services Administration to disregard
those legislative-veto provisions and submit remedial legislation.448 Relatedly,
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution, in part because of the legislativeveto provision it contained. 44 9 Even thbugh Nixon did subsequently sign
several legislative-veto provisions into law without comment, 450 his previous
objections were doubtlessly sufficient to preserve his constitutional challenge
for the purposes of coordinate construction.
Although Richard Nixon's presidency was deeply problematic because
of the many violations of federal law that he committed, Nixon did not
acquiesce in any deviation from the theory of the unitary executive. We
believe that Congress was right to force Nixon to resign under threat of
impeachment, but it is vital to remember that this was accomplished without
an independent-counsel law. Watergate thus shows not that such a law is
needed, but rather that the traditional system of checks and balances can be
made to work.
VI. GERALD R. FORD
When Gerald R. Ford came to the White House, he had every reason to
expect that he would be hard pressed to defend the prerogatives of the
executive branch, given that Watergate had effectively destroyed public
confidence in the presidency. Moreover, having never run for national
office, Ford lacked the mandate and the broad base of political support
needed for vigorous presidential action. More than any other post-World
War II president, one could have -expected Ford to acquiesce in
congressionally imposed invasions on the unitariness of the executive
branch. Instead, Ford held firm and defended the unitariness of the
executive.
When Ford assumed office, his biographer, John Robert Greene, notes
that "[p]olitical sagacity dictated that [he] fire the Nixon people as quickly
as possible and when he installed his own advisers that he steer clear of a

448. Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, supra note 446, at
687-88.
449. Veto of the War Powers Resolution (Oct. 24, 1973), in 1973 PUB. PAPERS 893, 893, 895
(objecting that the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), violated the
Constitution). Congress overrode Nixon's veto. 119 CONG. REC. 36,198, 36,221-22 (1973). See
generally Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428 & n.21 (1978); Watson, supranote 96, at 1016 n.160.
450.
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107; Act of Oct. 21,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-520, sec. 3, §. 18(d)(4), 86 Stat. 1019, 1021; Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627. Nixon even proposed a legislative-veto
provision, but he eventually vetoed the underlying legislation on other grounds. See Watson,
supra note 96, at 1016 n.160. See generally id. at 1009, 1016 n.160, 1026 n.215, 1029.
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Haldeman-like chief of staff."45 1 Ford immediately indicated that White
House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig could stay on for a short while, but that
4 52
Rumnsfeld's
he would soon be replaced by a young Donald Rumsfeld.
strong personality guaranteed that there would be at least some centralized
control of White House operations and of the executive branch more
generally. During the one-month honeymoon period between Nixon's
resignation and Ford's pardon of Nixon, public opinion began to support
the idea of a strong cabinet, "[a] s most of the country had come to view the
Nixon White House as a fortress where access was forbidden and advice
ignored."453 Ford made some moves toward a stronger cabinet, but he did
not totally buck the modern trend toward strong White House staffs. "The
pattern that actually emerged in Ford's administration fell in between these
extremes of policy development. Ford's style with his cabinet was neither as
heavy-handed 454as Nixon's nor did it offer a collegial return to cabinet
government."
The first two major issues of the Ford presidency emerged one month
into his Administration when he pardoned both former President Richard
M. Nixon and many of those individuals who had evaded the draft during
the Vietnam War. These two pardons "destroyed [Ford's] honeymoon with
the American people." 455 The pardon of the draft evaders was a major
decision about the execution of the criminal laws based on Ford's belief that
it was necessary to bring to an end the "'long national nightmare' of the
sixties."456 This pardon gave Ford a reputation as a conciliator, 57 and it was
in accord with previous exercises of the pardon power to bring the
American people together after a major war.
The question of whether to pardon Nixon had "hung over the
administration like the sword of Damocles," since it had been a major item
of discussion at Ford's first cabinet meeting.45 8 Ford felt the pardon was
appropriate both because of Nixon's precarious health-a trial might have
killed him-and because he wanted to, in the language of the Preamble of
the Constitution, "ensure domestic tranquility." 4 9 Obviously, the two
pardons together were a major executive decision made by Ford personally
about what degree of law enforcement would best serve the interests of the
nation. The fact that Ford made these two law-enforcement decisions

451.
452.
453.

JOHN ROBERT GREENE, THE PRESIDENCY OF GERALD R. FORD 24 (1995).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 28.

454.
455.
456.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 35.
GREENE, supra note 451, at 39.

457.
458.
459.

Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 52.
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himself as the nation's chief law-enforcement officer is telling support for
the theory of the unitary executive.
After the Nixon pardon, congressional power vis-A-vis the executive
branch began to grow enormously, continuing a trend that began in the
Johnson and Nixon Administrations. The public perception of the time was
that there had grown up what was called, in Arthur Schlesinger's words, an
and that the time had come to restore some power to
imperial presidency
Congress. The "stinging" and "bipartisan" opposition on Capitol Hill to the
Nixon pardon began a long process of power flowing away from the White
House.46 1 "A new day had dawned, and Ford had to work in that new dayclearly, the locus of power in the federal government had shifted back from
the White House to Capitol Hill. 4 62
After two of Richard Nixon's Attorneys General were convicted of
crimes, it was essential that Ford pick a person of impeccable character to
serve in that role. Ford did precisely that by turning to Edward Levi, then
the president of the University of Chicago. "Levi made it clear to Ford early
in the nominating process that he would not take the job unlessJustice was
made apolitical."463 Ford and Levi together faced many crises, including the
threat of violence attending school desegregation in Boston. "Ford was ready
to intercede if violence broke out. He had ordered the Department of
Defense to put fifteen hundred troops of the Eighty-second Airborne on an
increased state of readiness, which would allow them to be in Boston in nine
hours., 46 4 This shows how seriously Ford took his obligation faithfully to
execute the laws.
In May 1975, Ford presided as Commander in Chief over the rescue of
American passengers and crew on the Mayaguez, a ship that was captured by
the Cambodians. Strikingly, Ford took military action without consulting
Congress under the recently enacted War Powers Act, 46 5 and when members
of Congress complained about his failure to consult them he said, "It is my
constitutional responsibility to command the forces and to protect
Americans."466
In November 1975, Ford made major personnel changes in his
Administration that showed he was not afraid to remove people when he
thought it necessary to do so. First, Ford asked for the resignations of
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby. He
also removed the ailing Rogers Morton as Commerce Secretary, and he
stripped Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of his second job as White House
460.
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National Security Advisor. 67 George H.W. Bush replaced Colby at the CIA;
Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger at the Pentagon; and a young Dick Cheney
replaced Rumsfeld as White House Chief of Staff.4 m The next day, it was
announced that Ford would drop Vice President Nelson Rockefeller from
the ticket when Ford ran for reelection in 1976. This was a move to reach
out to conservatives then gathering around the White House candidacy of
Ronald Reagan, since conservatives detested Rockefeller and were certain to
be disappointed by Ford's firing of Schlesinger.4 69 With these bold and
decisive personnel moves, Ford showed that he and he alone was firmly in
control of the executive branch.
There was one other prominent removal during the Ford years: the
firing of Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz in the middle of Ford's reelection
campaign. Butz foolishly told off-color jokes to Rolling Stone Magazine
correspondent John Dean that were subsequently published in the national
press to the great embarrassment of the Administration. "On Monday
morning Butz met with Ford; around noon, with tears in his eyes, he went
before the press and resigned. Ford's assessment of Dean was entirely
predictable: 'a low-down, no-good, son of a bitch. A sniveling bastard." 70
Ford took other steps that demonstrated his willingness to take control
of his Administration. For example, Ford did not hesitate to direct the
actions of subordinate executive officials, at one point directing the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to suspend a rule so that it
could be reexamined. 47' Ford also continued the Quality of Life program
begun by President Nixon, adding the requirement that major rules include
an "inflation impact statement" comparing the costs and inflationary effects
with the benefits of the rules. 472 These statements would then be reviewed by
the newly formed Council on Wage and Price Stability, although such review
would only proceed after the proposed rule had been published in the
Federal Register and the Council had no power to mandate changes in the
rules.473
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Ford also rebuffed congressional attempts to impinge upon the
president's authority to execute the law as seen when members of the Ford
Administration testified against the establishment of independent
prosecutors. Attorney General Levi maintained that the creation of a special
474
prosecutor appointed by the judiciary was "constitutionally dubious."
Assistant Attorney General Michael M. Uhlmann challenged the
constitutionality of the proposal as well, on the grounds that control of
prosecution lay at "the very core of 'executive functions.'- 475 Deputy
Attorney General Harold Tyler, Jr., similarly criticized the proposal as
"constitutionally inappropriate" because "[u] nlike any other officer of the
Executive branch [the special
prosecutor's] removal would be beyond the
476
discretion of the President."
Ford instead offered a proposal in which special prosecutors would be
appointed by the president to three-year terms, confirmed with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and subject to supervision and removal by the
Attorney General. 47 The Senate approved Ford's proposal by a vote of
ninety-one to five, but the House declined to do so on the grounds that the
creation of a permanent position would lead to the instigation of too many
special-prosecutor investigations. Members of the I-louse instead favored a
temporary special prosecutor appointed by a special panel of judges.478 In
retrospect, it is now clear that the House had it precisely backwards. It is the
absence of executive control rather than the permanence of the office that
represents the greater danger. 479 However, the fact that Congress declined to
enact this legislation does not weaken the constitutional import of the
President's insistence that executive functions remain subject to presidential
control.
As a Congressman, Ford had supported the creation of an independent
consumer agency, but in 1975 President Ford announced that he had come

AM. U. L. REV. 1138, 1160-61 (1977). Others have disagreed, arguing that the inflation impact
statements amounted to little more than "post-hocjustifications for decisions already reached."
O'Reilly & Brown, supra note 387, at 427; seealso Bruff, supra, at 547; Moreno, supra note 105, at
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to oppose the idea, and was able to kill the plan with a veto threat. 4s° David
Lewis observes:
Ford's change of heart about the wisdom of a new independent
consumer agency coincided with his move from the House of
Representatives to the White House. He is an excellent example of
how the incentives of presidents are different from those of
members of Congress and how much influence presidents can have
481
over the design of administrative agencies.
Furthermore, after a slow start,48 2 Ford began to challenge the
legislative veto as an impermissible invasion of the unitary executive. At first,
Ford was only willing to question the device, issuing a signing statement
challenging the legislative veto as improperly "inject[ing] the Congress into
the process of administering education laws" and "attempting to stretch the
constitutional role of the Congress. ,48 3 Although Ford acknowledged that
"[t]he Congress can and should hold the executive branch to account for its
performance," he also recognized that for "Congress to attempt to
administer Federal programs is questionable on practical as well as
constitutional grounds. "4 4 Accordingly, President Ford "asked the Attorney
General for advice on these provisions."4 5 Two months after seeking
guidance from the Attorney General, Ford's opposition to these provisions
stiffened when he vetoed a bill because it contained a two-house legislative
veto. 496 Ford also objected to legislative vetoes twice more in 1975, calling
power.,487
the legislative veto "an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional

LEwis, supra note 34, at 70.
Id. at 70-71.
482.
During the early stages of the Ford Administration, President Ford signed numerous
bills containing legislative vetoes without any objection. Dixon, supra note 449, at 428; Watson,
supra note 96, at 1016 n.160, 1029.
483. Statement on the Education Amendments of 1974 (Aug. 21, 1974), in 1974 PUB.
PAPERS 35, 37.
480.
481.

484.
485.

Id.
Id.

Veto of Atomic Energy Act Amendments (Oct. 12, 1974), in 1974 PUB. PAPERS 294, 294
486.
(objecting that the legislative veto violated Article I, section 7, of the Constitution). As Professor
Dixon has noted, this was "one of the more unusual versions of a legislative veto." Dixon, supra
note 449, at 430 n.24. Under the vetoed provisions, the Act would not become effective until
after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy submitted its evaluation of a particular study and
Congress adopted a concurrent resolution. "In effect, Congress here was reversing the normal
legislative process and asking for presidential approval of substantive legislation before
Congress was ready to commit itself to support the legislation." Dixon, supra note 449, at 430
n.24. President Ford suggested that the bill was "merely the expression of an intent to legislate,"
rather than actual legislation. Veto ofuAtomic Energy Act Amendments, supra, at 294.
487.
Statement on Signing a Bill Amending Child Support Provisions of the Social Security
Act (Aug. 11, 1975), in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 1148, 1149; Statement on Signing the Amtrak
Improvement Act of 1975 (May 26, 1975), in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 724, 724. Ford nonetheless
signed the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-25, sec. 8, § 404(c) (3), 89 Stat. 90,
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In the latter of these two instances, Ford instructed the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare "to treat this provision.., simply as a request for
information about the proposed standards in advance of their
promulgation. ,,488 Furthermore, Assistant Attorney General Antonin
Scalia
•
489
tirelessly testified before Congress in opposition to the legislative veto.
But it was not until 1976 that Ford offered his boldest criticisms of the
4
legislative veto.
entered no fewer than six vetoes and five signing
492
. " Ford
.
statements criticizing the legislative veto, basing many of his objections on
the unitariness of the executive branch. 49' At one point, Ford noted:
The exercise of an otherwise valid Executive power cannot be
limited by a discretionary act of a committee of Congress nor can a
91, "because the Nation needs the important passenger rail service it will provide." Statement
on Signing the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1975, supra, at 724.
488. Statement on Signing a Bill Amending Child Support Provisions of the Social Security
Act, supra note 487, at 1149.
489. Dixon, supra note 449, at 428 n.22 (citing numerous testimonials by Scalia in
Congressional hearings: CongressionalReview of Administration Rulemaking Hearingson H.R.3658,
H.R. 8231, and related Bills Before the Subcomm. on AdministrativeLaw and Governmental Relations of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1975); Congressional Oversight of
Executive Agreements-1975: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 167, 173-74, 183-87 (1975);
Improving Congressional Oversight of Federal Regulatory Agencies: Hearings on S. 2258, S. 2716, S.
2812, S. 2878, S. 2903, S. 2925, S. 3318, and S. 3428 Before the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81, 124 (1976); Congressional Review of International
Agreements: Hearings on H.R. 4438 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientific Affairs
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1976)); Symposium,
Oversight and Review of Agency Decisionmaking PartII, Morning Session, 28 ADMIN. L. REv. 661, 68495, 700-01 (1976) (remarks ofAntonin Scalia)).
490. Seeid.
at 429-30 n.24 (noting Ford's growing opposition to legislative vetoes). Ford's
attack on the legislative veto occurred at a time when the House had passed a proposal to
subject all agency rules to a legislative veto. 122 CONG. REC. 31,668 (1976); see also FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 380, at 142.
491. Remarks Upon Vetoing the Hatch Act Amendments Bill (Apr. 12, 1976), in 1976-77
PUB. PAPERS 1114; Veto of the Foreign Assistance Bill (May 7, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS
1481, 1482; Veto of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Bill (July 7, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB.
PAPERS 1984; Veto of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Extension Bill (Aug.
14, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2144; Memorandum of Disapproval of the International
Navigational Rules Act of 1976 (Oct. 10, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB.PAPERS 2481; Memorandum of
Disapproval of the Agricultural Resources Conservation Bill (Oct. 20, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB.
PAPERS 2583; see also BOLTON, supra note 229, at 10 n.24; Dixon, supra note 449, at 429-30 n.24.
492. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1976 (Feb. 10,
1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 241, 242; Statement on Signing the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976 (May 11, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1529, 1530; Statement on
Signing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (July 1,
1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1936, 1937; Statement on Signing the National Emergencies Act
(Sept. 14, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2249; Statement on Signing the Veterans' Education
and Employment Assistance Act of 1976 (Oct. 15, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2538, 2539; see
also Dixon, supra note 449, at 429 nn.2--24.
493. Ford also challenged the legislative veto as a violation of Article I, section 7. See, e.g.,
Statement on Signing the National Emergencies Act, supra note 492, at 2249. •
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committee give the Executive a power which it otherwise would not
have. The legislative branch cannot inject itself into the Executive
functions, and opposition to attempts of the kind embodied in this
494
bill has been expressed for more than 50 years.
Similarly, Ford later objected that legislative-veto provisions "purported to
involve the Congress in the performance of day-to-day executive functions in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers, resulting in the erosion
of the fundamental constitutional distinction between the role of the
Congress in enacting legislation and the role of the executive in carrying it
49 5
Ford repeatedly announced his support for challenging the
OUt."
constitutionality of the practice in court.49 6
Thus, even though Ford at times tolerated the enactment of legislative
vetoes,497 there can be little doubt that Ford raised numerous objections and
exerted sufficient control over his subordinates, overcoming any suggestion
that he acquiesced in congressional interference in the execution of the
laws. Despite all the handicaps that Gerald Ford faced as an unelected

494.
Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1976, supra
note 492, at 242.
495.
Statement on Signing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976, supra note 492, at 1937; see also Statement on Signing the National Emergencies
Act, supra note 492, at 2249 ("Such provisions are contrary to the general constitutional
principle of separation of powers whereby Congress enacts laws but the President and the
agencies of government execute them."); see also BOLTON, supra note 229, at 12.
Statement on Signing the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, supra
496.
note 492, at 1530 ("direct[ingl the Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of [the
legislative veto] at the earliest possible opportunity"); Statement on Signing the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, supra note 492, at 1937 (reserving his
right to challenge the constitutionality of a legislative-veto provision); Statement on Signing the
National Emergencies Act, supra note 492, at 2249 (noting that the Attorney General was
challenging the constitutionality of the legislative veto in the Federal Election Campaign Act).
Despite its stated intentions, the Ford Administration's brief in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), chose to portray the Federal Election Commission as a legislative agency and to
argue that as a legislative agency it could not constitutionally exercise any executive functions.
Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11020, Buckley (No. 75-436). This position necessarily forced the Ford Administration to forego any
challenges to the legislative veto, since any vetoes over the Connission's actions could not be
cast as an attempt by Congress to control an executive officer or as a method by which Congress
could change the law without presidential participation. Id. at 111-12. In accordance with tie
Administration's position, the Supreme Court did not reach the issues surrounding the
legislative veto. 424 U.S. at 140 n.176 (per curiam). But see id. at 284-85, 285-86 (White, J.,
dissenting) (defending the constitutionality of the legislative veto). The Ford Administration
did intervene as a plaintiff in a suit brought by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
challenging the constitutionality of the legislative veto. This case, however, was dismissed as
unripe. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc), affd sub nom. Carl v.
Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977); see also May, supra note 302, at 943.
See BOLTON, supra note 229, at 10 n.24; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLIcTS, supra
497.
note 380, at 142-43; May, supra note 302, at 942.
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president and as a result of the Nixon pardon, Ford still emerged as a steady
defender of the president's authority to execute the laws.
VII.JIMMY CARTER
The Administration of Jimmy Carter almost certainly represents the
nadir of presidential power in the post-World War II era. Unable to
articulate a clear vision for the country and beset by the oil and Iranian
hostage crises, Carter proved ill-suited to assume the strong leadership role
taken by many of his predecessors. 48 His political weaknesses, however, did
not translate into a willingness to allow control over the execution of the law
to be transferred from the White House to Capitol Hill. On the contrary, in
spite of its other problems, the Carter Administration appears, for the most
part, to have solidly defended the unitariness of the executive branch.
At the outset, it must be noted that that Carter wanted to run his own
White House and thus began his Administration with no strong White
House chief of Staff. Carter's biographer, Burton I. Kaufman, reports that:
Carter organized the White House staff intending that his cabinet
secretaries have direct access to him. In particular, there was to be
no chief of staff able to control and regulate the vital arteries of
communication between the Oval Office and the rest of the
administration-as had H.R. Haldeman during the Nixon
administration, and, to a lesser extent, Richard Cheney and Donald
Rumsfeld during the Ford administration. 99
Carter was obsessed with detail and spent too much time planning his
Administration during the transition5°° and then throughout the course of
his presidency.
By the end of his first year in office, this combination of attention to
detail and close management led "[v]oters... [to complain] that the
president was trying to do too much at once, [and] that he was trying to do
too much himself."5 1 This overreaching was evident in all policy areas,
including foreign policy, which was being made in the Oval Office and not
the State Department. 5 2 After a major cabinet shake-up toward the end of
his Administration, following his famous speech in which he claimed that
the nation was suffering from a spirit of malaise, 50 3 "Carter named Hamilton
Jordan as chief of staff and instructed the rest of the White House to obey

498.
In fact, Carter has subsequently indicated that he actively sought to reduce the
imperial status of the Presidency. JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH 27 (1982).
499. BURTON I. KAUFMAN, THE PRESIDENCY OFJIMMY CARTER 27 (1993).
500. Id.
501.
Id. at 65.
502. Id. at 37.
503. Energy and National Goals Address to the Nation (July 15, 1979), in 1979 PuR. PAPERS
1235, 1237.
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Jordan's orders 'as if they were the president's own.'"504 This was a response
to critics who had believed Carter needed a strong chief of staff to keep both
the President and the White House running smoothly.505
Jimmy Carter was not at all shy about using the removal power. During
the major cabinet shake-up alluded to above, in which Health, Education,
and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano, Treasury Secretary Michael
Blumenthal, and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger were all essentially
fired,5 °6 Carter requested the pro forma resignations of all his Cabinet
members so he could decide which ones he wanted to keep. In addition,
there were a number of other very dramatic removals from office during the
Carter years. After General John K. Singlaub, the third-ranking army officer
in Korea, publicly said that Carter's removal of troops from South Korea
would in his judgment lead to war, the President "immediately relieved
Singlaub of his command and ordered him home," thus "[r]eplicating
President Harry Truman's firing of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 for
questioning official policy." 50 7 During the scandal involving his OMB
in
Director Bert Lance, Carter essentially pushed Lance into resigning
what was effectively the removal of one of his best friends. Finally, with
Carter's support, Attorney General Griffin Bell fired a Ford-holdover U.S.
Attorney in Philadelphia, David Marston, in yet another dramatic illustration
power.509
of the Carter Administration's broad willingness to use its removal
But most important are the specific efforts President Carter made in the
wake of Richard Nixon's forced resignation from office to protect
presidential prerogatives from a self-aggrandizing Congress. Critically, the
Carter Administration shelved a proposal, advanced during the 1976
presidential election campaign, to respond to Watergate-era abuses by
turning the entire Justice Department into an independent agency with the
Attorney General appointed for a fixed ten-year term. Carter himself
endorsed this idea on Meet the Press, but, once he took office, Attorney
General Griffin Bell squashed the proposal.
In order to convince the President of the problems with turning the
Justice Department into an independent agency, Bell wrote of his "serious
doubt as to the constitutionality" of the plan."50 According to Bell, "[tlhe
first sentence of Article II vests the executive power of the Government in
the President and charges him with the general administrative responsibility
for executing the laws of the United States."" When combined with the
504.

KAUFMAN, supra note 499, at 146.

505.

Id.

506.
507.
508.

Id. at 145.
Id.at 47.
Id.at 63.

509.
510.
511.

KAUFMAN, supra note 499, at 79.
1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 75, 75 (1977).
Id.
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Appointments and Take Care Clauses, Bell concluded that "the President is
given not only the power, but also the constitutional obligation to execute
the laws.,'5 2 Moreover, Bell pointed out that the Supreme Court had made it
clear in Myers v. United States5 13 that "the President's freedom to remove
executive officials cannot be altered by legislation."5 4 This was particularly
true for the Attorney General:
The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the
United States. He acts for the President to ensure that the
President's constitutional responsibility to enforce the laws is
fulfilled. To limit a President in his choice of the officer to carry.
out this function or to restrict the President's power to remove him
would impair the President's ability to execute the laws.
Indeed, the President must be held accountable for the actions
of the executive branch; to accomplish this he must be free to
establish policy and define priorities. Because laws are not selfexecuting, their enforcement obviously cannot be separated from
policy considerations. The Constitution contemplates that the
Attorney General should be subject to policy direction from the
President. As stated by the Supreme Court: "The Attorney General
is... the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the
United States... be faithfully executed." Removing the Attorney
General from the President's control would make him
unaccountable to the President, who is constitutionally responsible
for his actions.515
Finally, Bell went on to argue that any limitation on the president's
power to remove the Attorney General, even if self-imposed by executive
order, "would be restricting [the president's] ability to fulfill his
constitutional responsibility to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
That constitutional responsibility for the execution of the laws cannot be
waived., 516 Thus, Bell concluded, "there is no method, short of a
constitutional amendment, to separate the Attorney General from
Presidential control."5 1 7 That Carter was willing to embrace these arguments
despite his campaign promise to take the contrary approach is further
evidence that he supported the idea of a unitary executive at least to some
extent. But to some degree, the Carter Administration's ability to resist

512.
513.
514.
515.
254, 262
516.
517.

Id. at 75.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 76.
Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S.
(1921)).
Id. at 77.
Id. See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 43-44.
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encroachments on presidential authority to execute the laws was limited by
the shadow of Watergate, as is demonstrated by the fate of the
Administration's constitutional objections to a troika of ethics-reform
proposals enacted over a two-week span in 1978.
The first big piece of reform legislation passed was the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978,18 which created a regime of judicially appointed
special prosecutors to investigate and prosecute high-level wrongdoing in
the executive branch. This was a watered-down version of the
unconstitutional idea of making the whole Justice Department an
independent agency. 5 ' g With respect to this Act, John Harmon, Carter's
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, suggested that
the provision of the Act that vested the power to remove special prosecutors
in a special panel of the D.C. Circuit raised "serious constitutional
questions."52 0 In addition, there were serious questions about the need for
such a statute. When allegations of presidential misconduct had surfaced
regarding a money-laundering scheme involving the Carter peanut
warehouse, Attorney General Griffin Bell had appointed his own special
prosecutor, subject to his supervision and removal. This special prosecutor
had then successfully completed his investigation in an exemplary manner
that enjoyed widespread public confidence. 5" This arguably suggested that
52
no regime ofjudicially-appointed special prosecutors was needed. 2 Indeed,
over time, Jimmy Carter'sJustice Department and his two Attorneys General
'
were to emerge as leading critics of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.5 Assistant Attorney General Harmon's discussion of the removal
provisions is a study in lawyerly circumspection, noting that the Justice
524
Harmon observed that
Department had no objections to the provisions.
under Myers, Congress may not ordinarily impose limits on the president's
power to remove, and he said it was not altogether clear whether the
Humphrey's Executor exception to Myers applied to special prosecutors.
Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (2000)).
518.
519. GRIFFIN B. BELL& RONALDJ. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 28 (1982).
Special ProsecutorLegislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crimin at Justice of the House
520.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 19 (1977) (testimony of John Harmon) [hereinafter Harmon
Testimony]. Congress responded in part to this concern by amending the legislation to place
the removal power in the Attorney General but prohibiting such removals except for
"extraordinary impropriey, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such special prosecutor's duties." § 596, 92 Stat. at
1872; see also EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 145 n.6; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra
note 380, at 77; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 475, at 145-46.
521.
Harmon Testimony, supra note 520, at 19.
522. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3541.
See 1999 Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 433, at 28-30 (testimony of former
523.
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Post-WatergateLegislation in Retrospect, 34
Sw. LJ. 1043, 1052-56 (1981); A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute, 49
MERCER L. REv. 457, 465-65 (1998) (comments of former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell).
524.

Harmon Testimony, supra note 520, at 19-21.
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Despite his Justice Department's misgivings about judicially appointed
special prosecutors, Carter had little choice but to overlook the
constitutional problems and sign the independent-counsel bill into law.i 2 In
the wake of Watergate and the criminal convictions of two of Richard
Nixon's Attorneys General, there was an extraordinary need to restore
public confidence in the government. For these reasons, the Justice
Department was willing to experiment with limited unconstitutional
restraints on the president's removal power.52 " This experiment was a
mistake by the Carter Administration, but it must be seen in light of the fact
that the Administration fought very hard and largely successfully to preserve
presidential control over the Department of Justice in the face of a hostile
Congress. The Ethics in Government Act was a small price to pay for the
greater goal of preventing a post-Watergate Congress from turning the
whole Justice Department into an independent agency.
The second big piece of reform legislation was the Inspector General
Act of 1978, which vested the existing audit and investigative authority
previously held by each of the executive departments in an independent
527
Office of Inspector General.
Each Inspector General was required to
report the results of such audits or investigations to the head of the
department and to make general reports to Congress on a semi-annual
basis. 528 The statute also required that the president communicate the
529
reasons for removing any inspector general to both houses of Congress.
John Harmon denounced this legislation as making "the Inspectors
General subject to divided and possibly inconsistent obligations to the
executive and legislative branches, in violation of the doctrine of separation
of powers."530 For example, he believed that the provision requiring that the
inspectors general report directly to Congress impermissibly interfered with
the president's authority to control the execution of the laws. As the opinion
pointed out:
Article II vests the executive power of the United States in the
President. This includes general administrative control over those
executing the laws. The President's power of control extends to the
entire executive branch, and includes the right to coordinate and

525.
See Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Remarks on Signing S. 555 into Law (Oct. 26,
1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1854; Ethics in Government: Message to the Congress (May 3,
1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 786, 788.
526.
Public Officias Integrity Act of 1977; Blind Trusts and Other Conflicts of Interest Matters:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong. 15-17 (1977). See generally
EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 57-58.
527.
528.
529.
530.

Pub. L. No.95-452, § 3(b), 92 Stat. 1101, 1102.
§ 5(a)-(b), 92 Stat. at 1103, reprinted in5 U.S.C. app. at 16-17 (2000).
§ 3(b), 92 Stat. at 1102, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 13 (2000).
1 Op.Off. Legal Counsel 16, 17 (1977).
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supervise all replies and comments from the executive branch to
Congress. 55

Moreover, the requirement that the President provide Congress with
reasons for any removal of an inspector general constituted "an improper
restriction on the President's exclusive power to remove Presidentially
appointed executive officers.35 ' Although the opinion acknowledged the
exception created by Humphrey's Executor and Wiener for quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative officers, "the power to remove a subordinate appointed
officer within one of the executive departments is a power reserved to the
President acting in his discretion." 53 Furthermore, the opinion stated that
the Inspector General Act violated the unitariness of the executive branch
by authorizing the comptroller general to prescribe the audit standards that
would apply to the executive branch .
The third big piece of reform legislation was the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, 515 which grew out of a bill submitted by Carter proposing that
the Civil Service Commission be replaced by two newly created agencies.
The Commission's administrative responsibilities would be transferred to
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), while its appellate functions
would be vested in the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and its
investigatory functions would be lodged in an Office of Special Counsel
within the MSPB. While this legislation was pending before Congress, Carter
issued a reorganization plan " and an executive order53 largely
implementing his legislative proposals.
When Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act, it retained the
same standard for dismissal that existed in previous statutes, allowing

531.
Id. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926); Cong. Constr. Corp. v.
United States, 314 F.2d 527, 530-32 (Ct. C. 1963)). The opinion also noted:
[T]he Justice Department has repeatedly taken the position that continuous
oversight of the functioning of executive agencies, such as that contemplated by
the requirement that the Inspector General keep Congress fully and currently
informed, is not a proper legislative function. In our opinion, such continuing
supervision amounts to an assumption of the Executive's role of administering or
executing the laws.
Id. By providing for unlimited access to executive branch materials, the bill also risked
infiinging upon executive privilege. Id. at 18.
532. Id. at 18.
533.

Id.; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 380, at 78.

534. See Charles J. Williams II, Comment, The New Separation of PowersJursprudenceand the
Controller General. Does He "Execute the Law" Under the Federal Employees' Retirement Act, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 35, 41 (1986) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 12 (1977)).
535. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
536. Reorg. Plan No. 2of1978,3 C.F.R. 323 (1978),reprintedin5 U.S.C. § 1101 app. at 1577
(1994), and 92 Stat. 3783 (1978).
537. Exec. Order No. 12,107,3 C.F.R. 264 (1978), reprintedin5 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
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"
removals "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. ,53
It added a list of prohibited personnel practices, including, among other
things, discrimination, political coercion, nepotism, and retaliation against
whisdeblowers. 5 9 In an apparent desire to limit the range of adverse action
that would be reversed on appeal, 540 the Civil Service Reform Act also scaled
back some of the procedural protections promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission in the aftermath of Arnett v. Kennedy.541 It also provided for
broader judicial review of adverse personnel decisions by giving the courts
jurisdiction to overturn MSPB decisions that were arbitrary or capricious,
obtained
without
applicable procedural protections, or unsupported by
subsantil
"- the 542
substantial evidence.
The statute did contain provisions exempting all
officials who were appointed by the president; who were confirmed by the
Senate; who served in the foreign service or for the Central Intelligence
Agency; or who were determined by the president, an agency head, or OPM
to occupy positions "of a confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or
policy-advocating character."543 By exempting all policymaking personnel,
this provision in effect limited the scope of the Civil Service Reform Act to
purely ministerial officials. As such, it did not represent a significant
derogation from the unitariness of the executive branch.
There were other provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
however, that were more problematic. Unlike the Civil Service Act of 1883,
which made Civil Service Commissioners removable by the president at will,
and in contrast to the president's initial proposal, which was silent on the
point and presumably would have allowed for unfettered removal of MSPB
members, the version of the Civil Service Reform Act actually adopted
provided that MSPB members "may be removed by the President only for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."5 44 In addition, the
statute extended the same removal protections to the Office of Special
Counsel charged with investigating wrongful terminations."45 Harmon
challenged the removal provisions, pointing out that "the functions of the
Special Counsel would be predominantly executive in character.... [S]ince
he will be performing largely executive functions, [OLC] believe [s] that

538. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2000). As was the case with the predecessor statutes, the legislative
history provides no help in interpreting this provision. See Stephen G. Vaskov, JudicialReview of
Dismissals of Civil Service Employeesfor Off-Duty Misconduct: The Approach of the Federal Circuit,34 AM.
U L. REV. 439, 458 (1985).
539. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)-(3), (6)-(8) (2000).
540. See S. REP. No. 95-969, at 55 (1978), reninted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2777; Brewer
v.USPS, 647 F.2d 1093, 1097 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
541.
416 U.S. 134 (1974). For a review of these expanded protections, see Buffon, supra
note 285, at 212-23.
542. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000).
543.
544.
545.

Id. § 7511(b).
Id. § 1202(d).
Id. § 1211.
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may impose no restrictions on the President's power to remove
Congress
,6
,54
him .
However, when the area of the executive branch being scrutinized by
Congress did not relate so directly to ethical abuses by the executive branch,
Carter was better able to defend the president's authority to execute the
laws. In 1978, Carter vetoed a bill that would have required three Cabinet
officers to report to Congress whenever the president's budget requests for
certain activities were less than the amounts authorized by Congress and to
explain why the higher amounts were not requested. 47 Calling it an
"unacceptable intrusion" on his obligations and ability to make budget
recommendations, Carter refused to comply.2 s Moreover, the following year
Carter refused to comply with a rider barring him from closing ten specified
he would
United States consulates, 549 announcing in a signing statement55that
0
treat the rider as a "recommendation and not a requirement."
Carter did not hesitate to intervene directly in legal matters of personal
concern, dictating the Administration's position in Bakke 5" and overruling
Bell's objection to the use of public funds to pay the salaries of employees of
church schools.552 The Carter Administration also centralized its control
over federal litigation, emphasizing the "Attorney General's plenary power
over governmental litigation."553 Toward this end, Carter created the Federal
Legal Council to facilitate "coordination and communication among
Federal legal offices"5 54in order to "avoid inconsistent or unnecessary
litigation by agencies. "

546. Letter from John Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to
Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 6 (June
14, 1978), quoted in Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a
Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 340 (1993).
547. Veto of the Sikes Act Amendments of 1978: Message to the House of Representatives
Returning H.R. 10882 Without Approval fJuly 10, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1250, 1250.
548.
Id.; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 380, at 192.
549. Act of Aug. 15, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-60, § 108, 93 Stat. 395, 397.
550.
Department of State, International Communication Agency, and Board for
International Broadcasting Appropriations Bill: Statement on Signing H.R. 3363 into Law (Aug.
15, 1979), in 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1434, 1434. Carter closed seven of the ten protected consulates
by early the following year. 126 CONG. REC. 21,515-16, 28,513 (1980); see also May, supra note
302, at 967.
551. See Devins, supra note 159, at 285 (citing inter alia BELL & OSTROW, supra note 519, at
29-32; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 475, at 266-68); Kristen A. Norman-Major, The Solicitor
General:Executive Policy Agendas and the Court, 57 ALB.L. REV. 1081, 1085 (1994).
552.
See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437,
449 n.223 (1993) (citing BELL & OSrROW, supra note 519, at 24-28).
553.
4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 233, 234 (1980), It should be noted that Carter did permit
the agencies to present their own views before the Supreme Court. See Devins, supra note 159, at

289.
554.

Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 410 (1979); see also Devins, supra note 159, at

266, 268-69; Harvey, supra note 159, at 1584.
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Carter also continued his predecessors' practice of opposing the
legislative veto 555 as an unconstitutional infringement of the president's
exclusive authority to execute ongoing federal programs. 56 Carter protested
that the legislative veto had "the potential of involving Congress in the
execution of the laws, a responsibility reserved for the President under the
Constitution." Therefore, in signing one bill with such a veto, Carter noted
his "intention to preserve the constitutional authority of the President." 55' A
month later, Carter even more explicitly based his objection on the
unitariness of the executive branch by adding a key word to the language he
used in his signing statement. The execution of the laws, according to his
statement, was "a,,558responsibility reserved exclusively to the President under
the Constitution.
Moreover, in a general message to Congress issued on June 21, 1978,
Carter issued a sweeping condemnation of all legislative vetoes. In Carter's
eyes, legislative vetoes unconstitutionally "inject[ed] the Congress into the
details of administering substantive programs and laws." Such congressional
participation in the execution of the laws violated the Take Care Clause by
"infring[ing] on the Executive's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the

555.
During the late 1970s, Congress extended the legislative veto into a wide range of new
areas, including the war power, national emergencies, impoundment, presidential papers, and
federal salaries. See Fisher, Legislative Veto, supranote 96, at 284. In 1977, the House considered a
proposal similar to the one that passed the House during the Ford Administration that would
have subjected all agency regulations to a legislative veto. See Dixon, supra note 449, at 432 n.29.
556.
For a summary of President Carter's positions on legislative vetoes, see Peter E. Quint,
The Separation of Powers Under Carter,62 TEx. L. REV. 785, 829-31 (1984). See also Dixon, supra
note 449, at 431-32 nn.27-29; Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, supra note 96, at 284-85. For lists of
President Carter's signing statements opposing the legislative veto, see William D. Popkin,
Judicial Use of PresidentialLegislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 701 n.7, 718-19 (1991);
May, supra note 302, at 934-35.
557.
International Security Assistance Act of 1977: Statement on Signing H.R. 6884 into
Law (Aug. 5, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 1431, 1432.
558.
Presidential War Powers Bill: Statement on Signing H.R. 7738 into Law (Dec. 28,
1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 2186, 2187 (emphasis added). President Carter also repeated his
objection based on Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution. Id. For other protests based on
Article I, Section 7, see International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980:
Statement on Signing H.R. 6942 into Law (Dec. 16, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2813; Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act: Statement on Signing H.R. 10 into Law (May 23, 1980),
in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 965; Department of State, International Communication Agency, and
Board for International Broadcasting Appropriations Bill: Statement on Signing H.R. 3363 into
Law (Aug. 15, 1979), in 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1434, 1434-35; National Parks and Recreation Act of
1978: Statement on Signing S. 791 into Law (Nov. 10, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1999, 2000;
International Navigational Rules Act of 1977 Statement on Signing H.R. 186 into Law (July 28,
1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 1374, 1375; see also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978:
Statement on Signing H.R. 8638 into Law (Mar. 10, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 500, 502
(challenging whether Congress could "overturn authorized executive actions through
procedures not provided in the Constitution").
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laws." 59 Although Carter noted that "the Attorney General [was] seeking a
definitive judgment" on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes, Carter
noted that "no immediate resolution is in prospect."'60 Therefore, Carter
urged Congress not to include legislative vetoes in future legislation and
informed Congress that he would treat all extant legislative vetoes as "report
and wait" provisions. Furthermore, Carter worried that "if Congress
subsequently adopts a resolution to veto an Executive action, we will give it
under our reading of the
serious consideration, but we will not,
561
Constitution, consider it legally binding."
As promised, Carter thereafter determinedly opposed legislative vetoes,
refusing to sign at least two bills because they contained legislative vetoes562
and announcing in numerous signing statements his intention to treat
legislative vetoes as "report and wait" requirements. 563 Moreover, the Carter

559.
Legislative Vetoes: Message to the Congress (June 21, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS
1146, 1147. Furthermore, legislative vetoes unconstitutionally "authorize[d] Congressional
action that has the effect of legislation while denying the President the opportunity to exercise
his veto," effectively "circnmventfing] the President's role in the legislative process established
by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.' Id. Carter also objected to legislative vetoes on policy
grounds, pointing out that they contributed to administrative delays, tended to politicize the
administrative process, and gave agencies incentive to rely on case-by-case adjudication rather
than issuing clear, uniform rules. Id. at 1147-48. Carter did acknowledge one major exception
to his position: Legislative vetoes contained in reorganization acts do "not involve
Congressional intrusion into the administration of on-going substantive programs, and [they]
[preserve] the President's authority because he decides which proposals to submit to Congress.
The Reorganization Act jeopardizes neither the President's responsibilities nor the prerogatives
of Congress." Id. at 1147; see also 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 10 (1977); Dixon, supra note 449, at 431-32
& n.27 (citing Letter from Griffin Bell to President Carter (Jan. 31, 1977), reprinted in H.R. REP.
NO. 95-105, at 10-11 (1977), and in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 41, 49-51); Letter from John Harmon to
Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (Feb. 14, 1977); Letter from John Harmon to Rep.Joshua Eilberg (Apr.
1, 1977)). Therefore, Carter entered no objection when signing the Reorganization Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, § 2, 91 Stat. 29, 29 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)). See
FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 475, at 124-25, 136-37; Quint, supra note 556, at 830 n.233.
560.
Legislative Vetoes, supra note 559, at 1147.
Id. at 1149. To say that the legislative veto is unconstitutional is not to give the
561.
President license to ignore the wishes of Congress. The day after Carter's Message to the
Congress was issued, Attorney General Griffin Bell and White House Adviser Stuart Eizenstat
each emphasized that, although the President could not be bound by a legislative veto as a
constitutional matter, as a matter of comity the President nonetheless had every reason to
accommodate the interests of Congress whenever possible. Fisher, Legislative Veto, supranote 96,
at 285; see also 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 55, 56, 58 (1980); May, supra note 302, at 981. As
Carter discovered throughout his tenure, the President disregards congressional politics at his
own risk.
See, e.g., Veto of the Navajo and Hopi Relocation Bill: Memorandum of Disapproval of
562.
H.R. 11092 (Nov. 2, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1925; Veto of Legislation Requiring a Study of
Health Effects of Dioxin Exposure: Message to the Senate Returning S. 2096 Without Approval
(Jan. 2, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 4.
563.
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Extension: Statement on Signing
H.R. 7018 Into Law (Dec. 17, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2814, 2815; National Historic
Preservation Act Amendments of 1980: Statement on Signing H.R. 5496 Into Law (Dec. 12,
1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2802, 2803; Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of
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Administration,
like
the
Ford
Administration,
challenged
the
constitutionality of the legislative veto in court. 64 These challenges were of
more than passing interest to the President. In two separate signing

1980: Statement on Signing S. 2622 Into Law (Oct. 18, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2335,
2335; Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Appropriations Bill: Statement on Signing
. 1140 Into Law (Aug. 29, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 1592, 1592; International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978: Statement on Signing H.R. 12222 Into Law
(Oct. 6, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1721, 1721; Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978: Statement
on Signing S.3040 Into Law (Oct.5, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1718, 1718; Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978: Statement on Signing S. 9 Into Law (Sept. 18, 1978), in
1978 PUB. PAPERS 1530, 1531; see also National Parks and Recreation Act Amendments:
Statement on Signing H.R. 3757 Into Law (Mar. 5, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 432, 433
(instructing the Secretary of the Interior to regard the committee veto "as advisory only");
Presidential War Powers Bill, supra note 558, at 2187 (issued prior to Message of June 21, 1978)
(indicating that a legislative veto would be treated as a "notify and wait" provision). In three
statements, President Carter specifically stated that congressional attempts to exercise a
legislative veto would be given serious consideration but not regarded as legally binding.
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Appropriations Bill, supra, at 1592; Coastal Zone
Management Improvement Act of 1980, supra, at 2335; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act Extension, supra, at 2815.
Four other signing statements effectively took the same position without referring
directly to the Message ofJune 21, 1978. See National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, supra,at
2000 (directing the Secretary of Agriculture to report actions to Congress and to "listen to any
concerns which may be expressed by the specified congressional committees" with the
understanding that the Secretary may consummate any actions without committee approval);
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, supra note 558, at 965 (directing the Attorney
General to "carefully consider any congressional views that are expressed" without "treat[ingl
any resolution of 'disapproval' as binding").
564.
The Carter Administration questioned the constitutionality of the legislative veto
before the Supreme Court. Brief of the Appellees at 26 n.ll, Nixon v.Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425 (1977) (No. 75-1605). However, the Court declined to reach the question, noting only
that "[w]hatever are the future possibilities for constitutional conflict in the promulgation of
regulations respecting public access to particular documents, nothing contained in the Act
renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and, therefore, unconstitutional on its
face." 433 U.S. at 444-45. The Carter Administration also backed challenges to the legislative
veto in several courts of appeals, with mixed results. See Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts,
supra note 96, at 82; Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 96, at 284. Compare Chadha v. INS, 634
F.2d 408, 415 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (striking down legislative veto),
and McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 1262 (4th Cir. 1977) (same), with Atkins v.
United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1063 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (upholding legislative veto).
The Carter Administration did face some problems framing the legislative veto as an
issue in a justiciable controversy. Even though President Carter instructed the Secretary of
Agriculture in 1978 that he should proceed without following a certain legislative veto
provision, National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, supra note 563, at 2000, the Justice
Department concluded that "in spite of the President's direction, the Department [of
Agriculture] and the Forest Service should cooperate with . .. the Congress" and advised the
Department of Agriculture that it could voluntarily comply with the legislative veto provision as
a matter of policy. May, supra note 302, at 945 (quoting Additions to the National Wilderness
PreservationSystem: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. On PublicLands of the House Comm. On Interiorand
InsularAffairs, 96th Cong. 244-45 (1979)). The Department of Agriculture ordered the Forest
Service "to proceed as if [the legislative veto provision] were applicable," the President's
instructions notwithstanding. Id. The Forest Service complied with the Department's orders. Id.
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statements, he mentioned his intent to bring a judicial challenge to the
legislative veto.565 Moreover, after the Ninth Circuit struck down the
566
Carter issued a statement applauding the decision and
legislative veto,
urging the Attorney General to "seek[] Supreme Court review of the
7
decision as soon as possible. ' 56
In fact, the Carter Administration even went so far as to ignore
Congress's attempt to exercise a legislative veto over a series of education
regulations.5 Carter's second Attorney General, Benjamin Civiletti, advised
the Secretary of Education that the legislative veto provision violated the
Constitution and that the Secretary was "entitled to implement the
regulations in question in spite of Congress' disapproval.""' Civiletti
concluded, "[O]nly the executive branch can execute the statutes of the
United States." 570 To recognize the legislative veto "as legally binding would
constitute an abdication of the responsibility of the executive branch, as an
equal and coordinate branch of government with the legislative branch, to
preserve the integrity of its functions. 571 As a result, "once a function has
been delegated to the executive branch, it must be performed there, and
except through the
cannot be subjected to continuing congressional control
" 72
5
constitutional process of enacting new legislation.
Despite Congress's insistence that the Attorney General abide by the
legislative veto provision,57 3 the Secretary of Education followed Civiletti's

565.
Legislative Vetoes, supra note 559, at 1147; Federal Trade Commission Improvements
Acts of 1980: Statement on Signing H.R. 2313 Into Law (May 28, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS
982,983.
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 415 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
566.
567. Chadha v. immigration and Naturalization Service: Statement on the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Decision (Dec. 24, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2836.
Like Nixon and Ford, Carter refused to follow the legislative veto procedures required
568.
by the War Powers Resolution. However, Carter opposed the provisions as an infringement of
his powers as Commander in Chief, rather than his exclusive power to execute the laws. A
Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
On Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 322 (1977); see alsoJohn Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War
Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1381 & n.8 (1988); May, supra note 302, at 97475.
569. 4AOp. Off. Legal Counsel 21,22 (1980).
570.
Id. at 29. The executive branch had a duty to execute the law faithfully. However, the
Attorney General pointed out, the "duty to enforce the fundamental law set forth in the
Constitution" at times overrides the "duty to enforce the law founded in the Acts of Congress."
Because the legislative veto "intrude [d] upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive,"
the present case was such a time. Id at 29.
571.
Id.
572.

Id. at 27.
May, supra note 302, at 978 n.541 (citing Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Sen. Max
573.
Baucus (July 30, 1980), reprintedin Constitutionality of GAO's Bid Protest Function: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,99th Cong. 745 (1985)).
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574

advice and implemented the regulations. Therefore, although the Carter
Administration did tolerate the enactment of a few legislative vetoes without
comment,575 it is clear that Carter defended the unitariness of the executive
branch by firmly opposing the legislative veto.
Carter did not merely react to congressional attempts to control the
execution of the laws: He also proactively asserted his control over the
executive branch by continuing the Nixon-Ford program of OMB review of
576
Upon assuming office, Carter ordered agencies to
proposed regulations.
impact of regulations and directed them
the
inflationary
continue to analyze
to give more detailed consideration to the economic cost of regulations as
well. Carter supplemented these directives the following year with an
executive order entitled "Improving Government Regulations" 5 77 that far
exceeded previous regulatory review efforts. This program required that
executive agencies include a "Regulatory Analysis" in all important
proposals, outlining the alternatives considered by theS578agency and
The order
explaining why the agency chose that particular alternative.
also required that "agencies ...publish at least semiannually an agenda of
significant regulations under development or review."579 The order cited no
specific authority as its basis, relying simply on Carter's authority as
President of the United States. 5s Although the initial draft of the order
clearly contemplated that it would apply to the independent agencies as well

574. 45 Fed. Reg. 22634, 22742, 23602, 27880 (Apr. 3, 7, 24, 1980) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
May, supra note 302, at 975-76. Congress did not give
§ 100d, 134, 161c, 161g (1980)); seealso
up without a fight. The House attempted to enforce its legislative veto by adding an
amendment to two key appropriations bills providing that "none of the funds appropriated ...
by this Act shall be available to implement, administer, or enforce any regulation" that had
been vetoed by Congress. 126 CONG. REC. 19,312 (1980) (reporting the House enactment of
the Levitas amendment to H.R.7584, 96th Cong. (1980)); id. at 20,507 (House enactment of
Levitas amendment to H.R. 7591, 96th Cong. (1980)). The Office of Legal Counsel responded
with an opinion condemning the amendments as an attempt by Congress to place indirect
restrictions on the President that, if placed directly, would violate the Constitution. 4B Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 731, 733-34 (1980).
575. See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICIS, supranote 380, at 143 (noting the acceptance
of legislative vetoes in legislation governing the FTC and the Federal Election Commission);
LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 94-95, 106 (1981) (noting acceptance of
legislative-veto provisions relating to arms sales, war powers, and gasoline rationing); Quint,
supranote 556, at 829-30 n.232 (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96TII CONG., STUDIES

ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 2 (Comm. Print 1980)) (noting OMB support for legislative veto in
the Impoundment Control Act); Strauss, supra note 5, at 580 n.20 (noting acceptance of
legislative vetoes in legislation governing the FTC).
576. For a general description of the Carter Administration's regulatory review program,
see Bruff, supra note 473, at 547-49; Percival, supra note 387, at 142-47; DeWitt, supra note 387,
at 771-72.
577.
578.
579.
580.

Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979).
Id. § 6, 3 C.F.R. at 156.
Id. § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 153.
Id. pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 152; see also Bruff, supra note 388, at 465 n.69.
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as the executive departments,5 Carter decided in the end to avoid a
"confrontation with Congress over the applicability of the order to the
independent regulatory agencies " 512 and opted instead to simply ask the
chairmen of
the commissions to comply with the Order's procedures
5 83
voluntarily.
Carter supplemented that order by creating the Regulatory Analysis
Review Group (RARG) to conduct an intensive review of ten to twenty major
regulations a year and to submit its findings during those regulations' public
comment periods. Carter also created a Regulatory Council charged with
keeping a calendar of forthcoming significant regulatory proposals and
using it to identify and mediate interagency conflicts. 5 4 Further, the Carter
Administration issued a circular laying out procedures for coordinating and
clearing agencies' legislative recommendations. Finally, in 1980 Congress
enacted two statutes that further strengthened OMB's control over agency
regulations. The Regulatory Flexibility Act required agencies to analyze the
impact of their regulations on small businesses;58f the Paperwork Reduction
Act required that OMB review and clear all information collection requests
and created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to
conduct regulatory reviews.58 7 In addition, the Executive Office of the
President reviewed a large number of the proposed regulations and
588
intervened directly in numerous regulatory decisions.
Like the Quality of Life Review of the Nixon and Ford Administrations,
Carter's program stopped short of centralized supervision of the rulemaking
process. Although the President and OMB gave some guidance as to which

581.
The initial draft of Executive Order No. 12,044 was ambiguous as to whether it applied
to independent agencies, and the notice accompanying it sought public comment about
whether it should be so applied. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,740 (Nov. 19, 1977). Carter was apparently
advised that it had the authority to do so. Strauss, supra note 5, at 592-93 n.20; see also ABA
COMM'N ON LAW & THE ECON., supra note 473, at 85; Bruff, supra note 388, at 499. See generally
Moreno, supra note 105, at 494-95.
582.
43 Fed. Reg. 12,670 (Mar. 24, 1978).
583.
Improving Government Regulations: Letter to the Heads of Independent Regulatory
Agencies (Mar. 23, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 563, 564; see also Frank B. Cross, The Surviving
Significance of the Unitary Executive, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 599, 706 (1990).
584.
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject:
Strengthening Regulatory Management (Oct. 31, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1905, 1905; see also
LAWRENCE]. WHITE, REFORMING REGULATION: PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS 21-22 (1981).
585.
OMB Circular A-19 (Sept. 20, 1979) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). This circular
on its face applied to the independent regulatory commissions, although it should be noted
that several of the commissions' organic statutes provided that the commissions were not
subject to OMB circulars. Moreno, supra note 105, at 490.
586. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980).
587.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812. This office was to
become a key bulwark of the unitary executive during the Reagan years.
588.
See WHITE, supra note 584, at 220-21; Cross, supra note 471, at 495; Kenneth Culp
Davis, PresidentialControlof Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV. 849, 851 (1982); Percival, supra note 387,
at 146-47 n.112.
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rules should be subjected to such analyses and how regulatory analyses
should be conducted, 5 9 the final decisions on those issues were left to the
individual agencies.
Furthermore, RARG had no authority to block
agencies from issuing proposed or final regulations and did not begin its
review until after the proposed regulation had been published in the
Federal
Register. 59 1
Nonetheless,
commentators
have
generally
acknowledged that Carter's regulatory review program did enable the
President to increase his control over regulatory policy. 592
Thus, despite Jimmy Carter's acceptance of certain pieces of postWatergate legislation that impinged on his authority to execute the laws, on
balance Carter emerges as a defender of the unitary executive. The fact that
short-term political pressures effectively precluded him from asserting the
president's prerogatives on a few occasions does not signify acquiescence in
a diminution of the unitary executive for purposes of coordinate
construction. Rather, Carter's rejection of Congress's extraordinary attempts
to turn the whole Justice Department into an independent agency clearly
marks him as another defender of the unitary executive.
VIII. RONALD

REAGAN

Ronald Reagan was one of the greatest and most controversial
presidents of the twentieth century. Although the Reagan presidency is
generally regarded as a brilliant success, Reagan's position on the unitary
executive was enigmatic. While the Reagan Administration was in power,

589.
Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3(a) & (b), 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979); Memorandum from
Wayne G. Grandquist, Associate OMB Director for Management and Regulatory Policy, to the
Heads of Departments and Agencies, Regulatory Analysis (Nov. 21, 1978), cited in Bruff, supra
note 473, at 548; see also Cross, supra note 471, at 495 n.62 (citing authorities).
590.
Cross, supra note 471, at 495 n.63; Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency
Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23
ARiz. L. REV. 1199, 1200 n.8 (1981).
591.
Percival, supra note 387, at 144-45; Rosenberg, supra note 291, at 1200 n.8; DeWitt,
supra note 387, at 772. The fact that RARG review occurred after a rule had already been
proposed marked a significant change from Quality of Life Review, since it prevented reviewers
from attempting to influence regulations before they were proposed. Percival, supra note 387,
at 144-45.
592. WHITE, supra note 584, at 221; Cross, supra note 471, at 495; Richard M. Neustadt, The
Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 129, 141-42 (1980);
Paul R. Verkuil, JawboningAdministrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts y the White House, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 943, 949 (1980). Carter also exerted his authority by denying procurement contracts to
companies that failed to follow "voluntary" wage and price guidelines. Exec. Order No. 12,092,
3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,288, 3 C.F.R. 125 (1982). Other similar steps
followed. The D.C. Circuit eventually upheld Carter's actions as an exercise of his powers under
the general procurement statutes. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 784-85 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc). Although this conclusion was quite a stretch, in the end it demonstrates that Carter's
imposition of wage and price controls was an exercise of statutory authority and not an exercise
of the President's power to control the execution of the laws. See Quint, supra note 556, at 79198.
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both its supporters and critics thought that the defense of the unitary
executive was a key part of Reagan's policy program.193 Thus, Charles Fried,
Reagan's Solicitor General, has written, "The Reagan Administration had a
vision about the arrangement of government power: the authority and
responsibility of the President should be clear and unitary. The Reagan years
were distinguished by the fact that that vision was made the subject of legal,
rather than simply political, dispute." 594
Others have been more equivocal about the depth of Reagan's
commitment to the unitary executive. As Reagan's first Attorney General,
William French Smith, later wrote:
If there was one area in which the White House was deficient
during my years in office, it was in the protection of presidential
power. Decisions there were made on the basis of the substance of
individual issues. There was no effective concern or review of the
impact that issue or the position taken with respect to it would have
on presidential power. Nor was there any effort to identify
governmental activities elsewhere that, if developed, would
adversely affect the province of the executive. Nor, to be candid,
was the bully pulpit used to provide leadership or defense of that
vital institution.595
In support of Smith's criticism, Professors Gary Lawson and Nelson Lund
have pointed out that President Reagan never vetoed a bill because it
infringed upon presidential power.' 96 As with many things, the truth may
well lie somewhere in between.2 Regardless of how deep one thinks
Reagan's commitment to the unitary executive ran, it remains clear that
Reagan never acquiesced in or agreed to a congressional power to deviate
from the unitary executive.
Reagan quickly showed that he "could be ruthless when necessary" on
personnel actions, 59 as evidenced by his decision not to give Edwin Meese
III, his longtime confidant and the head of his transition team, the job he

593. See Miller, supra note 374, at 410-12; Rosenberg, supra note 291, at 628-34; Shane,
supra note 5, at 596-97.
594.

CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND

ACCOUNT 133 (1991).
595. Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 38 (quoting
WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAWANDJUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 222 (1991)).
596. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 124546 (1994); Lund, supra note 595, at 42. But see infra notes 607-14 and accompanying text
(arguing that Reagan pocket vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 in part to protect
the unitariness of the executive).
597.
Miller, supra note 374, at 401-02 ("In the Reagan years, the picture was mixed, with a
resurgent and aggressive presidency, but with Congress not relinquishing the gains it had
made."); see also id. at 410-12.
598.

EDMUND MORRIS, DUTCH:

A MEMOIR

OF RONALD REAGAN 420 (1999).
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wanted most: White House Chief of Staff. Instead, that job went to James
Baker, formerly of George Bush's presidential campaign, with Meese
receiving a free floating White House spot as Counselor to the President.
Reagan then made Michael Deaver the third member of his White House
troika for the first term, giving him the title of Deputy Chief of Staff.5 99
Meese, Baker, and Deaver struggled for preeminence on the White House
staff during Reagan's first term. This struggle for preeminence left Reagan
able to pick and choose from the policy options that his three subordinates
presented to him. The net result was to augment Reagan's power and
control.
Reagan was not at all hesitant to use the removal power harshly to
further his Administration's goals. Early in the first term, Reagan had his
first major cabinet removal crisis when it became clear that Secretary of State
Alexander Haig was not working out well. Just as he had been ruthless in
picking Baker over Meese as White House Chief of Staff, so too was Reagan
ruthless in forcing Haig to resign. 6°° Additionally, in his first year in office,
Reagan dramatically used his removal power to settle an air-traffic
controllers strike by firing the striking air traffic controllers. 60 1 During his
second term, Reagan subtly forced the resignation of his White House Chief
of Staff Donald Regan because of Regan's failure to detect the Iran-Contra
affair. 602 Reagan also demonstrated his support for the unitary executive by
the manner in which he wielded his removal power to displace three
members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1983603 and
numerous other officials previously thought to be insulated from
presidential control . 4 Although the courts did not always approve of
Reagan's removals, 605 the fact that Reagan often used his power to remove
officials shows his commitment to the unitary executive.

599.
600.

Id. at 421.

Id. at 462-63.

601.
Id. at659.
602.
Id. at 620-22.
603. The statute creating the Commission was silent about removals and established the
Commission "in the executive branch of the Government." Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-315, § 101(a), 71 Stat. 634, 634. For a full discussion of the debate over the Commission's
supposed "independence," see Entin, supra note 208, at 770-76.
604. For other examples of removals instigated by Reagan, see 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1
(1982); 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 337 (1981); FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICrS, supra note
380, at 78-79; Miller, supra note 374, at 411 & n.63, 414 n.82.
605. A district court enjoined Reagan from removing the Civil Rights Commissioners. On
appeal, the D.C. Circuit subsequently vacated the injunction as moot, since the statutory

authorization for the Commission had expired. Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empi. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
33,898 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1983), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
Congress later reconstituted the Commission, this time requiring specific cause for the removal
of its members. United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-183,
§ 2(d), 97 Stat. 1301, 1301; see also Borders v. Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250, 268 (D.D.C. 1981)
(blocking Reagan's attempted removal of a member of the D.C. Judicial Nomination

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
Reagan also supported the unitary executive by opposing all three of
the post-Watergate ethics statutes reluctantly accepted by the Carter
Administration. First, in 1981, Reagan removed a dozen inspectors general
without complying with the statutory requirement that he inform Congress
of the reasons for his removals. Instead, Reagan simply explained that he
C6
wanted inspectors general in whom he had total confidence. '6
Second, Reagan pocket vetoed the proposed Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1988, which would have amended the Civil Service Reform Act in ways
that would have derogated from the unitary executive. 7 The Whistleblower
Protection Act would have moved the Office of Special Counsel outside the
MSPB and turned it into a freestanding independent agency. 68 Other
provisions would have given the Office of Special Counsel independent
litigating authority that was not subject to coordination by the Justice
Department.6 9 It would also have authorized the Office of Special Counsel
to transmit information to Congress "without review, clearance, or approval
by any other administrative authority. "r 1°
Recalling the concerns first raised byJohn Harmon, 61n Reagan objected
that the Act "creates an Office of Special Counsel and purports to insulate
the Office from presidential supervision and to limit the power of the
President to remove his subordinates from office."6 12 Reagan was also
concerned about a second provision that "purport[ed] to prohibit review
within the Executive branch of views of the Office of Special Counsel
proposed to be transmitted in response to congressional committee
requests." 618 These provisions, according
to the President, clearly raised
"serious constitutional concerns., 614
But Reagan reserved his sharpest criticism for the section of the bill that
would have authorized the Special Counsel to challenge the decisions of the
MSPB in court. Permitting two executive agencies to resolve a dispute in
court "conflict[ed] with the constitutional grant of the Executive power to
Commission). But see Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding
removals); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 663 F.2d 239, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(same).
606.
Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on
the Inspector General Appointees of Certain Executive Agencies (Jan. 20, 1981), in 1981 PUB.
PAPERS 24, 25; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 380, at 78.
607. For overviews of the history of this legislation from two very different perspectives, see
Kmiec, supra note 546, at 340-44; Rosenberg, supra note 291, at 662-73.
608.

S.508, 100th Cong. § 1211 (1988), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. 19,974 (1988).

609.
610.

Id. § 1212.
Id.§ 1217.

611.
See supra note 546 and accompanying text.
612.
Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning Whistleblower Protection (Oct. 26,
1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1391, 1392.
613.
Id.
614.
Id.
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the President which includes the authority to supervise and resolve disputes
between his subordinates." 1 5 Such a provision was antithetical to the theory
of the unitary executive.
Third, the Reagan Administration in due time came to oppose the
Ethics in Government Act as an unconstitutional infringement on the
unitariness of the executive branch. Although the Reagan Administration
did not enter any objections when the Ethics in Government Act was first
reauthorized in 1983,616 by the time Congress revisited the issue again in
1987, the Administration began to voice more serious concerns. Assistant
Attorney General John R. Bolton challenged the constitutionality of the Act
during hearings, arguing that all prosecutors were properly considered
executive officers who thus had to be subject to the direction and control of
the President. 617 6 Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper endorsed
Bolton's position. 18
Reagan concurred, declaring that "[a]n officer of the United States
exercising executive authority in the core area of law enforcement
necessarily, under our constitutional scheme, must be subject to executive
branch appointment, review, and removal. There is no other constitutionally
permissible alternative." 619 However, in light of the fact that the matter was
being litigated before the D.C. Circuit and "[i]n order to ensure that public
confidence in government not be eroded while the courts are in the process
of deciding these questions," Reagan chose to "tak[e] the extraordinary step
of signing this bill despite [his] very strong doubts about its
constitutionality " 62° while at the same time pressing his opposition to the
independent counsel statute in the Administration's briefs before the D.C.
Circuit and the Supreme Court in the litigation leading up to Morrison v.
Olson.62'

615. Id. For a complete description of the Act and particularly sharp criticism of Reagan's
pocket veto, see Rosenberg, supra note 291, at 662-88. See also Devins, supra note 159, at 267-68.
For a more sympathetic assessment of Reagan's actions, see Kmiec, supra note 546, at 342-43.
616. Ethics in Government Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
617. FIsI IER & DEVINS, supra note 475, at 147, 156-57 (citing Independent Counsel Amendments
Act of 1987: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 429-33 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 House Committee Hearings], and quoting Oversight of the Independent Counsel
Statute: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 100th Cong. 8-9 (1987)).
618.
Letter from Charles Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, to Leon Silverman (Mar. 25,
1987), reprinted in 1987 House Committee Hearings, supra note 617, at 100.
619.
Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987 (Dec. 15,
1987), in 1987 PUB. PAPERS 1524, 1524.
620.
Id.
621.
487 U.S. 654 (1988). For the Reagan Administration's support for the unitary
executive, see Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5-16, 2941, Morrison (No. 87-1279); Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States, In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, and 87-5265), revd sub nom. Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), reprinted in 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 101-02, 104, 112-16, 126-30
(1987).

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
In his brief in the Morrison case, Solicitor General Charles Fried argued
that the Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II demanded that the
President be able to control the actions of, and remove, independent
counsels. The argument section of Fried's brief began by saying:
Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution declares: "The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." Section 3 of the same Article then charges the President
with the corresponding duty: "he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." The independent counsel statute violates the
plain meaning of those words by taking an important part of the
executive power, and of the concomitant duty to see the faithful
execution of the laws, away from the President and assigning it to a
person unaccountable to the President in her selection and her
performance and her tenure. The statute vests executive power
other than in the President,6 2in direct contravention of Article II,
Section l's "grant of power.,
The brief goes on to assert, "Whatever limits Congress may
constitutionally impose on the President's various means of holding other
officers to account, it may not deny his power to remove purely executive
officers like an independent counsel." 623 The brief distinguishes Humphrey's
Executor and Wiener by saying that those cases concerned entities that were
quasi-legislative or quasijudicial unlike here, where the function of
prosecuting high-level wrongdoing was a core executive function. All in all,
the brief was a ringing defense of the unitary executive, which unfortunately
led to a disastrous Supreme Court decision.
The Court in Morrison v. Olson divided seven to one, with Chief justice
Rehnquist writing for the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the
Ethics in Government Act.62 4 The worst part of Rehnquist's decision was his
apparent conclusion that even officers performing such core executive
625
functions as prosecution could be insulated from presidential removal.
Justice Scalia wrote an eloquent dissent in which he berated the majority not
only for its erroneous interpretation of Article II, but also for failing to
follow Humphrey's Executor, which itself did not purport to apply to core
626
The Reagan Administration lost the
executive functions like prosecution.
battle in the Morrison case. Even though the Administration's arguments
622.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5-6, Morison
(No. 87-1279) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926)).
623.
624.

Id. at 29.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659.

625.
Id. at 688-91.
Id. at 705-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Interestingly, subsequent court decisions have
626.
indicated that holdover officials, such as Humphrey, do not fall within the scope of the "for
cause" removal provision. See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1996). It is thus now
clear that under modern doctrine Humphrey's Executorwould have been decided the other way.

90 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2005]

failed to convince a majority of the Supreme Court, the fact that the
Administration advanced them is sufficient to overcome any claims that the
executive branch acquiesced in the institution of the independent counsel
as a deviation from the unitary executive. Indeed, many scholars have
questioned whether Morrison precludes a president from removing a
member of7 an independent agency for failing to follow a presidential policy
62
directive.
Reagan also joined his predecessors in objecting to the legislative veto,
which continued to command significant support in Congress.628 Although
Reagan primarily based his attacks on the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I, section 7,629 Reagan also condemned legislative
vetoes "because of the potential for involving the Congress in the day-to-day
implementation of the law, a responsibility allocated solely to the President
under the Constitution."6 3 0 As Reagan further noted:
These provisions can be expected to inject an unnecessarily
disruptive element by subjecting proposed
programs to
disapproval, congressional or even committee, even after they have
been examined by the executive branch and found to be
compatible with congressionally adopted standards and supportive
of the national interests of the United States.6"'

627.

See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 110-11; Strauss, supra note 5, at 615; cf I

KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RicHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.5, at 64 (3d

ed. 1994) (pointing to criticism of Humphrey's Executor in Freytagv. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868
(1991), as suggesting that the issue has not yet been resolved); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 4-10, at 254 n.45 (2d ed. 1988) (noting the lack of clarity as to what
may constitute proper cause for removal).
628. Much as had occurred during the Ford and Carter Administrations, the Senate had
passed legislation that would subject all agency rules to a legislative veto. See FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 380, at 142 n.1 13.
629.
See Statement on Signing International Security and Foreign Assistance Legislation
(Dec. 29, 1981), in 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1202, 1203; Statement on Signing a Bill Concerning the
Establishment of Alcohol Traffic Safety Programs (Oct. 25, 1982), in 1982 PUB. PAPERS 1378;
Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981 (Dec. 29, 1981), in 1981
PUB. PAPERS 1207; Statement on Signing a Student Aid Bill (Oct. 14, 1982), in 1982 PUB. PAPERS
1312; Statement on Signing a Bill Amending the Indian Judgment Funds Act (Jan. 12, 1983), in
1983 PUB. PAPERS 44.
630.
Statement on Signing International Security and Foreign Assistance Legislation, supra
note 629, at 1203.
631.
Id.; see also Statement on Signing a Bill Concerning the Establishment of Alcohol
Traffic Safety Programs, supra note 629, at 1378 (objecting that the legislative veto
"unconstitutionally involves the Congress in the executive functions of promulgating
regulations under authority previously conferred, in violation of tie principle of separation of
powers"); 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 294, 297, 301-03 (1981). The Reagan Administration did
occasionally allow a legislative veto to be enacted without registering any protest. Act of Dec. 21,
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, 1870 (extending the legislative veto contained in the
FTC Improvements Act of 1990); see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 380, at
143.
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The Reagan Administration backed up its rhetoric by successfully
challenging the legislative veto in the Courts of Appeals and by pressing the
case before the Supreme Court, in which it argued that that the legislative
veto impermissibly allows Congress to participate in the execution of the
6
31
laws.632 These efforts culminated in the landmark ruling in INS v. Chadha
holding that the legislative veto violates the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I, section 7. The fact that the Supreme Court
resolved the case on alternative grounds does not change the import of the
Reagan Administration's assertion of the unitary executive for the purposes
of coordinate construction. Indeed, Reagan continued his opposition to
legislative vetoes in the face of Congress's refusal to follow Chadha when
Congress continued to pass laws containing legislative vetoes. Reagan's
said that the
signing statements approving these laws consistently 634
unconstitutional legislative-veto provisions would be ignored.
The Reagan Administration even revived the objections raised by
Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt 6 35 to permitting the
Comptroller General to have any role in the execution of the laws. For
example, when signing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act, which gave the Comptroller General the
authority to issue sequestration orders that would lead to a series of
mandatory budget cuts, Reagan noted that "[u]nder the system of separated
powers established by the Constitution,... executive functions may only be
632.
Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 44-56, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983) (No. 80-1832).
633.

462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See Statement on Signing the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984
634.
(July 17, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1052, 1053; Statement on Signing the Department of
Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985 (July 18,
1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1056, 1057; Statement on Signing a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Appropriations Bill (Oct. 30, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1686; Statement on Signing the
Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act,
1986 (Nov. 25, 1985), in 1985 PUB. PAPERS 1419, 1420; Statement on Signing the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (Nov. 14, 1986), in 1986 PUB. PAPERS 1557, 1558;
Statement on Signing the Federal Triangle Development Act (Aug. 22, 1987), in 1987 PUB.
PAPERS 973, 973-74; Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Sept. 27, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1228;
Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
Amendments of 1988 (Oct. 5, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1284; Statement on Signing a Bill
Providing for the Leasing of Property to the District of Columbia Chapter of the American
National Red Cross (Nov. 8, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1485.
After Chadha, the Reagan Administration did enter into some informal agreements
with Congress, which served much the same purpose as legislative vetoes. See Fisher, Legislative
Veto, supra note 96, at 286-90; Fisher, InterpretationOutside the Courts, supra note 96, at 84-91.
The fact that the executive branch at times may voluntarily choose to keep Congress informed,
however, is not in any way inconsistent with the unitary executive or any other provision of the
Constitution. See City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 96, at 86.
635.

SeeYoo et al., supra note 23, at 52, 98-99, 101-0259-60.
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performed by officers in the executive branch. ", 36 Thus, Reagan concluded,
the "significant role" the bill assigned to the Comptroller General raised
"serious constitutional questions," because the Comptroller General was
an
agent of Congress who could not properly wield such executive power. 637
Although Reagan signed the legislation, he emphasized that he was "in no
sense dismissing the constitutional problems or acquiescing in a violation of
the system of separated powers carefully crafted by the framers of the
Constitution.,"C Therefore, notwithstanding his approval of the Act, the
Reagan Administration successfully challenged Gramm-Rudman in court,
arguing among other things that it unconstitutionally encroached upon the
63
president's Article II power to execute the laws. 1
For the same reasons, the Reagan Administration also challenged the
parts of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) that let the Comptroller
General resolve protests entered by unsuccessful bidders for government
contracts.6 40 Reagan "vigorously object[ed] to certain provisions that would
unconstitutionally attempt to delegate to the Comptroller General of the
United States, an officer of Congress, the power to perform duties and
responsibilities that in our constitutional system may be performed only by
officials of the executive branch." 641 Thus, Attorney General Smith and OMB
Director David Stockman issued orders to the executive agencies not to
comply with CICA, and the Administration subsequently refused to comply
with court orders upholding CICA's constitutionality. 642 Although the courts
did not ultimately accept Reagan's objections to CICA, 64 3 the fact remains

636.
Statement on Signing the Bill Increasing the Public Debt Limit and Enacting the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Dec. 12, 1985), in 1985 PUB.
PAPERS 1471, 1471.
637.
Id. Reagan also harbored constitutional concerns about a provision in the Act
requiring Comptroller General approval of all presidential terminations and modifications of
defense contracts. Reagan noted, "Under our constitutional system, an agent of Congress may
not exercise such supervisory authority over the President." Id.
638.
Id. at 1472. See generally FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 475, at 143-45, 148-50.
639.
Brief for the United States at 13-17, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Nos. 851377, 85-1378, 85-1379). These arguments, of course, ultimately prevailed. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at
726-27.
640.
CICA was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit.
VII, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1274-1276 (2000)).
641.
Statement on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (July 18, 1984), in 1984 PUB.
PAPERS 1053, 1053; see also Kmiec, supra note 546, at 349 (noting the Justice Department's
objections to CICA).
642.
See Rosenberg, supra note 291, at 691; May, supra note 302, at 979, 984 (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 99-138, at 308 (1985)); see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supranote 380, at

130 (discussing Congress's assertion of "usurpation of the legislative function" in response to an
executive plan to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
643.
See Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1988); Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1109-12 (9th Cir. 1988); Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
787 F.2d 875, 881-87 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); Universal Shipping Co.
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that the Reagan Administration protested Congress's efforts to assign the
Comptroller General a role in executing the law as being inconsistent with
the unitary executive.
The Reagan Administration also asserted the president's authority to
control the execution of the laws directly. For instance, Reagan also took
firm control of the federal government's legal affairs, expanding the Federal
Legal Council, using opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel to
centralize control of governmental litigation in the Attorney General, 4 and
even assuming a role in determining the positions that his Administration
would take before the Supreme Court. 4 The Reagan Administration also
repudiated several informal nonstatutory understandings regarding the
division of responsibility between the executive departments and the
independent agencies 646 and challenged one such agency's efforts to file an
amicus brief in federal appellate court.64 7 In fact, the Reagan Administration
went so far as to question the very constitutionality of these agencies
supposed "independence." As Attorney General Meese noted: "Federal
agencies performing executive functions are themselves properly agents of
the executive. They are not 'quasi' this or 'independent' that. In the
with enforcement powers is part of
tripartite scheme of government, a body
6 48
the executive branch of government."
The Reagan Administration also asserted the President's authority to
control the execution of the laws directly by continuing and expanding
649
upon the regulatory review program initiated by his predecessors.
Executive Order 12,291 directed all executive agencies to employ costbenefit analysis in implementing their regulations. The order further

v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 668, 674-75 (D.D.C. 1987), vacated as moot, No. 87-5120 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 9, 1989).
Devins, supra note 159, at 266 (citing 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47, 61-62 (1982); 6 Op.
644.
Off. Legal Counsel 180, 187-88 (1982)).
645.
Id.at 285 (mentioning Reagan's reversal of a Solicitor General opinion and insistence
that the Solicitor General file specified amicus briefs); Harvey, supra note 159, at 1585
(discussing the Attorney General's reversal of several opinions to fit Reagan's policies).
646.
See Devins, supra note 159, at 268 (discussing the conflict between independent
agencies and the Solicitor General).
647. Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: Wat M~akes an Independent Agency
Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 286-98 (1993) (describing the Reagan Administration's
efforts to prevent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from filing an amicus brief
in Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cit. 1984)).
648.
Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J.
779, 789-90 (quoting Stuart Taylor, A Question of Power, a Powerful Questioner,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1985, at B6); see also id. at 779 n.4 (noting that Meese suggested "that the entire system of
independent agencies may be unconstitutional"); Miller, supra note 374, at 411 & n.66 (noting
that Meese questioned the constitutionality of independent agencies).
649. For a complete description of the Reagan regulatory review program, see Percival,
supra note 387, at 147-54; see also Bruff, supra note 473, at 549-51; Cross, supra note 471, at 49698; DeWitt, supra note 387, at 773-76.
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required them to submit all rules to OMB for prepublication review and to
prepare Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of all major rules explicitly
laying out the anticipated costs and benefits of the rule, the alternatives
considered, and an explanation, if appropriate, of the reasons why the most
cost-effective means of achieving the anticipated benefits was not adopted.
OMB would review the proposed650 rules and the RIAs to maximize the
"aggregate net benefits to society."
Reagan supplemented Executive Order 12,291 with Executive Order
12,498, which empowered OMB to take formal control of the regulatory
planning process by requiring agencies to submit to OMB a "draft regulatory
program" describing "all significant regulatory actions" to be undertaken
that year. 65' OMB would then resolve any inconsistencies between the draft
regulatory program and the Administration's policies and would consolidate
them into the Administration's overall regulatory plan. These two orders
extended the White House's control over the agencies to a greater degree
than ever before, by dictating substantive criteria that agencies had to
employ in issuing regulations and by permitting OMB to postpone
indefinitely the publication of regulations of which it disapproved. 652
Reagan did not invoke any particular statutory authority for issuing
these orders, instead relying solely on "the authority vested in [him] as
President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America"653 as
had so many of his predecessors.654 Reagan specifically disclaimed any intent
to direct agency decisionmaking, noting that nothing in the order "shall be

650. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
651.
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985).
652. See Percival, supra note 387, at 149-50. The Reagan Administration, like the Carter
Administration, considered including the independent regulatory commissions within its
program of regulatory review, but declined to do so. Memorandum from U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Hon. David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and
Budget, Re: Proposed Executive Order on Federal Regulation 7-13 (Feb. 3, 1981), reprinted in
Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 152, 158-64 (1981) [hereinafter OMB Hearings]; and
PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 48688 (1996). Interestingly, this portion of the memorandum was omitted from a later version of
the same memo. See 5Op. Off. Legal Counsel 59 (1981), reprinted in OMB Hearings, supra, at
486-98.
653. Exec. Order No. 12,291, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 127; Exec. Order No. 12,498, pmbl., 3
C.F.R. at 323. Courts reviewing these orders apparently agreed. See Prof'l Drivers Council v.
Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming application
of cost/benefit requirement of Executive Order 12,291); Envd. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F.
Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986) ('A certain degree of deference must be given to the authority of
the President to control and supervise executive policy making."); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, Local 1622 v. Brown, 645 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Within the range of
choice allowed by statute, the President may direct his subordinates' choices.").
654.

See supra notes 122, 273, 339 and accompanying text; Yoo et al., supra note 23, at 81.
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" 55
construed as displacing the agencies' responsibilities delegated by law., o
Even opponents of the unitary executive theory recognized that the
regulatory review program did in fact have a direct impact on regulatory
outcomes and represented one of the most sweeping invocations of the6
unitary executive yet seen, in spite of strong congressional disapproval.
David Lewis notes:

[I]n response to President Reagan's subjection of all new
regulations to cost-benefit analysis beginning in 1981, Congress
attempted in 1986 to defund the agency responsible, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). After extracting what
members believed to be concessions from the OMB and the White
House, Congress relented in its attempts. Ambiguities in the
agreement, however, led to continued conflict between the
legislative and executive branches over the regulatory review
657
practices of the OMB.
During his second term, Reagan designated Meese to lead the Justice
Department by appointing him Attorney General. Meese became very firmly
committed to the theory of the unitary executive as well as to the authority
and duty of all three branches to interpret the Constitution. As mentioned
above, Meese explicitly questioned the constitutionality of independent
agencies in a major speech,
which was widely noticed at the time.6 5 He
also made a speech defending departmentalism-the notion that all three
branches of the federal government are co-equal interpreters of the
66
0
Constitution-that was worthy of Thomas Jefferson or Abraham Lincoln.
Meese's so-called Tulane speech defending departmentalism is every6 61bit as
ringing as Abraham Lincoln's similar speech responding to Dred Scott.
Reagan was decisive and personally in charge when it came to most
matters of policy. When the question arose whether to invade and liberate
the tiny Caribbean nation of Grenada, Reagan tersely ordered his joint chief
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of staff, "Do it."66 In the key arms control negotiation with Mikhail
Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland, Reagan took personal charge of the
negotiations, and when Gorbachev tried to force him to abandon the
Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan dramatically walked out of the Reykjavik
talks.6 Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was
later to mention Reagan's walkout at Reykjavik as the key moment when the
Cold War was won. 6 " Even after the disastrous Iran-Contra scandal broke,
Reagan took the decisive action of appointing a three-member board of
inquiry headed up by former Senator John Tower to investigate the scandal
and get to the bottom of what happened. Reagan was, in short, a very
decisive leader who always knew in what direction he wanted policy to go.
The historical record thus shows Ronald Reagan to be a steadfast
proponent and supporter of the unitary executive. Thus, even if one agrees
with Attorney General Smith that the Reagan Administration could have
done more to protect presidential power, Reagan's efforts on behalf of the
unitary executive certainly do not show any acquiescence in congressional
dismemberment of the unitary executive. While Reagan should not have
signed the reauthorization of the special prosecutor law, he did fight that
law and many others like it in the courts. Ronald Reagan was, like his hero
FDR, a committed proponent of the unitary executive.
IX. GEORGE H.W. BUSH
More than almost any other president, except for William Howard Taft,
George Herbert Walker Bush staunchly defended the unitariness of the
executive branch. 665 Bush was a vigorous, hands-on leader, and his attention
to detail was appreciated by the public after concerns in Ronald Reagan's
later years over his inattention to detail. As Bush's biographer, John Robert
Greene reports:
Despite Americans' latent affection for Ronald Reagan, long before
1988 they had become troubled with his hands-off, detached
approach to presidential leadership. In George Bush they found
Reagan's polar opposite. Bush's style of executive leadership was
characterized by indefatigable energy. Indeed, the words
"energetic" and "hyperactive" damn Bush with faint praise; by any
definition, he was a workaholic .... Bush's staff continually
complained (or boasted, depending on whom they were talking to)
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about the long hours and the phone calls in the middle of the
night from a boss who just wanted to talk. 66
George Bush was clearly in charge of his Administration and was very
attentive to detail. Thanks in large measure to his White House Counsel, C.
Boyden Gray, and his superb legal staff, Bush defended the unitariness of
the executive branch with almost academic rigor.
The Bush Administration began with the somewhat surprising decision
that after eight years of Ronald Reagan, it was time to clean house. Greene
reports that "[f]ar from the 'friendly takeover' that many members of the
press, and, later, one influential scholarly book viewed it to be, Bush
sounded as if he were taking the office away from a president of the other
party,."667 Greene notes that superficially the cabinet seemed to belie this
since seven Reagan cabinet members continued in the Bush Administration,
but since "Bush had absolutely no intentions of dispersing power back to the
departments, "668 what really mattered was his complete overhaul of the
White House staff. Greene notes that "[a]s the administration carried on,
cabinet meetings became more infrequent. Though he made it clear to his
staff that any member of his cabinet could see him at66 any time, Bush
reserved the policy-making role for his White House staff." (
Early on in his Administration, Bush engaged in a major battle with the
Democrats who controlled the Senate over the nomination of former
Senator John Tower to be the new Secretary of Defense. Tower had been
very supportive of Bush's career in Texas politics, and Bush stuck with him
loyally and doggedly to the very end. When Tower's nomination was finally
rejected on a 53-47 vote, it became the first cabinet nomination to fail since
the last years of the Eisenhower Administration in 1959.67 Bush immediately
recovered by appointing Dick Cheney to be Secretary of Defense in place of
Tower, and Cheney was easily confirmed. Bush's willingness to support
Tower against all the odds sent an important signal to subordinates in the
executive branch that loyalty would be a two-way street in the first Bush
Administration.
Almost immediately after his inauguration, Bush expressed his concerns
about "the erosion of presidential power. 67 1 In response to these concerns,
Bush embarked upon one of the most aggressive defenses of the president's
prerogatives the republic had ever seen. Bush used a plethora of vetoes and
signing statements to protect against any invasions of the constitutional
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672

Confronting from day one a
authority of the presidency that he perceived.
Democratic majority in both the House and the Senate, Bush realized from
the start that he was going to have to wield his veto power to great effect if
he wanted to play a role in policy-making, and in the end Bush was to
achieve astonishing success in using the veto. "fIun four years Bush vetoed
forty-four bills, and his veto was upheld forty-three times." 673 "The only
[Bush veto ever to be] ... overridden was on the Cable Television
Protection and Competition Act of 1992." Greene reports:
As a result of his successes with the veto, Bush was able to use the
threat of it to affect how legislation was constructed. As of 25 July
1991, the White House Press Office had recorded thirty-eight
threats of a presidential veto of legislation; the 75vast majority of the
legislation on the list did not ever become law.1
In this way, Bush was able "to put a conservative cast on legislation that was,
in its original
form at least, marked by the liberal slant of the Democratic
676
Congress."
Perhaps the most important example for our purposes is the Ethics in
Government Act, which was scheduled to expire in 1992. In a speech, Bush
indicated that he would veto any extension of the independent-counsel
677
statute unless significant changes were made . 7 At a luncheon with
the Bush
reporters, Attorney General William Barr reiterated
Administration's dissatisfaction with the Act and confirmed the likelihood of
a veto of the proposal then pending before Congress.678 This veto threat,
when combined with a filibuster organized by Senate Republicans, doomed
the reauthorization legislation and "caused the Act to lapse."6 79
Bush undertook other steps to assert control over his Administration.
For example, Bush charged that permitting executive agencies to present to
Congress views differing from those of the Administration "infringe [d] upon
[his] constitutional responsibility to supervise my subordinates and to

672.
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ensure that the executive branch speaks with one voice."'8 Therefore, Bush
indicated that he would "interpret these provisions in a manner consistent
with [his] constitutional authority, as head of a unitary executive branch, to
resolve disputes among [his] subordinates before their views are presented
to the Congress." 68 1
Bush also protested that statutes purporting to prohibit the president
from changing any decisions made by executive officials "must be
interpreted in light of my constitutional responsibility, as head of the unitary
executive branch, to supervise [his] subordinates.
Bush raised similar
objections to statutes that attempted to guide the manner in which he
controlled the executive branch.6 3 As Bush noted, "[w] hen a member of the
executive branch acts in an official capacity, the Constitution requires that I
have the ultimate authority to supervise that officer in the exercise of his or
her duties."68 4 Clearly, if any president aspired to a "zero-tolerance" policy
with regards to infringements on the unitary executive, it was Bush.

680. Statement on Signing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
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(Oct. 24, 1992), in 1992 PLB. PAPERS 1962, 1963; see also Statement on Signing the Treasury,
Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993 (Oct. 6, 1992), in 1992 PUB.
PAPERS 1766, 1767 (objecting that provisions concerning regulatory review by OMB "could be
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684. Statement on Signing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, supra
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The Bush Administration also backed up these words with action. It
ignored the failure of the Reagan Administration's challenges to the
Comptroller General's role in executing the Competition in Contracting
Act 6s5 and disregarded the fee-recovery provision of the Act for similar
reasons.6 Furthermore, the Bush Administration pressured Congress into
enacting a version of the Whistleblower Protection Act that omitted the
constitutionally objectionable features that led Reagan to pocket veto the
initial version. 68' Specifically, the revised Whistleblower Protection Act
dropped the previous attempt to give the Office of Special Counsel
independent litigating authority. As Bush noted in his signing statement,
this change
addresse[d] the chief constitutional concerns raised by earlier
versions of this legislation. The most substantial improvement in
the bill is the deletion of provisions that would have enabled the
Special Counsel, an executive branch official, to oppose other
executive branch agencies in court. Under our constitutional
6
system, the executive branch cannot sue itself. 88
The amendment also resolved another problem with the original legislation
by providing that any materials submitted by the Office of Special Counsel to
Congress would be submitted "concurrently" to the President, dropping the
clause providing that such materials would be submitted without the
President's review. 9 Bush's signing statement construed these provisions in
a manner consistent with the unitary executive by stating, "I'do not interpret
these provisions to interfere with my ability to provide for appropriate prior
review of transmittals by the Special Counsel to the Congress. " 69°
Bush also asserted his control over the executive branch by continuing
the regulatory review program established by Executive Orders 12,291 and
12,498 during the Reagan Administration. Bush supplemented these
Executive Orders by creating an interagency task force known as the Council
on Competitiveness, which was charged with coordinating regulatory policy
and mediating disputes arising between OIRA and the agencies during the

685. See supra notes 640-42 and accompanying text (noting Reagan's various challenges
statutes attempting to vest executive authority in the Comptroller General).
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687. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16; seeKmiec, supra
note 546, at 343-44 (quoting Harmon, who asserted that Congress did not have the fight to put
limitations on the president's executive authority).
688. Statement on the Signing of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (Apr. 10, 1989),
in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 391, 392.
689. § 3(a) (13), 103 Stat. at 28.
690. Statement on the Signing of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, supra note 688,
at 392.
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regulatory review process. 69 ' Through this mechanism, the Bush White
House was able to exert its control over the entire executive branch in an
extremely effective manner. David Lewis reports that the Council on
Competitiveness so irked Congress that in "1992, the House voted to delete
funding for the salaries of staffers on the council,692but the Senate restored
the funds when President Bush threatened a veto.
The Council on Competitiveness's effectiveness is especially evident, for
example, in one incident when Bush partially overruled both OMB and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In this instance, Bush approved a
modification to food labeling requirements proposed by the FDA over
OMB's objections, but changed the substantive scope of the FDA's proposed
exempting restaurants in partial accommodation of OMB's
rule by 69
concerns. 6 It would be a mistake to construe Bush's willingness to
compromise as suggesting that the decision was anyone's but the president's
to make. As FDA Commissioner David Kessler acknowledged, "If the
decision went against me, I could not disobey an order from the President.
694
For me as a political appointee, the only response to defeat was to leave."
Indeed, when Deputy Chief of Staff Bob Zoellick informed Kessler of the
final outcome, he flatly stated, "This is the President's decision."69 5
It is true that Bush found himself unable to mandate the solution
initially preferred by OMB. Bush noted with some surprise, "I can't just
make a decision and have it promptly executed, that the Department can't
696
just salute smartly and go execute whatever decision I make." Some critics
of the unitary executive have mistakenly taken this statement as a reflection
of limitations on the president's sole authority to execute the law.6 97 Closer
inspection reveals any such conclusions to be erroneous. Bush's inability to
impose OMB's proposal did not reflect any substantive restrictions on the
president's authority to execute the law, but rather stemmed from the fact
that changes of the magnitude proposed by OMB would have to be
subjected to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative
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Procedure Act, which would delay the decision by at least six to eight weeks
698
and leave the final decision to the Clinton Administration.
Bush also attempted to assert his control over the independent agencies
when he directed the U.S. Postal Service to withdraw its suit against the
Postal Rate Commission "pursuant to the President's authority as Chief
Executive and his obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed." 99 Bush backed up his order by threatening to remove members
of the Postal Service's Board of Governors who refused to go along with his
70
order. 7' ° That the courts eventually refused to back up Bush's order ' does
not blunt the fact that the Bush Administration's position did represent a
strong assertion of the unitariness of the executive branch.
There was one major removal in the Bush years, and it involved
Governor John Sununu, Bush's first White House Chief of Staff. Although
brilliant and dedicated, Sununu ultimately became a big liability to Bush.
George W. Bush and Andrew Card, Sununu's deputy, ultimately persuaded
Sununu that Bush wanted him to resign, and he finally did so on December
3, 1991. There is no question that the resignation was a forced one, for the
angry Sununu did not want to leave.
In addition, Bush continued the pattern of presidential opposition to
the legislative veto as an impermissible violation of the separation of
702
Accordingly, Bush announced that he would "treat [legislative
powers.
vetoes] as having no legal force or effect in this or any other legislation in

KESSLER, supra note 694, at 68.
699.
Memorandum of President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon (Dec.
11, 1992), quoted in Devins, supra note 665, at 1045.
See Devins, supra note 665, at 1043-46; Lund, supra note 595, at 79--82.
700.
701.
The D.C. Circuit ruled against the Bush Administration's arguments on all counts,
enjoining the removal of the members of the Board of Governors and holding that the Postal
Service had the authority to bring suit against the Postal Rate Commission despite the
President's contrary wishes. Mail Order Ass'n v. USPS, 986 r.2d 509, 527 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

698.

Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
702.
Appropriations Act, 1993 (Oct. 5, 1992), in 1992 PUB. PAI'ERS 1756, 1757; Statement on Signing
the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, supra note 683,
at 1767; Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1992 (Oct. 28, 1991), in 1991 PUB. PAPERS 1349, 1350; Statement on
Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991 (Nov. 5,
1990), in 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1558, 1559; Statement on Signing the International Narcotics Act of
1989 (Dec. 13, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1698, 1699; Statement on Signing the Intelligence
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990 (Nov. 30, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1609, 1611; Statement
on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1990
(Nov. 3, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1448, 1449; Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Nov. 5, 1990), in 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1553, 1555; see also 16 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel, 18 (1992) (preliminary print); 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 37, 38 (1990)
(preliminary print). Despite Bush's attempt to object to every legislative veto, Reagan and Bush
reportedly signed more than two hundred new legislative vetoes into law after Chadhaand often
Vetoes, supra note 96, at 288; Lund, supra note 595, at
complied with them. See Fisher, Legislative

THE UNITARYEXECUTIVE
Although the Bush Administration did enter into at
which they appear.
least one informal agreement with Congress that would have had much the
same effect as a legislative veto, such informal arrangements did not raise
the same constitutional concerns as true legislative vetoes."0 5
But even an administration as vigilant about protecting presidential
power as Bush's occasionally failed in its duty to protect the unitariness of
the executive branch. When Congress enacted a statute permitting members
of Congress to exercise control over the management of Washington
National and Dulles Airports, the Bush Administration failed to challenge its
constitutionality before the Supreme Court when given the opportunity to
706
do so.
The Bush Administration did not suffer for its mistake, as the
Supreme Court nonetheless struck down the legislation in part because it
represented an impermissible exercise of executive power by members of
the legislative branch.70 7
The Bush Administration's failure to defend the unitary executive in
this one regard simply underscores the propriety of requiring that a
presidential practice be systematic, unbroken, and long standing before it
can form the basis for inferring acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate
construction. It should not undermine the other, ample evidence that
President Bush determinedly defended the President's authority to execute
the laws throughout his Administration and that he almost invariably acted
to protect the unitariness of the executive branch against any and all
congressional attempts to encroach upon it.
The Bush Administration ended with some extraordinary Christmas
pardons of leading figures being investigated in the Iran-Contra probe
headed up by independent counsel Lawrence Walsh. Among those
pardoned were Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense to
President Reagan. The Walsh investigation was seen by the first President
Bush and by most Republicans as being a partisan, vindictive witch hunt.
Indeed, it is fair to say that Republicans saw the Walsh investigation as an
703. Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1990, supra note 702, at 1449; see also Statement on Signing the Department
of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, supra note 702, at 1559;
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Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, supra note 683, at 1767.
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abusive prosecution in the same way Democrats later viewed Kenneth Starr's
investigations of President Bill Clinton.
President Bush's pardons of Weinberger and others for all practical
purposes ended the Walsh investigation dead in its tracks. These pardons
showed the first President Bush's determination not to let a court-appointed
independent counsel interfere with the presidential power to see to it that
the laws were faithfully executed. The Christmas pardons were thus a
triumph for the unitary executive. They allowed the President to reassert
executive power over the Walsh investigation that the Ethics in Government
Act had wrongly taken away from him.
X. WILLIAMJ. CLINTON
Although Bill Clinton has emerged as one of the most controversial
presidents of the twentieth century, 7°s all agree that Clinton's intelligence
and knowledge of policy-making details was very impressive. Joe Klein,
Clinton's biographer, notes that the president's staff was awed by:
Clinton's intelligence-particularly, his encyclopedic knowledge of
policy questions-his perseverance and his ability to charm almost
anyone under any circumstances; he was, without question, the
most talented politician of his generation. At close range, his skills
could be breathtaking: He was always the center of attention; he
filled any room he entered .
Klein adds that Clinton "seemed to know everything there was to know
about domestic social policy. ", ; ° Others echo these conclusions with regard
to Clinton's knowledge of policy-making details. Klein quotes one observer
as saying that Clinton was "U]ust remarkable.... You call him up and ask,
'Who's doing interesting things in housing?' And he can tell
you what
711
everyone is doing-every last housing experiment in every state."
Harold Varmus, Clinton's Director of the National Institutes of Health,
remembered Clinton grilling "AIDS researchers for several hours, asking
questions so detailed and sophisticated that most of the participants were
shocked by his mastery of the issue."71 Clinton seemed to promise so much
with "his intelligence and remarkable political skills, . . . his detailed
knowledge of almost every government activity,.., his very presence. " M In
708. SeeJames Lindgren & Steven G. Calabresi, Rating the Presidents of the United States, 17892000: A Survey of Scholars in Political Science, Histoy, and Law, 18 CONST. COMM. 583, 591-92
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sum, there can be no doubt about the force of Clinton's intelligence or
about his mastery of the details of policy-making.
In addition, Clinton was an unusually hard-working president who was
deeply immersed in the policy-making details of his Administration. Clinton
demanded total control over the workings of the executive branch-and this
attitude filtered into his decisions in appointing and dismissing as well as
controlling subordinates:
Clinton's problems stem not from his oft-reported love of detail,
but also from his desire to reach down into his administration to
make minor decisions best left to others. Consider the delays in
filling important jobs in the administration. Clinton demanded
that he be involved in "signing off on the appointment of every
assistant secretary, and sometimes deputy assistant secretaries." The
desire to be involved in every level of administration and in the
many detailed debates of his policies reflects more than a quest for
excellence; it suggests a need for control .... By setting up a
freewheeling staff system without clear lines of authority, by
allowing lines of authority to be blurred, and by attempting to act
as his own chief of staff, Clinton not only retains a large measure of
control but remains the focus and the center. By appointing a
cabinet that reflects both strong left-of-center leanings (Donna
Shalala, Henry Cisneros, Robert Reich) and strong moderate
leanings (Lloyd Bentsen, Janet Reno), Clinton has done more than
ensure he will get conflicting views; he has set himself as the center,
as the person to be convinced, the person toward whom all debate
is addressed. 14
Both Bill and Hillary Clinton "have a greater need than is good for
them to have people around them whose loyalty-and lack of
independence-wasn't in question. 7 15 When it came to selecting his first
chief of staff, "[f] riend after friend of Clinton said Clinton didn't want aJim
Baker (Reagan's strong, and cunning Chief of Staff). He wanted someone
with whom he was utterly comfortable, whom he could completely trust, who
"to his
had no agenda of his own, and who wouldn't get in his way" because
7 16
own great detriment, Clinton wanted to be his own Chief of Staff.,
In addition, Clinton did not hesitate to exercise his authority to remove
executive officials. In October 1993, following a major battle in Somalia and
a serious blunder in Haiti, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and
Secretary of State Warren Christopher both offered to resign, but Defense
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Secretary Les Aspin, who was "less prompt with his tender, was the one who
was asked to leave. 717 The effective dismissal of Les Aspin was probably the
most visible removal of the Clinton Administration.
In addition to determining the composition of his Administration,
Clinton meticulously protected the executive from infringements of
constitutional power throughout his term when signing legislation into
law.718 Moreover, he employed a wide array of institutional arrangements to
ensure that he retained control over the execution of the law, which have
been superbly documented in a recent article in the Harvard Law Review by
719
Dean Elena Kagan, who previously worked on Clinton's White House staff.
For example, Clinton left the system of OMB regulatory oversight instituted
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations largely intact. Specifically,
Clinton continued to require agencies to participate in a regulatoryplanning process and to submit major regulations for OMB review. 720 After
the criticism leveled by Democrats at OMB involvement in the regulatory
process, 721 that Clinton would continue this program might be regarded as
something of a surprise. Clinton did institute some changes in the program
to mitigate the more deregulatory bent of the Reagan-Bush program of
regulatory review. Although Clinton's scheme continued to evaluate rules
through the lens of cost-benefit analysis,7 22 it broadened the inquiry to allow
consideration of other" 7 factors, such as "equity," "distributive impacts," and
"qualitative measures. 23
In addition, the Clinton program regularized many of the procedures
surrounding regulatory review, requiring disclosure of all ex parte contacts
and written communications between OIRA and the agency, 1 4 and placing
limits on the time available for OMB review. 72 ' The executive order
implementing the scheme also listed as one of its goals the "reaffirm [ation
of] the primacy of Federal agencies in the regulatory decision-making
process" and averred that "the regulatory process shall be conducted...

717. Id.at 73.
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United States.").
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to the discretion that has been entrusted to the Federal
with due "7regard
6
agencies. 2
What did not change was the commitment to the unitariness of the
executive branch underlying the institution of OMB review. Clinton's
executive order clearly put the president in the position of resolving any
727
"At the end of this
interagency disputes that emerged from OMB review.
review process, the President, or the Vice President acting at the request of
the President, shall notify the affected agency... of the President's decision
with respect to the matter. 7 21 Centralized regulatory planning and oversight
continued to give the president a powerful tool for exercising control over
his administration. Moreover, the decision to make the president the person
to resolve7 29any conflicts "constituted a striking assertion of executive
authority."
Indeed, although centralized regulatory review was criticized as a largely
Bush
and
Reagan
the
during
institution
deregulatory-oriented
Administrations, the experience under the Clinton Administration revealed
that its importance transcended mere partisan politics. Instead, it is driven
by the more fundamental and enduring issue of the proper balance of
power within the federal government and the most effective way to ensure
effective execution of the law.
In some ways, Clinton expanded the regulatory review process far
beyond that employed by Reagan and Bush. For example, unlike Reagan,
who asserted that he had the authority to include the independent agencies
73
Clinton
within OMB review but declined to do so as a matter of discretion,
planning
regulatory
in
the
to
participate
agencies
required the independent
process.73 1 Policies proposed by the independent agencies that were in
conflict with other agency action or "the President's priorities" would be
733
Clinton's belief in the
required to participate in "further consideration."
president's authority over the independent agencies was also evident in his
response to legislation turning the Social Security Administration into an
independent agency headed by an Administrator who was removable only
for "neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." 733 When signing the bill into
the removal provisions raised significant
law, Clinton noted 7that
34
constitutional questions.
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Clinton also sent letters to the independent agencies requesting that
they take action on particular issues, although it has been suggested that
these communications more resembled requests than orders from the head
of the administrative state. 5 As Kagan notes, the inclusion of the
independent agencies within the regulatory planning process "signified a
strong commitment to presidential oversight of administration" that
exceeded even that asserted under Reagan.7 6
Clinton also demonstrated his support for the president's authority to
implement the laws by issuing directives to other federal officials about how
they should exercise their discretionary authority across a wide range of
areas."' In short, "[tihe President... asserted his right as head of the
executive branch to determine how its internal processes and constituent
units were to function."7 38 Although both Reagan and Bush had employed
this device in the past, Clinton took it to a completely different level. Not
only did Clinton issue many more such directives than did any of his
predecessors, 7s 9 but Clinton's interventions also went far beyond the
managerial issues that had previously been the subject of such directives,
such as the administration of the national park system, the armed forces,
and federal contracting. Instead, Clinton's orders had a broad impact on
nongovernmental actors and rights customarily viewed as private. 40 Such
authority was extremely helpful with respect to issues that transcended the
classic departmental boundaries or required significant coordination7 4 1 and
Presidential authority became all the more important after the Democrats
lost control of Congress.742 Clinton's domination of the lower agencies
"sa[id] something significant about the nature of the relationship between
the agencies and43 the President-to say that they were his and so too were
7
their decisions."
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See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2308-09.
736. Id. at 2288; see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 721, at 29 (arguing that the inclusion
of the independent agencies within the Clinton regulatory review scheme was driven in part by
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judgments made by independent agencies").
737. See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2282-84, 2292, 2303--06 (detailing instances of presidential
direction of federal policy in a wide range of areas, including health care; firearms regulation;
nondiscrimination with respect to sexual orientation, parental status, or genetics; labor policy;
energy and environmental policy; child support; youth smoking; and family leave).
738. Id. at 2292.
739. Kagan identifies only nine instances in which Reagan directed heads of domestic
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Clinton, in contrast, issued 107 such orders. Id. at 2294-95.
740. Id. at 2291-92.
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Clinton's close association with regulatory policy was apparent not only
in his willingness to assert control over the agencies, but also in the manner
in which he communicated those policies to the American people. As Kagan
notes:
In this administration,.., nothing was too bureaucratic for the
President. In event after event, speech after speech, Clinton
claimed ownership of administrative actions, presenting them to
the public as his own-as the product of his values and decisions.
He emerged in public, and to the public, as the wielder of
"executive authority" and, in that capacity, the source of regulatory
action.7 "
The manner in which Clinton used the bully pulpit to control the direction
of his Administration and to mobilize public support for his regulatory
program "sent a loud and lingering message: these were his agencies; he was
" 745
successes.
responsible for their actions; and he was due credit for their
Indeed, so great was Clinton's domination of his administration that one
46
Using
senator accused Clinton of "debasing the constitutional structure."
language reminiscent of criticisms leveled at Andrew Jackson, Abraham
Lincoln, and Andrew Johnson,747 Congressman J.C. Watts criticized Clinton
for "pretty much ... acting as the king of the world."748
Another major initiative launched by Clinton was the attempt to
reinvent government to be smaller and more efficient. Vice President Albert
Gore was charged with being the point man on the "Reinventing
Government" reform portfolio. 749 Klein describes Gore's involvement in the
project as follows:
The Reinventing Government project was perfect for [Gore], very
worthy if eminently vice presidential: Presidents usually have more
important things to worry about than how the government actually
works. But Reinventing Government was a particular favorite of
New Democrats, who loved the idea of a direct assault upon the
750
ancient paradigm of federal bureaucracy ....
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Many aspects of this program would prove quite successful:
The federal workforce would be reduced by about 350,000 and an
estimated $157 billion saved. Equally important, 16,000 pages of
bureaucratic regulations would be tossed-including some of the
more famous government snafus, like the purchasing regulations at
the Pentagon that resulted in $700 toilet seats and $150
hammers.5
Ultimately, however, the plan to "reinvent government" was to some degree
sidetracked by Clinton's desire for new programs in health care and
housing. That Clinton was unable to marshal the resources to carry through
the attempt to reinvent government should not be taken as any belief that
he lacked the power to do so.
It must be conceded that one low point of the Clinton Administration
from the point of view of the unitary executive came with the creation of the
2
Social Security Administration as an independent agency in 1995. 1 Given
all the extraordinary steps Clinton took to augment presidential control over
the executive branch, however, this must be seen as a relatively minor
departure in an administration that was otherwise quite committed to
executive unitariness.
The Clinton Administration ended in January of 2001 with quite a bang.
President Clinton chose to depart office after "granting 177 presidential
pardons and commutations of sentences on his last night in office." As Klein
reports:
There was a libidinous crudeness to all of this. It was a final selfindulgence, a total loss of control. Other presidents had granted
last-minute pardons, had signed last-minute executive orders, had
staged bathetic [sic] farewell tours-but the rapacious enormity of
these conceits and absolutions seemed to recapitulate Clinton's
most loathsome qualities. 5
The only bright spot about the pardons was that they showed the extent to
which, for better or worse, the Constitution puts the President squarely in
charge of the law enforcement process.
Although there is always room for disagreement as to the substance of
Clinton's policies, in retrospect his commitment to the unitariness of the
executive branch cannot be gainsaid. As Clinton himself noted toward the
end of his presidency, "I think if you go back over the whole"754reach of our
tenure here, I have always tried to use the executive authority.
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XI.

THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND THE DEATH OF THE ETHICS IN

GOVERNMENT ACT
The Clinton years also witnessed one of the most climactic moments in
the history of the unitary executive: the death of the Ethics in Government
Act and the institution of court-appointed independent counsels. This
demise began when Clinton directed Attorney General Janet Reno to
investigate allegations of improper conduct regarding the Arkansas
Whitewater Development Corporation. On January 20, 1994, Reno
appointed Robert Fiske, a moderate Republican and prominent member of
the New York Bar who had served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York during the Carter Administration, as special counsel to
investigate Whitewater.
While the investigation was underway, Congress repassed the Ethics in
Government Act, which had lapsed in 1992 at the end of the Bush
Administration because of the first President Bush's constitutionally
motivated veto threats.755 A three-judge court designated under the statute
to oversee the independent counsels immediately dismissed Fiske on the
grounds that because he had been picked by the Administration to
investigate Whitewater, he was insufficiently independent. 756 In a fateful
move, the three-judge court instead tapped Kenneth Starr, a former federal
circuit judge and Solicitor General during the Bush Administration, to be
the Whitewater independent counsel. Starr's inquiry kept expanding as
more and more new subjects opened up for him to investigate, including
firings in the White House Travel Office and even the suicide of Deputy
White House Counsel Vince Foster.
Eventually, the Starr investigation collided with a sexual harassment suit
brought against Clinton by Paula Jones, who alleged that Clinton had
exposed himself to her and had demanded oral sex after seeing her
managing the registration desk at a conference when Clinton was governor
of Arkansas. Jones sued Clinton, who claimed an executive privilege to the
effect that a sitting president is not subject to civil suit for events that took
place before he took office. This issue went up to the Supreme Court, and
the Clinton Administration's Solicitor General's office argued that the Court
should find a privilege such thatJones's suit would be postponed until after
Clinton left office. The Administration's brief began with the claim that:
To require that the President defend against private civil lawsuits in
state and federal courts during his term of office would intrude
impermissibly upon the President's performance of his
constitutional duties, in violation of separation of powers
principles. In both constitutional and practical terms, the demands
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placed upon the President under Article II are unceasing. A sitting
President cannot defend himself against litigation seeking to
impose personal financial liability without diverting his energy and
attention from the exercise of the "executive Power" of the United
States. Ajudicial order requiring the President to participate in the
defense of a private civil suit would therefore place the court in the
government in
position of impairing a coordinate Branch of75the
7
the performance of its constitutional functions.
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously against Clinton,7 8 although Justice
Stephen Breyer wrote what can best be described as a Clinton-friendly
concurrence. 75 9 One great point of amusement about the Court's opinion in
Clinton v. Jones was Justice Stevens's statement, hilarious in retrospect, that
was "highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of [Clinton's]
the case
76 °
time.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones,Jones's
attorneys deposed the President, asking him about his not-so-secret affair
with Monica Lewinsky, a White House intern. When confronted with the
Lewinsky allegations, Clinton denied under oath having a sexual
relationship with Lewinsky, which in turn led Starr to investigate charges of
perjury and obstruction of justice by the President. These charges ultimately
led to Clinton's impeachment by the House of Representatives on
December 19, 1998, and his subsequent acquittal by the Senate on February
12, 1999.
Although some scholars predicted that the Clinton impeachment would
weaken the presidency just as had the failed impeachment of Andrew
Johnson,76 ' other scholars wrote that this view overlooks a fundamental
difference between the two impeachments.1 62 Although there was certainly a
partisan element to both impeachments, as Keith Whittington has
eloquently demonstrated, "[t] he Johnson impeachment was centrally about

757.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (No. 95-1853).
758.
759.

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
Id. at 710 (Breyer, J.,concurring).

760.
Id. at 702.
761.
See R.W. Apple Jr., The Fallout of the Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at Al (quoting
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GEO. L.I. 1, 6 (2002) ("[Ulnlike the other instance-the impeachment of Bill Clinton-at the
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presidential power." 76 1 Whittington writes that the Johnson impeachment
would control
concerned
with which branch
was particularly
Reconstruction' 64 and with Johnson's conception of the president as the
direct spokesperson for tihe people and the sole head of a unitary executive
branch.76 5 The Johnson impeachment was thus in no small part a battle
between Congress andJohnson over the proper role of the presidency in the
constitutional order. Indeed, it is no accident that the "high crime" that
provided the basis forJohnson's impeachment-the removal of Secretary of
War Edward Stanton in contravention of the Tenure of Office Act of 1867was a crime that could only have been committed by the president and not
by any other individual.766 Nothing less than the very structure of the federal
government hung in the balance during theJohnson impeachment.
In stark contrast, the Clinton impeachment focused on the particular
individual holding the office of president and not the presidency itself.
Indeed, as Whittington notes, "[t]he Clinton impeachment was so
unsatisfying in part because it seemed so constitutionally unimportant." 67
Neither the president nor Congress used the impeachment process as a
platform for advancing a vision of the president's place within the
constitutional order.'68 As a result, Whittington argues that the Clinton
for the distribution
impeachment is unlikely to have significant implications 769
of power between the legislative and executive branches.
In the end, the most important consequence of these events for the
theory of the unitary executive was that it led to the Clinton Administration's
abandonment of its prior support for the Ethics in Government Act and the
whole system of court-appointed independent counsels. This was the case in
part because Clinton was by no means the only member of his
Administration to be dogged by an independent-counsel investigation. Five
members of Clinton's Cabinet were investigatcd by special prosecutors, as
many as all the Carter, Reagan, and Bush officials investigated between 1978
and 1992. 77' Thus, when the Ethics in Government Act came up for renewal
in 1999, the Clinton Administration dropped its previous support for the
Act, and the Act ultimately lapsed.
The first indication of this change in position appeared in Deputy
Attorney General Eric Holder's testimony during House subcommittee
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hearings on reauthorization. 771 Attorney General Reno offered similar
testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs about the
Act:
After much reflection and inquiry, we [at the Justice
oppose
Department]
have
decided-reluctantly-to
reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act.... In 1993, as
many of you 'know, I testified in support of the statute....
However, after working with the Act, I have come to believe-after
much reflection and with great reluctance-that the Independent
Counsel Act is structurally flawed and that those flaws cannot be
corrected within our constitutional framework ....
Our Founders set up three branches of government: a Congress
that would make the laws, an Executive that would enforce them,
and ajudiciary that would decide when they had been broken. The
Attorney General, who is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, is publicly accountable for her
decisions ....
In contrast, the independent counsel is vested with the full
gamut of prosecutorial powers, but with little of its accountability.
He has not been confirmed by the Senate, and he is not typically
subject to the same sorts of oversight or budgetary constraints that
the Department faces day in and day out. Accountability is no small
matter. It goes to the very heart of our constitutional scheme. Our
Founders believed that the enormity of the prosecutorial powerand all the decisions about who, what, and whether to prosecuteshould be vested in one who is responsible to the people. That
way-and here I am paraphrasing Justice Scalia's dissent in
Morrison v. Oson-whether we're talking about over-prosecuting or
under-prosecuting, "'the blame can be assigned to someone who
can be punished."' It was for this reason that the American
republic survived for over 200 years without an Independent
Counsel Act.772
Both the first (Archibald Cox) and the last (Kenneth Starr) of the modern
independent counsels asked Congress to let the statute die.773 Senators
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Howard Baker, Robert Dole, and George Mitchell, 7 as well as a bipartisan
array of former Attorneys General 775 and independent counsels, 776 also
called for restoring control over prosecution of senior government officials
to the executive branch.
The Clinton Administration's opposition to reauthorization dealt a final
death blow to the post-Watergate Ethics in Government Act. Republicans
still upset about Lawrence Walsh's investigation of Iran-Contra joined with
Democrats outraged by the Starr investigation of Clinton to bring an end to
the regime of court-appointed independent counsels. The statute was
allowed to lapse, and subsequent regulations gave the Attorney General the
authority to appoint and supervise executive branch special counsels
charged with investigating top government officials.
The abruptness with which support for the Act collapsed was somewhat
shocking. At the end of 1997, the statute still enjoyed broad support,
although many commentators and legislators believed some adjustments
might be necessary. By the end of 1998, political support had almost
completely evaporated.777
Thus, as we predicted in an article in 1997, 7vs the rise and fall of the
Ethics in Government Act was ultimately to parallel the rise and fall of the
Tenure of Office Act of 1867 chronicled in our prior work.779 Both statutes
were enacted by imperial Congresses at a time of great presidential
weakness: the Andrew Johnson Administration in one case and the postWatergate Carter Administration in the other. Both statutes lasted roughly
twenty years, during which time they worked ineffectively. Both statutes were
then finally repealed in a show of bipartisan determination to return to the
system of presidential removal power that the Framers so wisely bequeathed
US.
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XII. GEORGE W. BUSH
We complete our chronicle by offering a few observations about the
presidency of George W. Bush. The full history of the current
Administration has yet to be written. Given the importance of recent events
to the historical narrative of the battle between the president and Congress
for control over the administration of federal law, it seems appropriate to
offer a brief discussion of some of the major events that have already
occurred.
George W. Bush assumed the presidency under exceptionally trying
circumstances after an election that was as chaotic and controversial as the
Hayes-Tilden election of 1876. Bush entered the White House having lost
the popular vote by a significant margin and having carried one essential
state, Florida, by only a few hundred votes. To make matters worse, Bush's
victory in Florida was confirmed in what was essentially a 5-4 decision of the
Supreme Court.70 One question many skeptics raised about Bush during his
presidential campaign was whether he was a lightweight whose
administration would in fact be run by others behind the scenes. If so, the
unitary executive under Bush would have been unitary only in name.
David Frum, Bush's biographer and former speech-writer, reports that
his very first impression of Bush was that he was thoroughly in control of his
Administration. Frum reports that "[i]n that hour, Bush had settled one
thing in my mind: I could never again take seriously the theory that
somebody else was running this administration-not Cheney, not Rove, not
Card., 7 11 Vice President Dick Cheney was often identified as the man
running the Bush Administration behind the scenes because of his past work
as Gerald Ford's White House Chief of Staff and as Defense Secretary during
the first Gulf War under the first President Bush. However, Cheney's
strength depended entirely on Bush's trust in him-and he earned that trust
by subordinating himself entirely to Bush. David Frum noted:
Cheney was certainly a powerful figure within the Administration,
but those who identified him as a shadowy shogun who secretly
controlled Bush, the weak mikado, were wrong. Even on energy,
the domestic issue Cheney cared about most, Bush made the
ultimate decisions-and Cheney's views, though authoritative, were
often overridden.7 2
Despite the political controversy that accompanied Bush's accession to
the presidency, Bush emphatically endorsed the unitariness of.the executive
branch. His defense of the president's sole authority over the administration
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of the law was evident in his signing statements, in which he relied on
unitary executive theory to continue the objections raised by previous
Presidents to the legislative veto, 783 independent agencies,78 4 the insulation
inspectors general from presidential control, 7 ' and attempts to vest
78 6
executive functions in the Comptroller General. He also used his signing
statements to oppose congressional attempts to limit OMB review of
787
to control the resolution of interagency disputes, 788
regulatory initiatives,
7859
to limit the
to direct the actions of subordinate executive officers,
80
and other efforts to
president's untrammeled power over prosecutions,
micromanage executive affairs. 7 9 ' Bush also invoked the unitary executive to
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786. Statement on Signing the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOc. 1888 (Oct. 29, 2002) ("Because this provision attempts to vest executive functions in the
Comptroller General, it violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers."), On
other occasions, the President construe statutory provisions purporting to vest executive
authority in the Comptroller General as a directive to inform and confer with the Comptroller
General in the interests of comity. See Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act, supra note 785; Statement on Singing the Strengthen AmeriCorps
Program Act, 39 WEEKLY COMe. PRES. DOC. 876 (July 3, 2003).
See Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 40 WEEKLY
787.
Comp. PREs. Doe. 137 (Jan. 23, 2004); Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution, 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 225 (Feb. 20, 2003).
788. See Statement on Signing the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,
supra note 784.
789.
See Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act,
2004, 39 WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. DOc. 1732 (Dec. 1, 2003); Statement on Signing the 21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1971
(Nov. 2, 2002); Statement on Signing the Foreign Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, in 38
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1658 (Sept. 30, 2002); Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRFS. DOc. 822 (May 14, 2002).
790. See Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, 39
WEEKLY COMe. PRES. DOc. 1798 (Dec. 13, 2003); Statement on Signing the 21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, supra note 789; Memorandum on the
Congressional Subpoena for Executive Branch Documents, Memorandum for the Attorney
General (Dec. 12, 2001), in 2001 PUB. PAPERS 1509, 1510 ("Congressional pressure on executive
branch prosecutorial decisionmaking is inconsistent with separation of powers and threatens
individual liberty.").
See Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act,
791.
supra note 785 (rejecting restrictions on legal advice given by judge advocates general);
Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOc. 1453 (Aug. 5, 2004) (rejecting limits on integration of foreign intelligence
information); Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, supra note 787
(objecting limits on the detailing of executive branch personnel to Congress); Statement on
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oppose congressional attempts to limit his exercise of the president's
Commander-in-Chief and foreign affairs powers by placing limits on the
manner certain troops could be used 792 or by attempting to direct the
Administration to adopt certain foreign policy positions.79 3 In addition, the
President repeatedly insisted that congressional requests that executive
agencies submit legislative proposals 794 or reports 795 did not interfere with
Signing the Foreign Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, supra note 789 (rejecting restrictions
on the State Departments authority to protect correspondents working for Voice of Anerica).
See Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act,
792.
supra note 785; Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,
supra note 790; Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1683 (Nov. 24, 2003).
793. Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act,
supra note 785; Statement on Signing the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1795 (Dec. 12, 2003); Statement on Signing the Sudan Peace Act,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1819 (Oct. 28, 2002); Statement on Signing the Foreign
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, supra note 789; Statement on Signing the Export-Import
Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1014 (June 14, 2002);
Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, supra
note 789.
See Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act,
794.
supra note 785; Statement on Signing the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of
2004, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1518 (Aug. 9, 2004); Statement on Signing the Federal Law
Enforcement Pay and Benefits Parity Act of 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1836 (Dec. 19,
2003); Statement on Signing the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOc. 1774 (Dec. 8, 2003); Statement on
Signing the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, 39 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1744 (Dec. 3, 2003); Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2004, supra note 792; Statement on Signing the Animal Drug User Fee Act of
2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1644 (Nov. 18, 2003); Statement on Signing the National
Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2178 (Dec. 19,
2002); Statement on Signing the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2114 (Dec. 2, 2002); Statement on Signing the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2102 (Nov. 27, 2002);
Statement on Signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 2095 (Nov. 25, 2002); Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department ofJustice
Appropriations Authorization Act, supra note 789; Statement on Signing the Foreign
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, supra note 789; Statement on Signing the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Dec. 28, 2001).
See Statement on Signing the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
795.
Doc. 278 (Feb. 24, 2004); Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004, supra note 790; Statement on Signing the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, supra note 794; Statement on Signing the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, supra note 792; Letter to
Congressional Leaders Certifying Actions Responsive to Ratification of the Joint Convention on
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 39
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 692 (May 29, 2003); Statement on Signing the Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution, 2003, supra note 787; Statement on Signing the E-Government Act
of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 2174 (Dec. 17, 2002); Statement on Signing the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, supra note 794; Statement on Signing the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2092 (Dec. 2, 2002); Statement on Signing
the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, supra note 789;
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the president's ability to exert sole control over the affairs of the executive
branch. Bush also routinely included clauses in his executive orders
requiring that they be implemented in a manner consistent with "the
President's constitutional authority to ... supervise the unitary executive
staunchly protected the autonomy of the
branch."7 96 And his Administration
7
(
courts.
the
in
branch
executive
Bush's control over his own Administration was vividly illustrated during
the debate in 2001 over the federal government's policy on stem cell
research. Some presidents might have taken a poll on the issue and then,
having discovered that stem cell research was popular, allowed it. Polls did in
fact show that "two-thirds of the public favored stem cell research" as did
Statement on Signing the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1112 (July 8, 2002); Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of
2002, supra note 793.
796. See Exec. Order No. 13,361, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 2831 (Nov. 22, 2004); Exec.
Order. No. 13,346, § 6(d), 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1218 (July 8, 2004); Exec. Order No.
13,345, § 5(a) (iv), 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1216 (July 8, 2004); Exec. Order No. 13,333,
§ 3(d), 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 428 (Mar. 18, 2004); Exec. Order No. 13,313, § 3(c), 39
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1019 (July 31, 2003); Exec Order No. 13,302, § 1(e), 39 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. DOc. 611 (May 15, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,277, § 3 (b) (i) (D), 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOc. 2059 (Nov. 19, 2002).
797. Consider, for example, Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a case
concerning whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act could authorize discovery of the
process by which the Vice President and other senior advisors gathered information to advise
the President. The Administration's brief offered a detailed historical and constitutional basis
for its arguments:
Article II, section 1 of the Constitution vests "the executive Power" in the President
of the United States. In order to fulfill his executive duties, the President must be
able to consult with his advisors and to obtain their candid guidance and expertise.
Both the Opinion Clause and Recommendations Clause reflect this need and
provide specific textual foundations for the President's powers to gather
information and develop policy-and both clauses are manifestly not subject to
manipulation or interference by Congress.
Brief for Petitioners at 28-29, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004) (No. 03-475). The
brief concludes this argument in sweeping fashion:
For the reasons set forth above, the Constitution, by its textual commitment of
"executive Power" to the President and by the Opinion and Recommendations
Clauses, has struck any balance there is to be struck-the Constitution preserves
the zone of autonomy for the President in obtaining advice he seeks to perform his
duties.
Id. at 34. By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the D.C. Court of
Appeals dismissing the Vice President's application for a writ of mandamus and his attempted
interlocutory appeal. The Court found that the Court of Appeals failed to ask whether the
district court's actions in entering discovery orders constituted an unwarranted impairment of
another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties and that it evaluated the case
under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege was a necessary
precondition to the Vice President's separation-of-powers objections. 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
The decision marked a major, albeit temporary, victory for the Administration's stance on
executive privilege.
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many major donors and prominent Republicans such as Nancy Reagan. 798 If
"Bush were the puppet of his staff or his vice president that so many
journalists still believed him to be, now was the moment for him to snap to.
But he didn 't." 799 Instead, he brooded and then reached as pro-life a
position as he could under the circumstances. "Bush did not want to retreat.
He held true to his principles .... 8800
Bush's leadership ability was most dramatically on display after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Shortly after the attacks, Bush went
to New York City to see the devastation of the World Trade Center buildings
and, using "American vernacular, the plain language of the frontier," Bush
pledged to "'smoke out' the killers and 'git em' ... 'dead or alive."' 0 ' Frum
reports that from the moment of the attacks on, Bush was firmly in charge of
the situation. "Within hours of the attack, he had made two crucial decisions
80 2
that would determine the aims and conduct of the whole war [on] terror."
The first decision was to recognize that the War on Terror was a real war.
The second was to hold not only the terrorists, but also those who had aided
and harbored them, accountable for the destruction.
This latter decision came to be known as the Bush Doctrine, whereby
the President said, "[w]e will make no distinction between those who
planned these acts and those who harbor them."80 Bob Woodward
concluded that this "was an incredibly broad commitment to go after
terrorists and those who sponsor and protect terrorists, rather than just a
proposal for a targeted retaliatory strike. The decision was made without
consulting Cheney, Powell or Rumsfeld."80 4 Woodward additionally reported
that Bush was adamant that he guide the war policy. When Cheney proposed
that a war cabinet be composed that would devise "options" and then report
to the President, Bush rejected the idea outright.
No, Bush said, I'm going to do that, run the meetings. This was a
commander-in-chief function-it could not be delegated. He also
wanted to send the signal that it was he who was calling the shots,
that he had the team in the harness. He would chair the full
National Security Council meetings .... 8)-5
It is particularly noteworthy that Bush did something that no president
other than Ronald Reagan in dealing with Libya had done, and that was to
"interpret a terrorist attack as an act of war, demanding a proportionately
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warlike response." 90 By interpreting the September 11 attacks as an act of
war and holding the Taliban accountable for their support of Osama Bin
Laden, Bush showed he was fully in charge of his Administration.
One of Bush's leadership traits is that "more than either of his
immediate predecessors, he dared to discard obsolete ideas and habits and
"8 7
Many people who
adapt himself to new times and new circumstances.
David Frum
advice.
good
just
gets
he
dispute Bush's intelligence claim
responds that "Presidents are inundated by advice, and the very worst of it
often sounds as beguiling and plausible as the very best. A president who
consistently recognizes and heeds good advice will make good decisions.
And about a president who consistently makes good decisions we can say:
He's smart enough."80 8 Far from being a lightweight swayed by the opinions
of others, Bush is a heavyweight fully in control of his Administration who is
sometimes plagued by the problem of being inarticulate.
Bush's greatest domestic policy achievement was his passage of tax
cuts, 8°9 but he also took other actions of major significance that were not
widely noticed. One example is his decision not to repeal the Clinton-era
hiring protection and spousal benefits for gay
executive orders providing
81
federal employees. 0
Bush's most important action for the unitary executive came during the
development of the Department of Homeland Security: his insistence on
unilateral presidential power to fire subordinate federal employees in that
key department. This led to a major impasse between the Bush
Administration and the Democratic Senate right before the 2002 midterm
elections. Bush demanded that the Senate create his Homeland Security
Department without the usual labor rules protecting the job security of
department employees. Senate Democrats refused, and Bush, rather than
caving, took the issue to the people in the 2002 midterm election and won.
Republicans specifically won a Senate race against Max Cleland in Georgia
on the very issue of Cleland refusing to vote for Bush's Department of
Homeland Security on Bush's terms. This is significant because the fight
over the Department of Homeland Security was in essence a fight over the
removal power, and Bush fought that fight and won. This establishes that
our most recent president is just as committed to the importance of the
president's removal power as were such past great presidents as Andrew
Jackson, William Howard Taft, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan.
In addition to championing presidential removal power vis-a-vis the
Department of Homeland Security, Bush also made two very high profile
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removals that deserve note. After concluding that the economy was in
recession and that his economic team needed revamping, Bush removed his
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and his chief White House economic adviser
Larry Lindsey, and replaced them both with a new economic team. By
showing this vigor in firing two officials whose policies did not seem to be
working, Bush made it clear that he: expected results from his subordinates
in the executive branch, and that he would fire those who did not produce.
At the same time, Bush made one very high profile decision not to
remove leaders of intelligence agencies in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11 attacks. Many individuals thought that after those attacks FBI
Director Robert Mueller and CIA Director George Tenet should be fired,
but Bush retained them both. Frum's account is worth quoting at length:
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy is supposed to
have said to CIA director Allen Dulles, "If we lived under a
parliamentary system, I'd have to resign. We don't so you have to."
September 11 was a debacle that made the Bay of Pigs look like
MacArthur's triumphant landing at Inchon, yet Bush insisted that
both FBI director Robert Mueller and CIA director George Tenet
stay at their posts. In the case of Mueller, Bush's forbearance was
hard to gainsay: the FBI man had been sworn in only nine days
before September 11. Keeping Tenet was a tougher call. Tenet had
run the CIA for six years. If there was any obvious candidate to bear
the blame for the 9/11 catastrophe, Tenet was the guy.
Yet Bush protected him. Why? The very toughest decisions a
president makes are often the decisions to do nothing. When the
country's blood is running hot, and the press is twitching, and the
aides are panicking, it's tempting to quell the crisis with a bold
audacious maneuver. In the very short run, these maneuvers often
seem to work. The president is seen to be leading, and people are
so impressed that they don't ask too many questions about where
he is leading them.""
Bush was too strong a leader to be stampeded into firing George Tenet
after September 11, when he thought Tenet was not to blame for the 9/11
fiasco. Tenet was ultimately removed in 2004 because of the CIA's mistaken
intelligence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The unitary
executive is protected when presidents refuse public pressure to dismiss
capable people, which is what George W. Bush did in this particular case.
There was only one major call for a special investigation of alleged
executive wrongdoing in George W. Bush's administration. That fact is in
itself an achievement, considering the Administrations of Jimmy Carter,
Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton all had more ethics cases in their first four
811.

Id. at 190.
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years than Bush did. In Bush's case, allegations were raised that White
House Political Advisor Karl Rove had illegally disclosed the identity of a CIA
agent, thus violating federal law. Attorney General John Ashcroft initially
investigated this allegation and ultimately designated a special prosecutor,
Patrick Fitzgerald, the United States Attorney in Chicago, Illinois, to
investigate Rove.81 This appointment was done in the fashion traditionally
followed prior to the enactment of the EIGA, under which special
prosecutors such as Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski were picked, and was
widely accepted as a good and fair way ofjustly investigating the allegations.
It is noteworthy that this one investigation was well handled without the
cumbersome and unconstitutional apparatus of the Ethics in Government
Act. Had that Act been around, it is doubtful these allegations could have
been investigated as justly and secretly as is now being done.
Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft took exceptionally vigorous
measures to execute the law to protect the safety of Americans after
September 11. "The Bush Justice Department detained more than 1000
people who might have relevant information about the terror attacks," and
the Administration fought enthusiastically to exercise absolute control as to
these detentions, irrespective of the citizenship or place of capture of the
detainee.8 13 Advancing an argument reminiscent of the vision of presidential
s14
Theodore Roosevelt's
authority asserted by Abraham Lincoln in 1861,
is
Stewardship Theory,8 and Harry Truman's justification for seizing the steel
mills in 1952,1 6 the Bush Administration maintained that it did not need a
specific authorization from Congress in order to detain "enemy
combatants," since Article II gave the executive plenary authority to
detain."" Although the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Bush Administration's detention program in the landmark cases of Hamdi v.
19
the Court was able to resolve both cases
Rumsfeld I S and Rumsfeld v. Padilla,8
without having to address whether the Constitution gave the executive the
authority to pursue its detention program in the absence of statutory
authorization. 20
Support for the unitariness of the executive branch does not necessarily
require supporting the broad claims of inherent executive authority
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advanced by the Bush Administration. Even Justice Antonin Scalia, whose
dissent in Morrison v. Olson remains one of the definitive statements in
support of the unitary executive, took the view that citizens detained as
enemy combatants must be either charged with treason or be released,
absent a congressional act suspending the right to habeas corpus.
We
agree with Justice Scalia on this point and think the Administration's
doctrine of detaining citizens as enemy combatants takes the Lincolnian
view of presidential emergency powers too far. As in the Steel Seizure Case, the
Court was right in Hamdi to say that citizens cannot, be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, even if the president has
designated them to be enemy combatants in a war. As this Article has
hopefully made clear, we generally reject such broad claims of presidential
power to deprive people of life, liberty, or property in the absence of
statutory authority, although we have some sympathy for the limited, implied
protective power endorsed in Cunningham v. Neagle 2 and in In re Debs. 23
The fact the Bush Administration has made such extraordinary claims
of presidential power-claims that go way beyond a claim of control over the
removal and law execution powers defended in this Article-shows that
there has been no acquiescence in any diminution in presidential power
during the Administration of George W. Bush. The fact that at times Bush
may have pushed an overly vigorous view of presidential power that
expanded far beyond the logical boundaries of the unitary executive
implicitly confirms his determination to defend the prerogatives of the
executive branch.
CONCLUSION

We thus come to the end of our survey of the presidents during the
fourth half-century of American history, from Harry Truman to George W.
Bush. We conclude that every president between 1945 and 2004 defended
the unitariness of the executive branch with sufficient ardor to rebuff any
claims that institutions such as independent counsels and independent
agencies have been sanctioned as a matter of constitutional custom or
history. The consistency with which presidents have asserted their sole power
to execute the law is made all the more important by the Supreme Court's
recognition in INS v. Chadha 24 that the fact that every president since
Woodrow Wilson had objected to the legislative veto was sufficient to
prevent the issue from becoming an established aspect of our constitutional
order. Similar reasoning leads to a similar conclusion with respect to the
removal power and the unitary executive.
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The most important controversy during the last half century of our
history that bore on the unitary executive was the constitutionality of the
special prosecutor regime set up by the Ethics in Government Act. The key
point to appreciate about that controversy is that, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's approval of court-appointed independent counsels in
Morrison v. Olson,s25 the Ethics in Government Act was allowed to lapse in
June 1999 after both Democrats and Republicans grew to doubt its
constitutionality and whether it represented good policy. This rejection of
the Ethics in Government Act some twenty years after it was first enacted
mirrors the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act under Grover Cleveland,
which also occurred some twenty years after that statute was enacted. In both
cases, Congress experimented with unconstitutional limits on the president's
removal power, and in both cases the unconstitutional regime did not work.
The stories of the rise and fall of both the Tenure of Office Act and the
Ethics in Government Act are strikingly similar and stand as stark reminders
of the dangers that can occur when the power to execute the law is placed
outside of presidential control.
That the unitariness of the executive would reemerge as an open
constitutional question in the years between 1945 and 2004 is all the more
remarkable in light of the radical expansion of presidential power during
the post-World War II era. The rise and fall of the Ethics in Government Act
refutes the views of those who have argued that the modern Imperial
Presidency needs to be reined in by the sanctioning of greater congressional
meddling in the execution of the laws. The saga of the independent-counsel
law, and most recently of the removal power and the Department of
Homeland Security, suggest that we have not yet seen the last of the debates
surrounding the unitary executive. It is our hope that this review of the
history of presidential practices with respect to the execution of the law will
help provide the historical context for discussing the relevant legal and
normative issues.

825.

487 U.S. 654 (1988).

(71
?4/,
FE

